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Abstract 
 
The traditional notion of Western liberal democracy has in recent years been met with a barrage of 
negative criticism. Liberal democracy from both a minimalist and substantive position appears to be 
backsliding, and once more falling into what Samuel P. Huntington (1991) termed a reverse wave. The 
analysis which Huntington (1991) presented ended in an era in which liberal democracy once more 
dominated the political landscape for a third consecutive wave,  without any indication that it was 
going to  relapse. In light of Huntington’s (1991) closure, this study has attempted to continue with his 
analysis and point to the possible existence of a third wave reversal. In order to do so, this study has 
meticulously used the same methodological approach as Huntington (1991) did to highlight previous 
wave reversals. This has been done by critically discussing, with examples, the existence of those 
factors that lead to a global decline in liberal democratic practice as prescribed by Huntington (1991). 
This study attempts not only to point to the possible existence of a third wave reversal, but also to 
explain the contextual reasons behind such an increase in anti-democratic rhetoric. The application of 
Huntington’s (1991) wave theory does not explain the subjective reasoning behind the contemporary 
deterioration of liberal democracy, as his factors leading to wave reversals may be too pragmatic for 
this study. It is in this light that a second argument as brought forward by Huntington in 1996, serves 
as the contextual layer for the decrease in democratic support as it provides the basis for the 
application of a critical discourse analysis. Therefore, this study serves not only as an investigation of 
the possible existence of a current third wave reversal, but also as an analysis into the discursive nature 
of liberal democracy’s historical and future trajectory.   
 
Die tradisionele konsep van Westerse Liberale Demokrasie is in onlangse jare met negatiewe kritiek 
teegekom. Liberale demokrasie, uit beide ‘n substantiewe en onafhanklike oogpunt, blyk om agteruit te 
gaan en val tans weer in die kategorie wat Samuel P. Huntington (1991) as ‘n “ontrekkings beweging 
van liberale demokrasie” bestempel het. Die ontleding wat Huntington (1991) na vore gebring het, is 
voltooi tydens ‘n era waarin liberale demokrasie die dominante politieke vorm van organisasie was, 
tydens die derde golf verspreiding van liberale demokrasie, sonder enige aanduiding dat daar weer ‘n 
ontrekkingsbeweging van liberale demokrasie sou wees. Met Huntington (1991) se gevolgtrekking in 
ag, is hierdie studie ‘n poging om sy werk voort te sit en om die moontlike bestaan van ‘n derde 
ontrekkingsbeweging van liberale demokrasie aan te dui. Om dit te bewerkstellig, is dieselfde 
benadering en metode wat Huntington (1991) gebruik het om vorige gevalle van liberale demokrasie 
ontrekkingsbeweging uit te wys, ook noukeurig in hierdie studie toegepas. Die bestaan van dié faktore 
wat kan lei tot 'n wêreldwye daling in liberaal-demokratiese praktyk, soos voorgeskryf deur 
Huntington (1991), is krities bespreek en voorbeelde is verskaf. Hierdie studie beoog nie net om die 
moontlike bestaan van ‘n derde ontrekkingsbewiging van liberale demokrasie te bewys nie, maar ook 
om die kontekstuele redes agter so 'n toename in anti-demokratiese retoriek te verduidelik. Die 
toepassing van Huntington (1991) se bewegingsteorie verduidelik nie die subjektiewe redenasie wat 
verantwoordelik is vir die moontlike hedendaagse agteruitgang in liberale demokrasie nie en vir 
hierdie studie blyk sy faktore wat gelei het tot bewegingsagteruitgang, te pragmaties te wees. 
Sodoende word ‘n tweede argument, soos wat Huntington (1996) beskryf het, as die basis om die 
afname in demokratiese ondersteuning gebruik. Dit verskaf die basis van ‘n kritiese diskoers analise. 
Hierdie studie dien daarom nie net as n ondersoek na die moontlike bestaan van n derde 
bewegingsagteruitgang nie, maar ook om die verwarrende aard van ‘n liberale demokrasie se 
geskiedenis en vooruitsigte te analiseer. 
 
Key Terms 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
For more than a century, the world’s civilisations have been living under the dominant political and 
economic vision of the West. This is evident in the fully operational workings of international 
institutions such as the United Nations (UN), who promote an overarching global democratic order by 
advancing the facilitation of political development and ideological frameworks associated with the 
West. Institutions such as the United Nations (UN), with its Democracy Fund (UNDEF) assists in the 
spread of liberal democracy by encouraging the recognition of human rights, strengthening civil 
societies and stressing the importance of election participation. Most notably, the United Nations 
Democracy Fund (UNDEF) states that it “plays a novel and distinct role in complementing the UN’s 
traditional work – the work with Governments to strengthen democratic governance around the world” 
(http://www.un.org/en/events/democracyday/pdf/presskit.pdf).1  
 
However, it can be argued, as it has by Diamond (1996), Huntington (1996B) and Zakaria (1997) that 
the traditional notion of Western liberal democracy is disappearing and is being replaced by a third 
wave reversal. First theorised by Larry Diamond in 1996, subsequent literature on the rise of 
authoritarian nostalgia, a democratic retreat and an authoritarian backlash, has emerged, thus bringing 
liberal democracy under close scrutiny. Through a systematic analysis of these arguments, this study 
has investigated the possibility that the era of liberal democracy has been overshadowed by anti-
democratic rhetoric emanating from non-Western countries which has, as a result, set in motion the 
beginning of an epoch during which the global community will see an increase in resistance to liberal 
democracy. The traditional tenets of liberal democracy are both procedural and substantive in nature. 
Procedural democracy pertains to those activities focused on measuring how democracy works while 
substantive democracy comprises those elements which gauge the extent of living standards under the 
rule of a democratic regime.  
 
 
Substantive and procedural democracy therefore generate their legitimacy from different sources; the 
former from how agreeable the political exercise is citing “good government or the purposes of 
government” (Jackson and Jackson 2003:16), and the latter from the processes’ promised and achieved 
                                                          
1
Here it is important to highlight the presence of the word traditional’ in the UN’s agenda to advance democratic 
governance. Its practice of promoting peace stems from a Western perspective of which none of the current states in which 
the UNDEF operates in have historically conformed to. These are countries such as Afghanistan, Palestine, the Caucuses, 
the Union of Myanmar also known as Burma and lastly, Sudan.  
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deliverables; in other words, “the mechanics or procedures by which a country discusses and organises 
political differences” (Jackson and Jackson 2003:16). In other words, a country which holds relatively 
free and fair elections every five or so years is, from a procedural standpoint, democratic. Similarly, if 
that same country is able to successfully carry out its role, into which a government is voted, it can, 
from a substantive perspective be termed democratic. The dilemma in democracy’s dual nature arises 
when the procedural elements are present, but the substantive ones are not. If a country holds relatively 
free and fair elections, but the period between said elections are plagued by poor regime performance, 
corruption and human rights abuses, can that country then be labelled as democratic?  
 
The notion of liberal democracy as a global governance model is possibly coming to an end in so far as 
the structures which have held it in place appear to be eroding. The emergence of “post communist 
nationalism in China and Russia [and the] Islamic totalitarianisms” (Gilley 2010:162) could be the 
medium through which this third wave reversal has transpired. Attacks on the traditional notion of 
Western liberal democracy by autocratic states have prompted a return to the study of Samuel 
Huntington’s (1991) three wave theory, suggesting that the third wave of democracy is indeed coming 
to an end and that the start of a third wave reversal has possibly begun. In truth, Huntington’s text, The 
Clash of Civilisations (1996A), which follows The Third Wave (1991), paints a shadowy picture of the 
future of liberal democracy as we know it.  
 
Although highly criticised at the time for his discouraging predictions on the sustainability of liberal 
democracy and the West as an ideological and political hegemon, Huntington’s work has proved to 
stand as a solid foundation upon which this study can be built.  His work has questioned what can only 
be compressed as investigating the unfounded belief of “democracy’s global appeal as a characteristic 
(and characteristically naive) trait of Western culture rather than as a universal truth” (Kurtz 2002). 
Moreover, Huntington’s previously criticised forecasts and theoretical analyses have in recent times 
proven to have been unquestionably valid, in so far as to say that his argument in The Clash of 
Civilisations (1996A), might perhaps have been with substance and genuine insight.  
Indeed, scholars such as Kurtz (2002) ask how Huntington was able to predict the future, and identify 
problems that would ultimately affect the landscape of global politics as we know it today. 
Huntington’s ability to recognise that which others have failed to observe, has subsequently 
encouraged a further examination of his work, based on contemporary examples which only function 
as reinforcements for the continual legitimacy of his arguments. Be that as it may, proving the current 
relevancy of his earlier foresight will stand as ultimately futile unless this study is able to suggest the 
existence of an ideological alternative. That is, liberal democracy cannot be replaced by nothingness, 
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which Diamond (1996) argues is one of the reasons for democracy’s success, because there is no 
efficient substitute. Thus, if it is to be proved that the era of liberal democracy is disappearing, then 
theoretically, a viable replacement must exist.  
 
One must remain cautious when arguing that the presence of a rational proxy to liberal democracy will 
take control of the political stage, because even the most “profound thinkers of the twentieth century 
have directly attacked the idea that history is a coherent or intelligible process” (Fukuyama 1992: xiii). 
With that in mind, this study seeks not only to conduct an analysis as to whether a third wave reversal 
is currently underway, but also to investigate whether there exists an increasing support for any 
possible political alternative/s. Like Fukuyama (1992), who warned against the subjective nature of 
mankind in relation to his political history, Schumpeter (1942) fifty years earlier, stressed that 
“ultimate values – our common conceptions of what life and what society should be – are beyond the 
range of mere logic” (Schumpeter 1942:251).  
 
The present study has been built upon an all-encompassing foundation of theoretical frameworks, 
provided by recognised and long-standing authors on democracy such as Huntington (1991, 1993 and 
1996), Diamond (1992 and 1996), Di Palma (1990), Lipset (1959), Schumpeter (1942),  and Moore 
(1965), and has therefore based its observations on theory which gives substance to the analysis in 
relation to relevant examples, instead of providing an absolute and clear-cut response to every counter 
argument. It is therefore the intention to illustrate, after an objective investigation, that the predictions 
of previous texts, do in fact stand as relevant in the current context. If they did not, there would be no 
justification for a study such as this, to have been carried out.  
 
Thus, in order to enable the relevancy of Huntington’s work to achieve recognition in relation to this 
study, it is imperative that a breakdown of liberal democratic history must first be conducted. This 
must be done in order to understand the historical personality of the key component of this study; 
namely that of previous rises and falls of Western liberal democracy, and how underlying factors 
played a key role in each instance. 
 
The Context of the Study 
 
In his book The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century (1991), Samuel 
Huntington analyses the transition of once non-democratic states to democratic political systems. He 
highlights three waves of democratisation dating as far back as 1828 while conducting an analysis for 
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the reasons behind each push toward democratic status, and the consequent reversals that caused other 
states to regress toward non-democratic status. Doorenspleet (2000:384) explains that a wave is 
“defined as a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occurs within a 
specified period of time and in which those transitions significantly outnumber transitions in the 
opposite direction”. While Huntington (1991:15) states that “history is messy and political changes do 
not sort themselves into neat historical boxes” he is able to identify a pattern providing some 
measurable data as to why states democratise in the first place, why some are able to enter into the 
transition and successfully achieve some form of democratic consolidation, and why other countries 
revert to government policy that is authoritarian in nature.  
 
By conducting a historical analysis, Huntington (1991) thus illustrates three waves of democratisation 
and notes that the first wave, which occurred between 1828 and 1926, was largely due to the historical 
events of the Enlightenment, followed by the American and French Revolutions. He claimed that the 
development of democratic institutions such as the emergence of a larger and more politically engaged 
electorate, combined with a reformed executive, would serve as a starting point for the entrenchment 
of liberal democratic ideals. The Age of Enlightenment began to undermine previously entrenched 
norms and values surrounding culture, religion and ultimately traditions that surrounded the 
relationship between the state and society. Civil liberty, freedom and open dialogue on the sources of 
social and political power were among the tenets of this period.  
 
Similarly, the aspect of popular politics in France, which fought against the sovereignty of tyrants, 
feudal lords and the struggle between classes, had a tremendous subsequent influence upon the socio-
political history of Europe. The French Revolution gave birth to the belief that in a liberal and stable 
society, the will of the citizens and not the nobles or clergy, should structure the institutions and 
determine the legislature under which the masses lived; in North America, tension between the 
Northern and Southern parts was rising as a result of 2000 anti-slavery societies and Abraham 
Lincoln’s attempts to abolish slavery due to the political engagement of North America’s people.  
 
Hence, within the boundaries of Europe and North America, the foundations for contemporary 
Western liberal democracy had been laid; and as they “expanded beyond the immediate periphery and 
moved into the twentieth century, demonstration effects were joined by a new force, namely the direct 
exportation of democracy by democratic powers with global, regional, or colonial clout” (Di Palma 
1990:18). In contrast, the First World War initiated the rise of the first reverse wave which occurred 
between 1922 and 1942, as well as the economic recession that followed in 1929 and the inability of 
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those fledgling democracies to survive through the anti-democratic expressions that flooded the 
political world during Hitler and Mussolini’s regimes. The internal dynamics of Germany and Italy 
would transcend national borders, and inspire political sentiment in other countries such as Spain, 
while even in England, America and Australia, influential businessmen and political leaders helped to 
support them.
2
  
 
The second wave of democratisation which began in 1943 and ended in 1962 was a reaction to what 
Huntington perceived as external pressure from the Allied occupation of Europe after World War 2, in 
so far as the “record of democratisation shows that just about the easiest, almost surgical, method of 
replacing...dictatorships with democracy has been war and occupation” (Di Palma 1990:32). The 
dictatorships of Germany, Italy, Japan and Austria came after war and defeat, eventually transformed 
into functioning liberal democracies. These countries offer as examples of the argument that military 
defeats turn dictatorships into democracies.  
Similarly, South Korea and later Turkey, Greece, Uruguay, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru all 
inaugurated and promoted the implementation of democratic institutions. Meanwhile, the end of 
colonial rule saw the emergence of new states and subsequent democratic institutions being formed as 
the need for self governance was finally fulfilled following the moral obligation by the colonial powers 
to participate in the decolonisation exercise. Be that as it may, the second wave began to reverse by the 
late 1950’s as the Orient and Africa moved towards authoritarian rule. Not only did the rise of 
dictatorships and the numerous coups d’états largely emerge out of an environment where political 
legitimacy was overshadowed by the insatiable and oftentimes irrational need for power, but it was 
also a consequence of those in charge having no track record or experience in governance to begin 
with.  
 
This combination left many African states in a vulnerable position, torn between having to meet 
massive challenges as laid out by their colonial predecessors and follow suit in the democratic process, 
and being unwilling to relinquish power as a result of their oppressive colonial heritage.
3
 According to 
Huntington (1991), thirty-three other African countries that became independent between 1956 and 
1970 became authoritarian with independence or very shortly after independence, citing that the 
“decolonisation of Africa led to the largest multiplication of independent authoritarian governments in 
                                                          
2
 Some of the primary and more famous Americans and companies that were involved with the fascist regimes of Europe 
were Joseph Kennedy, Charles Lindbergh, John Rockefeller, Andrew Mellon (head of Alcoa, banker, and Secretary of 
Treasury), DuPont, General Motors, Standard Oil (now Exxon), Ford, ITT, Allen Dulles (later head of the CIA), Prescott 
Bush and National City Bank. http://www.rationalrevolution.net/war/american_supporters_of_the_europ.htm 
3
 In Africa, the only country to ever be able to consistently maintain democratic order was Botswana, even though it too, is 
characterised by what can ultimately be defined as a one-party regime (Huntington 1991:20). 
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history” (Huntington 1991:20-21). In the Orient, the imposition of martial law in Pakistan and the 
procedures implemented by Syngman Rhee to undermine democracy in South Korea were evident in 
the 1950’s.4  
 
In Indonesia, the military ended democracy in 1965 by overthrowing the government and in India, 
Indira Ghandhi suspended democratic practices and declared emergency rule. The third wave of 
democratisation which began in 1974 saw the longest period during which liberal democracy spread, 
emerging as a result of the need for a stable political environment. It began with the Carnation 
Revolution in Portugal during which Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano was overthrown by the military, 
subsequently changing his authoritarian dictatorship in to a democracy.  
 
Similarly, modernisation and economic development promoted the formation of informed societies, 
now educated and able to exert a social force that paved the way for active political engagement. By 
combining these two factors, a system emerged whereby “processes of diffusion and demonstration 
encouraged elites and civil society groups to press for change towards democracy” (Doorenspleet and 
Kopecky 2008:760). Since Aristotle, theorists have argued that wealthier nations housed more 
intelligent peoples, and because of their education, the population “could participate in politics and 
could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible 
demagogues” (Lipset 1959:75). As people began to be made more aware of their rights, their ideas of 
how they should and wanted to be governed were voiced; and thus the truest form of democracy was 
practiced, in which the “emergence of civic rights [was] followed by the flowering of a broader 
ensemble of social, political and economic rights” (Koelble and Lipuma 2008:4).  
 
As one democracy began to flourish and the benefits began to show, other countries were either 
pressured or freely chose to follow suit, claiming that the traditional notion of Western liberal 
democracy appeared to be the most suitable form of governance. What this study is attempting to 
illustrate is the importance of context in relation to liberal democracy. Societies need to believe in the 
system, it should be their own voices heard and their unique concerns acknowledged in order for them 
to reach a democratically consolidated phase of existence. In other words, the greatest and most 
important difference that separates the West and the remaining civilisations is an idea, and this idea 
                                                          
4
 In 1960, Syngman Rhee was succeeded by a democratic regime, but that too was overthrown by a military coup in 1961. 
Even though elections took place in 1963, it eventually evolved in to a full-scale authoritarian system by 1973 (Huntington 
1991:20).  
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has arguably, been dangerously forced upon cultures that cannot, because of historical and traditional 
reasons, relate to it.  
 
What is immensely problematic, is that the Western world has “made the mistake of calling that idea 
‘democracy’ and imagining that any country can adopt it merely by holding elections” (Ferguson 
2011:97). Democracy is the tip of a much greater structure, a societal structure that is founded upon 
the rule of law and legitimacy which is granted by the society. This is perhaps the reason why the 
remaining civilisations have proved to be reluctant to accept liberal democracy as their governing 
structure. The positive attributes of the regime’s institutions, and even a successful regime 
performance by a newly found democratic state, do not guarantee that the political culture of the 
society will adopt liberal democracy as its own.   
 
 
In many countries, as this study will show, the “adoption of Western modes of operation [is] merely a 
superficial modernisation without any cultural depth” (Ferguson 2011:16), making these societies 
virtual democracies or shadows of the colossal political regime the West has created. In 1939, Winston 
Churchill described a civilisation as an entity where “the traditions of the past are cherished... [and 
where the] central principle ... is the subordination of the ruling class to the settled customs of the 
people and their will as expressed in the Constitution” (Ferguson 2011:98).  Therefore, it is not the 
right of the West to force upon another civilisation those ideas which they do not cherish or express in 
their own legitimate ruling structure. It is in this light, that Huntington (1991 and 1996), Diamond 
(1996) and Lipset (1959) stress the notion of inclusivity, citizenship, belonging, moralistic trust and 
national unity as important prerequisites to the legitimacy of governments and their ideologies.  
 
It is only through the acknowledgement of these critical values, that true legitimacy is engendered. If 
they are not present, the structure of a newly founded liberal democracy will be weak. That is, “if a 
political system is not characterised by a value system allowing the peaceful play of power – the 
adherence by the ‘outs’ to decisions made by the ‘ins’ and the recognition by the ‘ins’ of the rights of 
the ‘outs’ – there can be no stable democracy” (Lipset 1959:71). In this study the myriad of specific 
conditions that give democracy its legitimate definition have not been neglected. It is argued however, 
that without acknowledging the importance of political culture, the practice or implementation of 
liberal democratic theory will be fundamentally flawed.  
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The recognition of democracy’s institutions is one step in a very complex process, and relies heavily 
on regime performance and ultimately the ideas of the society in which liberal democracy is being 
adopted. Any country can hold elections, and in that regard many have; but comparatively few have 
achieved democratic consolidation. Here, the crucial dynamic between the procedural and the 
substantive is what needs to be studied in order to find the answer whether and why liberal democracy 
is possibly experiencing a third wave reversal. With that in mind, Huntington (1991) is able to chart 
the symptomatic relationship between “political democracy [and] historical development” (Huntington 
1991:27), which in turn provides a plausible theoretical framework or predictive theory upon which 
this current analysis has been conducted.  
 
Research Objectives 
 
As per Huntington’s wave theory, this study seeks to demonstrate that the international political arena 
is currently in a third wave reversal. This study will validate its argument by applying the factors that 
Huntington (1991) previously pointed to as causes of a decrease in liberal democratic sentiment, in the 
contemporary world and highlight the similarities between past reverse waves and the current reverse 
wave this study argues for. As Huntington (1991) does not provide a closing date when the third wave 
will end and thus enter a third wave reversal, it is the aim of this study to illustrate that the terrorist 
attacks which took place on the 11
th
 of September 2001 offer a relevant starting point for the beginning 
of a third wave reversal.  
 
 It is in this light that events from 2001 onwards will serve as the timeline across which this study will 
present its argument. These occurrences will be discussed under the relevant factors Huntington (1991) 
highlights as causes of reverse waves. Similarly by presenting this study’s argument through a critical 
discourse analysis, this study will be able to illustrate the influence of social and political power in 
relation to the rise and fall of liberal democracy.  
 
Delineation of the Study 
 
Recent events that have taken place in the international political arena have generated sufficient cause 
for another investigation into Huntington’s (1991) wave theory. Support for liberal democracy as a 
political institution is declining and liberal democratic sentiment around the cultural tenets upon which 
this political ideology is founded are also under close scrutiny. It is in this light that this study has 
chosen Huntington’s The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century (1991) and 
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Huntington’s The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (1996A) as its primary 
sources, in so far as both texts provide the theoretical relevance upon which a solid argument for the 
purpose of this study can be built.
5
 The central theme of this study is further based upon additional 
displays of non-democratic attitudes encompassing a universal applicability in the international arena 
by traditionally non-Western states.  
In countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia as well as in the Tiger Economies of North Korea, Russia 
and China, the seemingly ever present application of soft authoritarianism points to the fact that there 
is indeed no move toward a liberal democratic way of life, but rather that the international community 
appears to be suffering from democratic fatigue as Rupnik (2007) puts it.
6
 It is with this in mind that 
the analysis of this study has used the terrorist attacks as the starting point to the third wave reversal, in 
so far as it can arguably be seen as the most visible attack on Western culture and therefore on liberal 
democracy. That is, due to the scale of the September 11
th
 attacks and the hegemonic status of the 
United States (US), this study has chosen this instance to stand as a representative for the remaining 
Western world and what anti-democratic acts of violence have taken place in it.
7
 What further prompts 
this event to be called as the key instigator of the third wave reversal, emerges once more from 
Huntington’s (1996A) prediction of the West’s final war against Islam.  
 
Relating back to Huntington’s argument in The Clash of Civilisations (1996A), the violent resistance 
to the West by the Muslim world is a “late twentieth century fact which neither Muslims nor non-
Muslims can deny” (Kurtz 2002). Nevertheless, staunch denial of Huntington’s warnings continued to 
operate amongst academic and government circles until the 2001 attacks. This prediction, coupled with 
Huntington’s (1996A) theory on the importance of culture, then emerges as a convincing argument of 
the possible decay of liberal democratic institutions as dominant players in the world system. Because 
Huntington’s theory demonstrates the existence of a tangible foe to the West, it also prompts questions 
pertaining to the emergence of alternative styles of governance. Ultimately, Huntington attacks the 
liberal paradigm, not because of its imperialist spread, but rather because he sees its demise in doing 
so. That is, the underlying problem that the West faces is not necessarily Islam as an ideology, but 
rather of its all encompassing difference, its people have been and continue to strive for global 
authority.  
                                                          
5
 While this study does acknowledge other works produced by Huntington, it has chosen to focus specifically on his 1991 
and 1996A publications as they are directly related to the focus of this investigation.    
6
 The title of ‘Tiger Economy’ is an economic term given to any economy of a country which undergoes rapid economic 
growth within a short period of time. The prompt increase in economic growth is usually accompanied by an increase in the 
standard of living.   
7
 This study acknowledges that Europe forms a large part of the Western world as well and that countries such as the 
United Kingdom (UK), Norway and Australia were also involved in the War on Terror.  
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Thus, Western liberal democracy will fail; not because of what it does, but rather because of what it is 
– “a very simple idea that is difficult, if not impossible, to replicate exactly in the real world” (Jackson 
and Jackson 2003:16). Therefore, since the “United States is the premier democratic country of the 
modern world, and its identity as a nation is inseparable from its commitment to liberal and democratic 
values” (Huntington 1991:30), it can be argued that the 2001 terrorist attacks are an adequate 
illustration that democracy has once more been confronted by a non-Western civilisation. This is also 
most evident in the relatively obvious actions committed by other non-Western states and their leaders 
such as Kim Jong-il of North Korea, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Raul Castro of Cuba, Vladimir Putin 
of Russia, Muammar Gadaffi of Libya and Ali Khamenei of Iran. It can be argued that in 
contemporary society,  
 
“democratic transitions are now tending to take place in a climate of mobilisation and impatience, if not of 
outright violence. The benefits of gradualism and accommodation, which [has] marked the Western 
experience, [has] thus [been] lost... [and only] with a few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in 
the world may well have been reached” (Di Palma 1990:3).  
 
Rationale of the Study 
 
The direction in which Western liberal democracy once progressed has appeared to change its 
direction by moving in reverse. The failures of liberal democracy as well as the fundamental nature of 
non-Western societies have left these regions in a state of melancholy and weariness, unwilling or 
fearful of giving liberal democracy a second, third or fourth chance at development and change.  It is a 
theoretical assumption that the process of democracy works as follows; there is liberalisation, a 
democratic transition, then democratisation and finally democratic consolidation, with an 
understanding that once a country reaches another stage, it will not regress. That is, once a state is in a 
democratic transition, or is democratically consolidated, it should not from a theoretical perspective, 
revert to an authoritarian regime. The original use of the term democratic consolidation was meant to 
address the challenge of measuring regime stabilisation. It was thought to give insight into the 
important question and subsequent criticisms brought forward by authors such as Schedler (2001) who 
sought to investigate consolidation in relation to adequately measuring at what level democracies 
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needed to operate before they were deemed reasonably secure from breakdown, or in Di Palma’s 
research (1990:141) “[a]t what point…democrats [could] relax”.  
Like Schedler (2001), this study has observed that the term democratic consolidation has been 
transformed into an “obese concept that [has come] to cover the whole panoply of political problems 
third wave democracies have been confronting” (Schedler 2001:66), due in part, to the dominant 
ideological structures emanating from Western liberal democrats. The democratic fatigue, of which 
Rupnik (2007) speaks, culminates in the civic culture of a society. In fact, according to Inglehart, Foa, 
Peterson and Welzel (2008:261), “the extent to which a society allows free choice has a major impact 
on happiness”. While liberal democracy is a strong promoter of free choice and thus happiness, so too 
is the freedom to choose not to become democratic and thus happy.  
 
The progressive demise of the liberal era in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), despite its inclusion in 
the European Union (EU) as argued by Krastev (2006 and 2007) is alarming. In countries such as 
Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, theorists such as Krastev (2007:56) 
warn that the increasing acts of illiberalism by regimes that are characteristically defined as being 
populist and nationalist are in his own words “tearing the region apart”. Arguably, in the non-Western 
regions that have been analysed in this study “democracy will never be consolidated... [and] in this 
context, democratic triumphalism is not only uncalled for but dangerous” (Gilley 2010:164), owing to 
the cultural obstacles that liberal democracy seems unable to overcome.  
 
What encourages the assumption that a global democratic order will be seemingly impossible to 
achieve and which has further been elaborated in this study, is the growing relevancy of political 
culture and its relationship with Western liberal democracy.  It has been argued that “[d]emocray’s 
chances to root itself are weak...because it is a system of compromise, a set of rules for mediating 
plural and competing interests” (Di Palma 1990:40), an issue which is most notable during a 
democratic election in a country that is comprised or multiple ethnic and or culture groups. Meredith 
(2006) says: 
 
European negotiators frequently resorted to drawing straight lines on the map, taking little or no account of 
the myriad of traditional monarchies, chiefdoms and other African societies that existed on the ground. In 
some cases, African societies were rent apart... [and in] other cases, Europe’s new colonial territories 
enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups, with no common history, culture, language or religion. 
Nigeria, for example, contained as many as 250 ethno-linguistic groups. Officials sent to the Belgian Congo 
eventually indentified six thousand chiefdoms there” (Meredith 2006: 1- 2) 
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The question as to whether liberal democracy is conducive to all cultures has received growing 
attention. Political culture appears to be one of the main obstacles which nations have to overcome in 
order to achieve a political environment which is sustainable enough to experience a transition towards 
liberal democracy. Huntington (1996A) points to approximately eight civilisations that will determine 
the future of conflict, all of which he claims will be based upon a cultural contestation. He argues that 
because “culture almost always follows power.... [and the expansion of a civilisation occurs] 
simultaneously with the flowering of its culture and has almost always involved its using that power to 
extend its values, practices, and institutions to other societies” (Huntington 1996:91A), retaliation by 
the people belonging to the nation-state is certain.  
 
That is, as only one of them, namely the West, can claim ownership to the groundwork of liberal 
democracy, it can be argued that the other seven civilisations, namely the Confucian, Japanese, 
Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African will in time challenge the status quo. As 
a result, Huntington (1996A) expresses concern, that the rise of the religious Islamic state and its 
hostility towards democracy, combined with the growing strength of the tiger economies, may hamper 
any future development of Western liberal democracy. That is, an “Islamic backlash” (Huntington 
1991:283), and an economic upswing by an authoritarian state may highlight the truth that Western 
liberal democracy supports Western culture and rarely anything else.   
 
The conflict between the West’s political ideology and the external environment dictates that 
“civilisations will clash because they embody incompatible political and moral values” (Rubenstein 
and Crocker 1994:114). This motivates Huntington’s notion that there exists a fixed hostility toward 
the implementation of Western liberal democracy on foreign soil. Thus, if “certain mass attitudes are 
very strongly linked to democracy” (Welzel and Inglehart 2008:132) then it can be argued that there 
are other attitudes and social conditions which are directly opposed to it, or as Di Palma (1990) 
describes as not being suitable to its exclusive pedigree. In many cases, the imposition of Western 
democracy exacerbates issues facing troubled nations as opposed to alleviating some of the challenges 
at hand.  
 
 
 
 Such is the case in many African and Latin American countries where the practice of colonial rule and 
the Cold War brought about a subsequent rise in violent and coercive episodes of ethnic conflict, the 
emergence of Third World debt and a subsequent loss of political legitimacy as a consequence of the 
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International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP’s). The imposition of 
liberal democracy is most notable during elections in which a system of governance, that is supposed 
to represent a majority, must do so in countries where there are over 250 ethnic groups; as is the case 
in Nigeria; where the majority only constitutes 29 percent.  
 
If, as in the case of many non-Western societies, the “embrace of democracy is not anchored on liberal 
values affirming freedom and the rule of law, the foundation of regime legitimacy will remain shallow 
and fragile” (Chang, Chu and Park 2007:75), the act will ultimately lead to disappointment in the 
regime and its consequent failure. In Japan which is the region’s oldest democracy, one third of the 
population still prefers an authoritarian-style government to a democratic one (Chang, Chu and Park 
2007). In most of the region, liberal democracy has failed to win support because of its poor 
performance, stemming from the people’s “disenchantment with the gap between democratic promises 
and democratic realities” (Chang, Chu and Park 2007:77).   
 
As these societies become more frustrated by the failures of liberal democracy to solve their problems, 
as is so often promised, it can be suggested that the “next ideology to emerge then, will be in 
opposition to the West and instigated by Third World regimes that cannot cope with their effects... 
[and] in the worst case scenario, that rejection could entail a demand for leadership from an organised 
bloc of non-Western states” (Fuller 1995:145), by people craving for decisive authority over freedom, 
liberty and equality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In his paper titled The Next Ideology (1995), Fuller explains this shift toward anti-democratic 
sentiment by stating that people; 
 
...feel under particularly intense cultural pressure as systems of international marketing and communications 
create freeways for the mass import of foreign cultural materials – food, drugs, clothing, music, films, books, 
television programs, even values – with the concomitant loss of control over societies. Such cultural anxieties 
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are welcome fuel for more radical political groups that call for cultural authenticity, preservation of 
traditional and religious values, and rejection of the alien cultural antigens. Big Macs become in-your-face 
symbols of American power – political, economic and military – over weak or hesitant societies and states. 
This civilizational clash is not so much over Jesus Christ, Confucius, or the Prophet Mohammad as it is over 
unequal distribution of world power, wealth, and influence, and the perceived historical lack of respect 
accorded to small states and peoples by larger ones. Culture is the vehicle for expression of conflict, not its 
cause. (Fuller 1995:153-154) 
 
Arguably, the triumph of a civilisation should not be measured by what it leaves behind, such as Rome 
and its legacy of empires, libraries and roads, Egypt and its colossal monuments or the Incan city of 
Machu Picchu in Peru, but rather in its duration of survival. The success of a civilisation should be 
measured in terms of its evolutionary progress and the quality of life it grants to its people over this 
period. A civilisation, according to Ferguson (2011:3), is the single largest unit of human 
organisation... [that] can persist through a series of economies or societies...[and is] more amorphous 
than even an empire. It is a multi-faceted response by the human population to endure. Because of 
such a powerful dynamic, it should not be surprising that the non-Western civilisations have reacted in 
such a manner, even though at times their reactions are violent in nature. The preservation of values of 
which Fuller speaks, is the civilisation.   
 
The hostile response by other civilisations towards the Western world, is a possible attempt to ensure 
the preservation of that identity, and therefore of the civilisation’s existence. Hinnebusch (2006) 
explains how culture predominantly impacts political society on two levels. Firstly, culture “shapes 
conceptions of political legitimacy” (Hinnebusch 2006:376), in so far as the legality of the societal 
status quo is subjective. Communities consciously or otherwise choose the manner in which they want 
to be governed, arising from an entrenched cultural tradition, which can be seen as logical to one 
civilisation, but entirely irrational or nonsensical to another. What this creates is a second dynamic, 
namely that culture is all encompassing.  
When tradition becomes a way of life and loyalty to customs are resilient, it becomes immensely 
difficult for that civilisation to adopt and adapt to a diametrically opposed existence. What results from 
this enquiry is an insight into how one civilisation, namely the West, has insisted on applying a social 
existence on to seven other civilisations that have no cultural connection to Western tradition. The 
issue of globalisation and cultural hybridity does not present a strong enough argument to overlook 
Huntington’s (1996A) theory on the importance of culture and political identity. A citizen of the 
European Union (EU) does not label himself or herself as a European Unionist, but rather as a citizen 
of one of the member states. Similarly, cultural hybridity does not altogether eliminate core values 
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associated with different cultures. It is at this point that one must refer to Di Palma’s (1990) question 
“is what we call legitimacy anything more than behavioural compliance, and does it need to be 
anything more?” (Di Palma 1990:12).  
 
Political legitimacy is determined by the norms and values that are most deeply entrenched in a 
society. The French Revolution crafted a contemporary secularist state, and in doing so, any alien 
culture which acted otherwise would be seen as a threat to its future existence. Cultural hybridity can 
only progress so far before a more dominant and historically entrenched culture will either expel the 
invading group or force it to conform to its own set of rules. It is no wonder that the construction of 
active civil societies and strong political parties in Africa, Arabia, the former Soviet bloc and the East, 
have more often than not failed – their tradition does not comply with the encroaching culture. 
 
This reaffirms Huntington’s (1996A) theory that these civilisations are by their very nature, unable to 
operate under and with a democratic system in place. It was Huntington who “doubted whether 
countries without substantial Western influence could sustain a form of government that had Western 
origins” (Gilley 2010:161), which has now posed the immensely problematic scenario that perhaps 
forced “liberalisation in the Arab world, for instance, [to be] empowering not democrats but Islamic 
radicals” (Gilley 2010:161). Statistics from Merkel (2008) have shown that “institutionally 
inconsistent hybrid regimes are less stable than autocratic regimes and even less stable than democratic 
regimes...Such hybrid regimes are significantly more prone to violence, susceptible to war and in 
danger of civil war than mature democracies or stable autocratic systems” (Merkel 2008:493).  
 
What this highlights is the problem which arises when autocratic regimes are converted into 
democratic societies, but do not have the historical prerogative and or motivation to successfully 
redefine their political structures. As a result, countries such as Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire, India, China, 
Russia and Venezuela, continue to call their systems of government democratic, whilst adhering to 
only the most basic of prerequisites. The result is the creation of a political regime that is labelled as 
being a ‘soft democracy’, in which the institutions that offer democracy the foundation upon which to 
operate are managed. To understand how soft or managed democracies operate, one could imagine a 
country in which a free press exists, but where self-censorship is practised. Or, a country could have a 
fully operational judicial system, but would be influenced or out rightly made by those with power. 
Similarly, a soft democracy could have its civil rights enshrined in a constitution, but in practice, 
people could be unable to use these rights.  
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Huntington (1991:287) claims that “the perceived failures of the United States would inevitably be 
seen as the failures of democracy”. To use this statement as a foundation it can be shown how 
important this study is. If one were to combine the religious-political attack on Western liberal 
democracy with the economic recession, it can be assumed that “people about the world [have] come 
to see the United States as a declining power, characterized by political stagnation, economic 
inefficiency, and social chaos” (Huntington 1991:287). The belief or disbelief in liberal democracy 
therefore plays an important role in the survival or downfall of this Western ideology. Once so 
dominant, the economies of the West now face a looming end in the midst of a rising China, with 
Brazil, India and Russia not far behind.  
 
The political hard-power of these rising economies should also not be overlooked. The extent of 
Russia’s interest in financially contributing to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) efforts to bail 
out countries suffering from Europe’s current economic crisis, is for example closely linked to 
Russia’s overarching political interest in increasing its level of influence. Similarly, while the West 
dictates political reform in exchange for developmental aid in Africa, China undercuts them and 
promotes business on a continent where commercial exchanges are traded with military dictators, 
corrupt government officials, human rights abusers and senile tyrants. In other words if one were to 
use the United States (US) as a means to gauge the current strength of liberal democracy, then the 
failures of the United States (US) would imply the possible collapse of Western liberal democracy.  
As the West continues to be seen as the most commanding civilisation at present, the notion of the 
“prosperous, free and just society...is not possible in the long run” (Desch 2007:12). Western liberal 
institutions continue to uphold the opinion that democracy can promote peace, but the argument by 
Huntington (1996A) that future conflict will not derive from politics or economics, but by culture must 
be acknowledged. As the foreign policy of the United States (US) continues to be influenced by 
Immanuel Kant’s (1997) notion of “perpetual peace” and Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’, 
Huntington makes it appear that the idea of an established peace agreement is nothing more than a 
bogus ideal upon which Western democracies have blindly based their futures.
8
 Rather he creates a 
threatening prediction of an imminent cultural conflict that will ultimately change the current world 
order.  
 
                                                          
8
 In 1795, Immanuel Kant wrote an essay titled Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay in which he questioned how war 
and the scourge of humanity could be prevented while expressing the belief that one day global peace amongst all nations 
could be achieved (Bohman,and Lutz-Bauchmann (1997).  
 
22 
 
Furthermore, Huntington (1991:287) poses the question: What would happen if the American model 
no longer embodied strength and success and no longer seemed to be the winning model? The impact 
of liberal ideology plays a significant role in promoting its future. After the Cold War, “the pitch to 
developing countries [had] been that if they want[ed] the benefits of capitalism, they [would] have to 
become democratic” (Davies 2010:170). In such an instance, the rise of non-conformist China as an 
economic force and the increasing concern of Islamist extremism in the form of global terrorism could 
and possibly points to the reality that the political and economic decline of the United States (US) 
could mean a decline in the successful spread of Western liberal democracy in years to come.  
 
One can argue that “the real globalisation of capital and the... [rise of non Western rhetoric] must be 
considered signs of dispossession and defeat” (Hardt and Negri 2000:44) of liberal democratic values. 
This study highlights such examples of political alternatives to the traditional notion of Western liberal 
democracy because one must be able to recognise that “although all of these struggles focused on their 
own local and immediate circumstances, they all nonetheless pose problems of supranational 
relevance” (Hardt and Negri 2000:55). The future of Western liberal democracy depends on the 
willingness of each separate state to accept and adopt the West’s ideological personality.  
Arguably, more restrictive styles of political theorising are less useful in an increasingly globalised 
world in so far as the notion of community has been stretched to encompass that which Hardt and 
Negri (2000:398) describe as the “mobile multitude... [in which] the multitude is organised and 
redefined as a positive political power”, and in which older notions of international relations are 
inapplicable. Communities have become global in size and are no longer restricted to borders or to 
subjective opinions. Indeed, the multitude now exists in a realm where everyone is now the political 
and not merely a group under which the great Leviathan governs. What Hardt and Negri’s (2000) 
argument alludes to is the notion that individuals have become more involved in the realm of political 
action.  
 
This means that political thought is now being influenced by human behaviour and people’s 
motivations as opposed to adopting ‘flavour of the month’ approaches to styles of governance. There is 
to a lesser extent some global obligation to follow suit, but rather a desire to be governed why 
institutions that best meet the needs of the people, and most importantly by institutions that are chosen 
by the people. With that in mind, this study has attempted to construct a timeline which lays out 
examples of anti-democratic practices, since the 2001 terrorist attacks. It has done so in order to 
illustrate the continuation of Huntington’s (1991) initial wave analysis, firstly to justify the relevancy 
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of his theories, and secondly, to investigate as to whether or not these  events serve as justifiable 
examples that point to the possible existence of a third wave reversal. 
 
Methodology 
 
The method upon which this study is based, has applied Huntington’s (1991) wave theory in order to 
illustrate that the factors upon which Huntington (1991) built his argument, are still relevant in the 
present political context. The factors with which Huntington (1991) used to portray the causes of the 
rise and fall of liberal democracy have been used in this study to demonstrate that a third wave reversal 
is currently taking place. Thus, this study serves as a qualitative investigation into the validity of his 
theory by using current and international events. It does this by merging contemporary interpretations 
of Huntington’s (1991) theory and their relationship with political power and cultural dominance.   
Although liberal democracy is currently perceived as being the dominant ideology that shapes social, 
political and economic action of states and other political institutions, it is imperative to make 
connections and hence conclusions about the argument this study has put forward.   
The application of Huntington’s (1991) factors leading to a reverse wave which has been applied in 
this study to present evidence that the democratic paradigm is shifting toward an anti-Western era, has 
provided sufficient support for this argument.
9
 Similarly, a critical discourse analysis has underlined 
the relationship between dominance and power, most importantly, from the perspective of those 
civilisations which do not conform to the traditional notion of Western liberal democracy. This 
approach is a sufficient method of producing a critical perspective and or attitude by studying the way 
discourse can produce or recreate “social domination, that is, the power abuse of one group over 
others, and how dominated groups may resist such abuse” (Van Dijk 2002:63).  
 
By using a critical discourse analysis, this study will specifically include “the interests, the expertise 
and the resistance of those groups that are the victims of discursive injustice and its consequences” 
(Van Dijk 2002:64). An objective stance has been adopted to analyse the ethico-social norms within 
said groups and how those values are being undermined by stronger political and economic powers. 
While this study in no way assumes that Western ideology is negative, it does attempt to demonstrate 
that the stringent force with which the West has attempted to implement its ideology, has been met 
with a hostile response.  This study will illustrate that as a response to the ideological dominance of the 
                                                          
9
Managed democracy in Russia and China, an increase in Nationalist sentiment in Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and 
Europe as well as growing South-South relations are a few examples of anti-Western sentiment of which this study will 
discuss.  
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West, “democracies can be made (or unmade) in the act of making them” (Di Palma 1990:8), and is 
therefore an explanation to the current presence of a possible third wave reversal.   
 
Applying a critical discourse analysis to this study will serve to highlight the importance of political 
culture in relation to liberal democracy. Through this approach, the concept of legitimacy will be 
shown to exist, and most importantly, is derived from the society in which liberal democracy is placed. 
Developing states have had substantially less time than the West to establish their identity on the 
international arena, yet they are being forced to comply with norms and values that far surpass the 
ability of such states to manage this transition effectively. While some non-Western states have 
willingly adopted a traditionally unfamiliar style of government, they have done so with the obligation 
to manage their duties and produce results at the same rate as an established regime does.  
North America and most of Europe have had more than three centuries to ‘get democracy right’, while 
Africa for example has had at best, 60 years. Liberal democracy, capitalism and the development of 
the nation-state in the West have all had time to develop and adapt, while slowly forming a system in 
which each served to complement each other.  If this is the case, why was the developing world 
expected to adopt these radical changes and produce the same level of success, overnight? To put 
things into better perspective, in the space of approximately 300 hundred years and in the process of 
getting democracy to where it is now, Europe and North America went through numerous revolutions, 
civil skirmishes and a very near East-West nuclear showdown; not to mention two world wars – and 
for some reason, regions such as Africa were expected to develop peacefully. This is notwithstanding 
the fact that Europe and North America have a complementary historical background, thus making 
their predisposition suitable for adopting a political ideology such as Western liberal democracy.  
 
Western timeframes and those rallying for a democratic world order also do not take into account that 
not all non-Western states willingly adopted liberal democracy, but rather did so under some kind of 
political or economic duress. As a result, the “[c]comparison of evidence from other countries [has 
sought] to confirm this generalisation” (Landsman 2008:16), in so far as it has provided evidence 
either alluding to a third wave reversal or the continuation of the third wave of democracy while citing 
only “trendless fluctuations” (Doorenspleet and Kopecky 2008:702) in non-democratic sentiment. 
Indeed, that is why a critical observation into the discourse of ideology was also imperative in this 
study. Firstly, “ideologies organise social group attitudes consisting of schematically organised general 
opinions about relevant social issues” (van Dijk 1995:138). With that in mind, it can be suggested that 
if societies use these norms and values as building blocks for their culture, then what is perceived as 
relevant may perhaps be seen as irrelevant to another culture.  
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In his paper titled Structures of Discourse and Structures of Power, Van Dijk (1989) states that; 
 
[at] an elementary but fundamental level of analysis, social power relationships are characteristically 
manifested in interaction. Thus we say that group A (or its members) has power over group B (or its 
members) when the real or potential actions of A exercise social control over B. Since the notion of action 
itself involves the notion of (cognitive) control by agents, the social control over B by the actions of A 
induces a limitation of the self-control of B. In other words, the exercise of power by A results in the 
limitation of B's social freedom of action. Note, however, that this...leaves room for variable degrees of 
freedom and resistance of those who are subjected to the exercise of power. (Van Dijk 1989:20) 
 
The social, political and economic interaction among states in the international arena is governed by 
the dominant group; namely that of the developed West, and for the purpose of this study, as a direct 
result of the West’s perceived supremacy, less powerful cultures are suppressed. The degree of 
resistance to such oppression varies, but does exist, and in the case of a collective non-Western world, 
of which this study has identified, is prevalent in the higher levels of interaction between non-Western 
states and the increase in their anti-liberal democratic rhetoric. It is in this light that the negative 
attributes of dominance and power will be analysed and juxtaposed to the argument brought forward in 
this study. As a result, this study will serve to point out the perspectives of those civilisations that do 
not subscribe to the idea of liberal democracy and are therefore hostile towards it.  
 
For non-Western countries, the implementation of liberal democracy can be seen as a form of 
rhetorical discrimination, by the forceful application of a perceived alien ideology that does not relate 
to their historical cultures. Developing states have had substantially less time than the West to establish 
their identity on the international arena, yet they are being forced to comply with norms and values that 
far surpass their socio-historical, financial and institutional abilities to manage this transition 
effectively. This study is not an attempt to explain what non-Western civilisations are doing, but rather 
through the rationale that a critical discourse analysis affords to consider why they are reacting towards 
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this political ideology in such an unreceptive manner. It is through this method, that the application of 
such an analysis will bring forward the argument that the definition of what is right and wrong.  
The concept of liberal democracy as the ultimate form of governance and the subjugation of this 
ideology upon non-Western worlds is in fact all based upon a subjective opinion, namely that of the 
West. In what is often a very complex and time consuming process, ideologies are gradually developed 
by members of a cultural group. This occurs when the people become socialised to a specific method 
of processing information, which to them, ultimately becomes the way in which knowledge is created 
and stored. For this study, an ideology is the society, infiltrating into every facet of their existence. It is 
the ultimate culmination of all that a society has been, is and will be in the future. An ideology is a 
multi-faceted system of belief in which social interaction and understanding is created and entrenched; 
of which its depths are often greatly miscalculated.   
 
Most important however, is the knowledge that ideologies generate. That is, internal and external 
relations are based upon a specific and often conflicting selection of values, which in turn often lead to 
misunderstanding. Jurgen Harbermas’ (1996) discourse theory of democracy, offers an introduction to 
the logic of reasoned agreement in which social norms are chosen and defined. The application of 
Habermas’ (1996) theory serves to strengthen the oppositional stance of a critical discourse analysis in 
so far as it introduces the notion of maximum inclusion as opposed to bias perceptions. Thus, the 
oppositional stance with which Habermas’ (1996) theory presents itself endorses the method with 
which this study has chosen to apply. Judgements derived from Western perspectives and which are 
executed on the non-Western worlds are merely factors of superiority and dominance, much like the 
relationship between the majority and the minority in contemporary liberal democracies.  
 
Through Habermas, one can come to understand the notion of basic liberties in moralistic terms and as 
a “legal expression of the mutual respect that persons ought to show one another as morally 
autonomous agents” (Habermas 1996: xxvi). While laws can be made, it is only through their 
acceptance by a society that they can be given legitimacy. Without that civic agreement, would the 
implementation of laws prove not to be dictatorial, tyrannical and resultantly authoritarian? That is, 
would forcing a society to adopt that which they do not want, be anything but anti-democratic? It 
would be going against all defining pillars that give liberal democracy its social standing, which for 
this study, is the most important element in the process and application of liberal democracy. To 
understand the complexity of legal authority, it is important to recognise that legitimacy is generated 
by allowing “every citizen to have some good reason to recognise the law’s validity” (O’Neill 
2000:503).  
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A law is not socially legitimate if it is imposed without the consent of the society it governs, because it 
has not taken into account all the relevant value systems that have created it. It is through this threat 
towards identity as Fuller (1995) argues that violence is brought about not by greed, but rather by the 
fear of a loss of individuality. As a critical discourse analysis is concerned with the unequal 
distribution of power and the human impulse to free oneself from such oppression, then its nature is 
well suited to this study. Furthermore, it is through such an analysis that this study is granted full 
access to argue that the procedural outlook on liberal democracy, should in fact be supplemented with 
more “substantive normative analyses of the conditions that are favourable to the just legitimation of 
law” (O’Neill 2000:504). That is taking into account the differences within each society and accepting 
them. It is at this point that the dilemma of Western intrusion and non-Western retaliation, which this 
study will analyse, must be further discussed.  
 
The acceptance of difference is what a critical discourse analysis attempts to achieve, in so far as it 
argues that “agreements that are rationally grounded but respectful of difference, and therefore non-
oppressive, might be possible in the pluralist context of a modern, complex society” (O’Neill 
2000:505). This enables complex issues to be resolved in a manner that reduces violence and 
alienation. However, owing to the hostile response of the non-Western world in relation to the actions 
of liberal democratic states, it can be deduced that such acceptance has not been achieved.  It is 
through this observation that to some extent, such violent reactions against liberal democracy and its 
institutions can be justified. Coercion and violence can be viewed as a justifiable reaction when their 
freedom is threatened, which in turn is an aspect within a society that holds its own unique definition. 
Such reasoning makes the application of liberal democracy immensely problematic because it is 
difficult to reach objective consensus on issues that are subjective in nature.  
 
This outlook is dangerous; especially when dealing with democracy in relation to political culture. 
While an arranged marriage between a non-Western society and liberal democracy might be viewed as 
the most practical way forward, it in no way guarantees mutual affection and a lasting relationship. 
The legitimacy and consolidation of such a process cannot reach its full conclusion unless the parties 
involved deem it to be, meaning that without a society’s consensus, “those citizens would be subject to 
a set of laws without having any sense of being their authors” (O’Neill 2000:506).  
 
Method and Techniques  
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According to Huntington (1991), there are six criteria that contribute to the emergence of a reverse 
wave. What limits this study is that the sample is very wide and the community which this paper will 
analyse is global. In order to overcome these challenges, this study will apply the criteria that 
Huntington (1991) uses, in so far as they provide the norms upon which this study can conduct its 
practical application of the factors that lead to reverse waves as highlighted by Huntington (1991). 
Below is a table highlighting the criteria which Huntington (1991) identifies as possible factors that 
would contribute to a third wave reversal. In order to conduct such a global study, this paper has 
analysed some of the predominant historical events that have taken place over the last ten years, and 
which are categorised under Huntington’s criteria.  
 
 
Figure 1: Factors Leading to a Wave Reversal 
(Constructed from Huntington, S. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth 
Century. United States of America: University of Oklahoma Press) 
 
The social, political and economic relevance of each of these examples when analysed in relation to 
Huntington’s predefined conditions is a justifiable measure to argue that a third wave reversal has 
possibly begun. The illustration on the following page shows the criteria on which the contextual 
analysis will be based. Each factor will be juxtaposed against a relevant contemporary example and 
discussed. In most of these instances, this study will attempt to demonstrate that these factors are in 
some measure, influenced by political culture, and the actions of non-Western states in relation to the 
table are doing so in order to ensure the preservation of their identity as opposed to acting out of self-
indulgence without any subjective reason.  
As this chapter has pointed out, the relevance of political culture is key to understanding the hostility 
which non-Western states carry towards implementing liberal democracy in their societies. It is only 
by dissecting the notion of value and tradition that one might be able to comprehend the reason why 
liberal democracy appears to be fading in the realm of global political governance. As other 
Factors 
Leading to 
a Wave 
Reversal 
Weakness in 
Democratic Values Economic 
Crisis 
Social, Economic and 
Political Polarisation 
Limiting of Political 
Engagement to 
Lower Classes 
Snowballing 
Intervention or 
Conquest by a non-
Democractic Foregin 
Government 
Acts of 
terrorism and 
Insurgency 
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civilisations develop and increase their power base, the waning of Western ideals and practice can be 
perceived as a natural process. It is immature, to assert the hegemonic superiority of a political 
institution which in fact, has only been present for just over one century. The historical analysis in 
Huntington’s The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century (1991) will allow this 
study to generate observational data through the process of in-depth research into the findings of 
democratic institutions such as Freedom House.  
 
Such findings will reinforce the causal relationship between the possible existence of a current third 
wave reversal and Huntington’s previous two. In other words, this study will be able to document a 
relationship and determine an association between past reverse waves and the one the Western liberal 
world is perhaps facing. From the specific historical analysis brought forward in this introductory 
chapter, it is important to graphically depict the past and present trajectory of liberal democracy. The 
illustration that follows serves as a tool to better understand Huntington’s (1991) three wave analysis 
and assist in constructing a better impression as to what this study aims to discuss and why it is 
important to do so.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Three Waves of Democracy 
(Constructed from Huntington, S. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth 
Century. United States of America: University of Oklahoma Press) 
 
From the above illustration, the factors which Huntington (1991) marks as instigators of wave 
reversals in conjunction with contemporary examples will be applied. The juxtaposition of the 
theoretical with the contextual elements of this study will in turn illustrate whether or not the trajectory 
of liberal democracy is heading towards a third wave reversal. As Huntington (1991) has already 
provided an analysis up to and including the third wave, it will be the task of this study to extract that 
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knowledge and utilise his argument to further his theory. Moreover, as this study is an analysis of 
Huntington’s theories (1991 and 1996A), what is most important to acknowledge is that critical 
discourse theory will offer an oppositional stance towards Huntington’s (1991 and 1996) work.  
 
This study is not a theoretical analysis in isolation, but rather that it evaluates its selected analysis 
within the framework of historical and social contexts. While a theoretical investigation into 
Huntington’s (1991 and 1996A) work is important, it is this study’s goal to juxtapose a theoretical 
analysis against existing contemporary examples. In doing so, this objective of this paper is not only to 
measure the relevancy of Huntington’s (1991 and 1996A) work, but also to determine if his theories 
offer insight into the future trajectory of Western liberal democracy.  
 
Chapter Breakdown 
 
This first chapter has outlined the basic premise of this study. It has done so by explaining why it is 
imperative that an investigation into Huntington’s (1991 and 1996A) theories be reintroduced. By 
outlining the historical trajectory of liberal democracy and utilising that as a foundation upon which 
the current context can be placed, this section has sought to assist the reader in understanding the basic 
outline of what is to follow in the next chapters. Similarly, Chapter 2 will serve as the textual 
foundation upon which the contextual analysis in Chapter 3 will be based. That is, the theory, upon 
which the foundation of this study will be built, will serve to establish the context within the examples 
in Chapter 3 will be discussed. As a result, an interpretive observation of the discussions posited in 
Chapters 2 and 3 will be introduced in Chapter 4.  
 
 
 
This will serve as an application of the critical discourse analysis of which this study will use. Through 
these chapters this study will reanimate Samuel Huntington’s (1991 and 1996A) analysis on the rise 
and fall of liberal democracy and the extent to which ideology and political culture influence this 
movement. While this analysis will apply the theoretical technicalities necessary for such a study, it 
will also bring the crucial element of human nature, by way of critical discourse theory. This element, 
of which Huntington (1996A) discusses, is too often overlooked when developing explanations for the 
success and failure of liberal democracy, and thus failing to take into account the physical, the social 
and the linguistic importance of ideological structures, which in turn are used in the exercise of social 
cognition.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Through such a critical political inquiry and qualitative content analysis into the work of Samuel P. 
Huntington (1991 and 1996A), this study will be used to reach a conclusion by observing known 
instances of anti-democratic events that have taken place based upon the practical application drafted 
in this study. Be that is it may, it is hoped that the reader will expand his or her understanding of the 
theoretical back drop of this study. It is in this light, that an analysis of Samuel P. Huntington’s 
theories will be introduced in the chapter that follows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Huntington’s Variables: Prerequisites to Democratisation 
 
In order to advance the focus of this study, it is imperative that a close analysis of Huntington’s work 
be conducted. The importance of such an exercise is to lay the foundation for the investigation that 
follows. With that in mind, this chapter will critically discuss the processes of liberal democracy and 
the challenges these undertakings face by using examples that illustrate the complexity of the 
democratic paradigm. Moreover, what this chapter will focus on is the importance of society in 
determining the success or failure of a democratic regime. This chapter will show why some countries 
have a better chance at democratising than others by way of juxtaposing necessary state characteristics 
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for democratisation with those of existing state characteristics. This will be done in order to highlight 
the significance of Huntington’s (1991) work in relation to achieving democratic consolidation.   
 
Huntington (1991) argues that the key element to his study is the process of democratisation, and not 
merely the topic of democracy. Huntington’s (1991) book was written to explain why some countries 
that were once authoritarian became democracies, and why some democracies reverted to 
authoritarianism. Both of these shifts in regime change were then analysed over a particular period of 
time. There is an unstated assumption in democratisation studies that by removing an autocratic 
regime, that it will automatically be replaced with a democratic one. However this is not the case in so 
far as “non-democratic regimes are more likely to be replaced by other non-democratic regimes than 
by democratic ones” (Huntington 1991:35).  
 
This was most notable in Africa after independence and can be identified in many modern-day South 
American countries, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Uruguay whose presidents are all 
dominated to some extent, by leftist ideology. The inherent problem with such a significant number of 
leftist regimes lies in the fact that it is “generally the case that people who self-defines as more leftist... 
are less likely to favour democracy as a political system” (Seligson 2007:87), and if Latin America has 
never before been governed by so many presidents of the left as Seligson (2007) highlights, then it can 
be argued that the region then, views liberal democracy as unfavourable.  
 
 
Similarly, Rupnik (2007:17) argues that in many of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
in which democracy is “allegedly consolidated have recently displayed signs of backsliding – even if 
these are not captured in their still very good Freedom House rankings.”10 In this region, it is not leftist 
ideology which has taken hold, but rather right-wing sentiments and what Tocqueville claims as being 
“habits of the heart” (Rupnik 2007:19). In a similar fashion, Lipset (1959:69) argues that when dealing 
with democracy, that is comparing its historical trajectory, one must be able to point to a set of 
conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries, and say democracy has emerged out of 
these conditions, and has become stabilised because of certain supporting institutions and values.  
 
                                                          
10
 In 2007 when Rupnik published his text, an in-depth analysis of Poland’s freedom status was listed as free as was its 
status in 2010 by Freedom House. In 2011 an in-depth analysis of Poland’s freedom rankings were not published. 
However, the country currently stands as partly-free on Freedom House’s Map of Freedom in the World.  
33 
 
Huntington (1991) would second Lipset’s (1959) argument, for they both acknowledge that democracy 
has a better chance at succeeding if a country houses specific social, political and economic variables, 
which this study will discuss further on.  As Huntington (1991:35) states, “circumstances that 
contribute to the initial establishment of a democratic regime also may not contribute to its 
consolidation and long-term stability”. In other words, the survival of a new democratic state does not 
only rely on its creation, but also on the ways it is nurtured and raised. If a newly founded liberal 
democracy evolves into an elite driven process, without acknowledging the majority of its citizens, it 
can lead to tattered civil societies or worse, to the ultimate collapse of the democratic regime entirely.   
 
What will transpire, will be a clash between “elites that [have] become ever more suspicious of 
democracy and angry publics that [have] become ever more hostile to liberalism” (Krastev 2007:63). 
In its most basic form, the process of democratisation thus involves the failure of an authoritarian 
regime, the implementation of a democratic regime, and most importantly, the successful consolidation 
of that democratic regime. Each of these three stages evolves over a period of time. In Egypt and Libya 
for example, it has taken 30 and 42 years respectively just to initiate a revolution. The second and third 
stages may take just as long, or even longer considering the complexity of democratic consolidation, 
and the difficulties the newly elected governments will have to face and solve during their tenure.  
 
 
Democratic consolidation is not a process that miraculously secures itself overnight, but instead a 
tedious and very complex process that requires the patience of both the electorate and an able 
government. If a democracy is not consolidated, or if it is unable to permeate the social, economic and 
political institutions successfully, it becomes a defective democracy in so far as “it changes the entire 
logic of a constitutional democracy” (Merkel 2004:18). As previously mentioned, such moves toward 
democracy or steps back toward authoritarianism are dependent upon certain variables, or events, each 
of which can together or independently, contribute to a change in regime. Should a regime lack any of 
these factors, or should the convergence of any of these factors at one time exist, will according to 
Huntington (1991), determine the nature of a country’s political regime. Huntington (1991) lists 27 
variables that contribute to democratisation.  
 
According to Huntington (1991), the first 5 variables are entrenched in economics and consist of high 
levels of economic wealth, relatively equal distribution of income, a market economy, economic 
development and social modernisation. Why these variables are important is because they are closely 
linked to legitimacy. In his paper titled Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development 
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and Political Legitimacy Lipset (1959) states that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the 
chances that it will sustain democracy... because only in a wealthy society in which relatively few 
citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could 
intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self restraint necessary to avoid succumbing 
to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues” (Lipset 1959:75).   
 
When consolidating democracies, one of the most “widely cited obstacles...is the danger posed 
by...disappointed popular hopes for economic improvement [most notably] in states undergoing 
simultaneous political and economic reform” (Linz and Stepan 1996:6).   Indeed, if a government fails 
to provide “some economic safety net for its citizens and some alleviation of gross economic 
inequality” (Linz and Stepan 1996:5), its democratic regime will become unsustainable. From a 
political perspective, a feudal aristocracy at some point in the history of society, the absence of 
feudalism in society, a strong bourgeoisie and a strong middle class are variables that promote 
democracy. These political variables mentioned above are closely connected to economics in so far as 
economic strength assists in building political legitimacy.  
That is, when a government is able to provide the economic development its people need, it will as a 
consequence have a greater chance of generating the political legitimacy it needs to stay in power.  
Arguably, the political regime is dependent on a successful economic ideology that will in turn benefit 
the population, and this is most noticeable when looking at the democratic failures in places such as 
Africa. The continent’s dismal democratic track-record can be closely linked to its economic failures. 
Bar one or two states with exceptional amounts of natural resources, few of the 48 countries south of 
the Sahara have actually managed to achieve sustained levels of political development. Because most 
of them have not been under poor leadership all of the time since independence, one can only suppose 
that their inability to sustain liberal democracy is a result of economic failures, which ultimately lead 
to a loss of political legitimacy.   
 
When a government retracts economic policies which are used to assist areas such as education, 
employment, healthcare and transportation; it limits the development of a free market economy that 
houses a strong and informed middle class. This in turn, leads to a dissatisfied electorate that will seek 
to remove those in power. Similarly, Huntington (1991) states that Protestantism, social pluralism and 
strong intermediate groups as well as the development of political contestation before the expansion of 
political participation are variables which greatly foster the development of liberal democracy. Indeed, 
democratic authority structures within social groups, low levels of civil violence, low levels of political 
polarisation and extremism and political leaders committed to democracy are further examples of 
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social variables that motivate democratic development as they encourage general consensus around the 
institutions that are needed to attain and manage a stable democratic environment.  
 
Similarly, experience as a British colony as in the case of North America, traditions of toleration and 
compromise, occupation by a prodemocratic foreign power, influence by a prodemocratic foreign 
power, elite desire to emulate democratic nations, traditions of respect for law and individual rights, 
communal (ethnic, racial, religious) homogeneity, communal (ethnic, political, religious) 
heterogeneity, consensus on political and social values and lastly, absence of consensus on political 
and social values are more factors as argued by Huntington (1991) that favour the implementation and 
maintenance of a democratic culture. The factors leading to democratisation are therefore different, as 
each of the variables is applied alone or in conjunction with others.  
This also depends on what is more conducive and relevant to a particular society. For example, 
Northern Europe created consolidated democracies because they implemented the variables of 
economic development, industrialisation, and the emergence of a middle class and had a cultural ethos 
that was suitable to democratisation. In contrast, the weakening of Western states and the withdrawal 
of pro-democratic powers in Africa and South America after colonisation, coupled with a weak sense 
of ethnic homogeneity and heterogeneity saw many new democracies go back to authoritarian rule. In 
his book titled The End of History and the Last Man (1992), Fukuyama states that;  
 
For democracy to work...citizens of democratic states must forget the instrumental roost of their values, and 
develop a certain irrational thymatic pride in their political system and way of life. That is, they must come to 
love democracy not because it is necessarily better than the alternatives, but because it is theirs. (Fukuyama 
1992:215) 
 
The lack of social values conducive to liberal democracy poses an imminent threat to liberal 
democracy’s consolidation in so far as political legitimacy, according to Lipset (1959:86-87), is 
generated when its “values fit in with [a society’s] primary values”. This set of social ethics is 
imperative to the sustainability of liberal democracy, not to mention the primary act of adopting it as a 
political ideology in the first place. Thus it is not surprising that in Egypt there exists a “high degree of 
nostalgia for the Mubarak regime [in so far as] few people... [can] afford the time and leisure to think 
about the future, let alone form political movements to change it” (Mishra, 2011). Without an engaged 
civil society, Egypt faces the possibility of reverting to an autocratic state, in so far as the societal 
forces that drove Mubarak out of office, now seem to have exhausted themselves.  
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This is a worrying concern considering that at the time of conducting this study’s investigation, Egypt 
had yet to legitimately begin its democratic journey. It can be argued that the social, political and 
economic factors that brought about the Nile Revolution, may not disappear as a result from the over-
throw of a dictator, but may rather create a new generation of tyrants, each seeking to carve out their 
political fiefdom. Such is the case in Indonesia where strong Islamic groups continue to grow in a 
predominantly Christian society, where “members of the military have reinvented themselves, and 
possess a new authority derived from the ballot box... [and where]... elected officials have carved out 
mini fiefdoms within Indonesia’s resource-rich territories” (Mishra, 2011). 
Problems Facing Democratic Transitions and Democratic Consolidation 
 
With that in mind, it must be noted that the paths available to democratic transition and the methods in 
which it is carried out are therefore very different from one state to the next. The leading question 
which one must ask then is: How will democracy endure? Another is how many of the most recently 
formed democratic regimes will reach consolidation and how many will revert back to authoritarian 
governments? Lipset (1959) suggests that a democratic cultural evolution is “still not strong enough in 
many new democracies to justify a conclusion that the third wave of democracy will not be reversed” 
(Stanford News Release, 1993).  Schmitter and Karl (1991:85) argue that there is 
 
An understandable temptation to load too many expectations on [the] concept [of democracy] and to imagine 
that by attaining democracy, a society will have resolved all of its political, social, economic, administrative, 
and cultural problems. Unfortunately, all good things do not necessarily go together.  
 
Democracies are not always more economically efficient than other forms of government. For 
example, Chile’s economy, under the authoritarian rule of Augusto Pinochet, proved to be more 
effective than it was under any democratic regime. In fact, the economic policies which Pinochet’s 
regime implemented “remain the foundations of Chile’s subsequent three-decades of economic and 
social development” (Packenham and Ratcliff, 2007), The same can be argued in relation to Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE), despite its move back to less democratic forms of governance. The 
economies of Hungary and Poland for example, are “not staggering, but booming. Standards of 
living are rising and unemployment is declining.... The streets of Budapest and Warsaw today are 
flooded not by ruthless paramilitary formations in search of a final solution, but by restless 
consumers in search of a final sale” (Krastev 2007:58). All three examples illustrate that economic 
development and success do not only occur under a liberal democracy. Rather, these examples show 
that capitalism works just as effectively under authoritarian and hybrid regimes.  
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Similarly Inglehart (1990) revealed that economic development gives a society a sense of free 
choice. Free choice in turn generates societal happiness; which means that if a society is happy and 
under an economically efficient regime, does it matter if the regime is not democratic? After all, the 
people are satisfied with the regime’s performance. Secondly, democratic regimes are not always as 
administratively efficient as other regimes in the sense that “their capacity to make decisions may 
even be slower than that of the regimes that they replace, if only because more actors must be 
consulted” (Schmitter and Karl 1991:85). Term limits, for example, prevent many newly elected 
leaders from fully implementing and carrying out policies purely because of time constraints.  
 
It is more beneficial for a democratic leader to fulfil smaller pledges to his or her electorate than it 
is to execute policies which extend the lifespan of its implementor. Simply put, the electorate 
expects results, and judges their government accordingly. It can be argued that governance requires 
a level of experience which is only acquired over time. By forcing executives out of office, it could 
be argued that one would ultimately be removing those who are most experienced to govern. Here, 
it is important to introduce the relationship between democracy and economics, albeit briefly in 
relation to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in so far as it highlights another administrative 
failure in relation to the need for autonomy. In many fledgling democracies, governments seek 
financial support in order to generate legitimacy. That is, by increasing levels of development, the 
electorate will be given the chance to enjoy the fruits of less inequality and greater spending power.  
 
If a government is able to provide, then its people will be less likely to hold a grudge against their 
chosen leaders. However, the problem arises when these new democratic regimes have reduced 
spending power and resort to borrowing money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
order to strengthen their economic-political legitimacy campaign. While the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) does attach conditions to its loans in order to promote democracy, the loans themselves 
also have an immensely damaging effect on the process of democratisation, in so far as “democratic 
practices may decline in the presence of conditionality as the government [is forced] to reduce civil 
liberties in an attempt to quell the social unrest that results from structural adjustment” (Brown 
2009:431). 
 By attaching conditions to financial assistance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
inadvertently or otherwise reduces government autonomy to virtually zero. When the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) binds a government to particular agreements, and introduces structural 
adjustment programmes, it effectively “eliminates any domestic input” (Brown 2009:434). Thus, 
the actions carried out in order to fulfil the expectations of the electorate are thwarted by the very 
institution that the government needs in order to accomplish its promises. The initial purpose of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was to assist in rebuilding Europe after World War 2, through 
financial assistance to an already democratically inclined region. It was not designed to finance 
newly independent states which had inherited vague notions of a democratic identity.  
 
As a result, one of the Fund’s greatest flaws is its ‘take it or leave it’ approach which has left 
vulnerable countries at the mercy of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) inflexible slew of 
policies. The unwillingness by the Fund to tailor its policies to each individual country has as a 
consequence, left many states unable to govern effectively by way of the economic statutes by 
which they must abide. Lastly, democracies are not necessarily as organised and stable as the 
autocracies which they replace. As a “by-product of democratic freedom of expression” (Schmitter 
and Karl 1991:85), the likelihood of continual disagreement surrounding rules is abundant. 
Regulations are often changed and new ones are all too abruptly adopted. Overall, these three 
factors make up what democracy is not, and in the 21st century, seems to contribute to three major 
problems confronting unconsolidated democracies.  
 
The first, Huntington (1991) terms transition problems. This first obstacle entails the difficulty 
regimes have when moving from an authoritarian style of rule to a democratic one. Drafting new 
constitutions, holding relatively free and fair elections and upholding party mandates, deciding how 
to treat authoritarian officials who have in the past regime blatantly violated human rights and 
lastly, effectively compromising with a highly implicated military are some of the transitory issues 
these new democratic regimes have had to confront. Niger, situated in West Africa is currently 
undergoing its sixth constitutional reform, all of which dates back to 1959 when it gained its 
independence from France. In 2010 Venezuela underwent a constitutional referendum which 
removed term limits for the offices of the President and his staff.  
Recent elections in Cote d’Iviore, Sudan, Togo, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Haiti have shown that 
countries which are unaccustomed to democratisation have trouble making the transition to 
democracy in so far as instances of post-election violence, accusations of election rigging, high 
levels of voter apathy and leaders refusing to hand over power  have occurred. This is because the 
necessary variables required for that specific democratic transition were either too few, flawed or 
entirely absent. It is important to understand that democracy “does not consist of a single set of 
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institutions [but rather that] there are many types of democracy, and their diverse practices produce 
a similarly varied set of effects” (Schmitter and Karl (1991:76).  
 
It is a fallacy that merely holding elections will produce peaceful democracies and promote 
legitimacy. In fact, there appears to be a “growing unease at the rapid spread of multi-party 
elections across south-central Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America... because of what happens at 
the elections (Zakaria 1997:23). This growing unease can be attributed to the realisation that these 
regions are inherently hostile towards democracy, not only because some of them illustrate blatant 
displays of adversity towards it, but also because people have come to realise that these regions are 
perhaps too different in their values systems and political outlook to form a strong enough 
foundation for the success of a democratic transition. Zakaria (1997:32) explains that; 
 
Many Western governments and scholars have encouraged the creation of strong and centralised states in the 
Third World. Leaders in these countries have argues that they need the authority to break down feudalism, 
split entrenched coalitions, override vested interests, and bring order to chaotic societies. But this confuses 
the need for a legitimate government with that [of] a powerful one....More often, such states have become 
predatory, maintaining some order also arresting opponents, muzzling dissent, nationalising industries, and 
confiscating property. While anarchy has its dangers, the greatest threats to human liberty and happiness 
in...[the twentieth century were] caused not by disorder, but by brutally strong, centralised states, like Nazi 
Germany, Soviet Russia, and Maoist china. The Third World is littered with the bloody handiwork of strong 
states. (Zakaria 1997:32) 
 
 
 
 
Many East Asian regimes turned authoritarian after only briefly flirting with democracy, most notably 
after World War 2. From being strictly autocratic, these regimes became more liberal, and in some 
cases went so far as to implement soft or managed democracies. While considered by some to be the 
unnerving pea under democracy’s bed, defective democracies have no intention of completing the 
democratic transition. That is, they are not necessarily regimes attempting to find their way along the 
road to democratic consolidation, but rather, they are defective because they choose to be.  More 
surprisingly, and as it will be discussed later in this study, defective democracies have been able to 
“form stable links to their economic and societal environment and are often seen by considerable parts 
of the elites and the population as an adequate institutional solution to the specific problems of 
governing effectively” (Merkel 2004:32).  
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The reason why defective democracies are able to establish themselves in a society so successfully is 
that they are able, through a country’s democratic defects, to generate support from the “socio-
economic/socio-cultural contexts and develop in a mutually supportive coexistence of environment 
and partial regimes” (Merkel 2004:49). What this demonstrates is democracy’s inability to 
successfully infiltrate a society that lacks Huntington’s (1991) and Lipset’s (1959) variables. Rather, 
democracy is moulded and restructured in a manner that best suits the current set of norms and values 
in that given society.  
 
The majority of the regimes in East Asia, South America and the Caucuses remain, to this day, only 
semi-democratic or illiberal democracies. In fact, the number of democracies in the world fell by 20 
percent between 1990 and 1996, while the quality of democracy declined. Democratic practices in 
many of the most influential third wave democracies such as Russia, Brazil and Pakistan are becoming 
more illiberal, while expected democratic transitions in currently autocratic regimes are imploding. 
However, what is more alarming is that “political freedom has deteriorated in several of the longest-
surviving democracies in the developing world, including India, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Venezuela. 
In fact... the overall trend of the past decade among regionally influential countries that are electoral 
democracies today has been toward a decline in freedom” (Diamond 1996:28). Eight years later, 
Merkel (2004:34) argues that only 58.3 percent of electoral democracies in the world could be 
classified as liberal democracies. 
 
 
Assessing Freedom: 1990 to 2010 
 
 Countries 
Covered 
Free Countries Partly Free 
Countries 
Not Free Countries 
1990 165 65 50 50 
2010 194 87 60 47 
According to this data, the level of freedom around the world has increased. However, what 
one must take into consideration is the number of countries covered. With an extra 29 
countries analysed in 2010, the figures do not illustrate an accurate comparison. The 
difference in the two figures represents a numerical difference of just fewer than 15 percent. 
In an attempt to make this analysis more equal, this study will add that 15 percent to 1990. If 
the two were to be compared equally, this is what the table would look like 
 Countries 
Covered 
Free Countries Partly Free 
Countries 
Not Free Countries 
1990 194 75 58 58 
2010 194 87 60 47 
Table 1: Assessing Freedom: 1990:2010 
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Constructed using: 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fiw/historical/CountryStatusRatingsOverview1973-
2011.pdf) 
 
What is visible in this table is that while the number of free countries in 2010 is higher than what it 
was in 1990, there is also a slight decrease in countries which are not free. In fact, the numerical 
difference in both columns is almost equal. Overall, this table illustrates that the amount of freedom in 
the world today, is not much different to what it was 20 years ago. When Di Palma published his text, 
To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions in 1990, he at that time, stated that in 
general, “even by the most generous definition of democracy, the proportion of democracies among 
independent nations is no greater today than it was after World War I” (Di Palma 1990:2-3).   
 
Thus, it can be argued that according to this graph, liberal democracy has not faired any better than it 
did two decades ago, nor has it showed signs of obvious and stable development. Similarly, and as 
Zakaria (1997:28) emphasises, “during the last two decades in Latin America, Africa, and parts of 
Asia, dictatorships with little background in constitutional liberalism have given way to democracy. 
The results are not encouraging... ten of the twenty-two principal Latin American countries have levels 
of human rights abuse that are incompatible with the consolidation of [liberal] democracy”. 
 
 If states are able to successfully apply the variables which are conducive to democracy that are at their 
disposal, then it can be argued that the chance of achieving democratic consolidation is far greater. 
French politician, Jean-Francois Revel once stated that “democracy may, after all, turn out to have 
been a historical accident, a brief parenthesis that is closing before our eyes (Fukuyayma 1992:8), 
because overall, “democracies have been relatively rare in human history, so rare that before 1776 
there was not a single one in existence anywhere in the world” (Fukuyama 1992:48).11  As a result, it 
can be argued that democracy has a “relatively narrow base, both in time and in space; and the 
evidence has yet to be produced that it is the natural form of rule for peoples outside of those narrow 
perimeters” (Huntington 1993:14).  
 
Regardless of the form of government, a country has an endemic set of values on which it creates its 
society; and once entrenched; neither an authoritarian regime nor the implementation of a liberal 
democratic system can alter it. These conditions are specific and differ from one country to the next. 
The issue that arises from this is what Linz and Stepan (1996) call “stateness”. Democracies require 
                                                          
11
 Fukuyama (1991:48) notes that the democracy of Periclean Athens does not qualify, because it did not     systematically 
protect individual rights.  
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nations, one polity whose freedoms and rights are equal. Such social and political engineering is 
imperative to the attainment of a nation-state and the success of its democratic transition. When there 
is a lack of homogeneity, “the state becomes the core contested terrain, the deadly serious theatre of 
ethnic conflict over which ethnic groups or coalitions of ethnic groups should control it and its vast 
resources” (Jinadu 2007:11).   
 
Hence, in order for democratisation to take place, the problem of stateness must be resolved. Conflicts 
between different cultures, be they social, political or economic, are reduced “when the residents of a 
state identify with one subjective idea” (Linz and Stepan 1996:25), and thus form a nation. If the issue 
of cultural diversity and the application of Huntington’s (1991) variables cannot be successfully 
compromised on, the context in which democratic consolidation is placed can be very weak. That is, 
the “logics of state policies aimed at nation-building [must be] congruent with those aimed at crafting 
democracy” (Linz and Stepan 1996:6).  
For example, one of the biggest challenges Africa and its new leaders faced after the colonial powers 
granted them independence “was to wield into nations a variety of different peoples, speaking different 
languages and at different stages of political and social development.  
The new states of Africa were not nations. They possessed no ethnic, class or ideological cement to 
hold them together, no strong historical and social identities upon which to build” (Meredith 
2006:154). Indeed, this coincides with what Fukuyama (1992:119) affirms in relation to the 
democratic success of the West;  
 
American democracy has done surprisingly well dealing with ethnic diversity, but that diversity has been 
contained within certain bounds: none of America’s ethnic groups constitutes historical communities living 
on their traditional lands and speaking their own language, with a memory of past nationhood and 
sovereignty.  
 
In some countries, Huntington (1991:253) notes that contextual problems to democratisation were 
neither numerous or severe, but in others they were both. Insurgencies and ethnic conflicts in El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, the Philippines, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sudan and Turkey; as well as 
extreme poverty, severe socio-economic inequality and terrorism in Bolivia, Mongolia, Brazil and 
Spain, all contributed to a weak foundation for democratisation to take place. With that in mind, it can 
be said that “liberal democracy may be more functional for a society that has already achieved a high 
degree of social equality and consensus concerning certain basic values... [b]ut for societies that are 
highly polarized along lines of social class, nationality, or religion, democracy can be a formula for 
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stalemate and stagnation” (Fukuyama 1992:118). The third and last dilemma which Huntington (1991) 
highlights is a systematic problem with the way democracy functions. Quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Fukuyama wrote that;  
 
Democracies have great difficulty sustaining serious and long-term foreign policies. They are hamstrung by 
their very democratic nature; by the plurality of the voices, the self-doubt and self-criticism that characterise 
democratic debate....As things stand, relatively minor causes of discontent corrode, disturb, unsettle, 
paralyze, the democracies faster and more deeply than horrendous famine and constant poverty do the 
Communist regimes, whose subject peoples have no real rights or means of redressing their wrongs. Societies 
of which permanent criticism is an integral feature are the only liveable ones, but they are also the most 
fragile (Fukuyama 1992:9).  
 
One of the most fundamental criticisms surrounding liberal democracy supposes that if an election is 
declared to be free and fair and the people who have been democratically chosen to lead are either 
terrorists, racists or fascists who are publicly opposed to building and maintaining peace; then who is 
to disallow them from taking power as they were elected via a legitimate route? Such was the case 
when Hezbollah, which has been accused of being a terrorist organisation, won in Lebanon’s 2005 
parliamentary elections. Similarly, if the electorate has the power to democratically remove a leader 
who is perceived as unworthy of office, should they not be allowed to keep leaders in power over their 
term limit if they are content with the leader’s performance?  
 
Former South African President Thabo Mbeki was ousted in 2008 following criticism surrounding his 
leadership, while in 2009 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez won a referendum to remove term limits 
after the electorate expressed their wish to keep him in power. Another problem includes the failure of 
liberal democracy to fix the past failures of the respective authoritarian regimes. Societies often force a 
state to democratise through revolution or through coup d’états in order to fix the so called injustices 
the past regime has committed. However, democratic systems of government are not without their 
shortfalls either. Indeed, they are known to often reach stalemates in decision making processes, they 
are dominated by the economic system of capitalism, while the majority rule creates political 
inequality and generates a sense of marginalisation for minority groups.  This is because; 
 
Unresolved and seeming unresolvable...problems reinforce tendencies toward disillusionment in the new 
democracies. In most countries the struggle to create democracy was seen as moral, dangerous, and 
important. The collapse of authoritarianism generated enthusiasm and euphoria. The political struggles in 
democracy, in contrast, rapidly came to be seen as amoral, routine, and petty. The workings of democracy 
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and the failure of the new democratic governments to resolve the problems endemic to society generated 
indifference, frustration, and disillusionment (Huntington 1991:255). 
 
During 1979 and 1980, waves of disappointment regarding democracy overshadowed Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Brazil, Argentina and Spain. In the latter, the term el desencanto meaning disillusionment 
was used to explain the anti-democratic political mood, or as Huntington (1991) terms it, 
“authoritarian nostalgia”. It is immensely important to emphasise that democracy will only be viable if 
the power of the state is counterbalanced by an active civil society which is willing to hold the state 
accountable.  
If there is no civil will, then the act itself is an indication of disinterest. History plays a very important 
role in the successful implementation of democracy into a previously undemocratic regime. “[T]he 
extent to which elites and publics believe in the value of the democratic system” (Huntington 
1991:258), depends heavily on the political culture the intended society has. The history of the West 
has created enough legitimacy for liberal democracy to flourish in the contemporary era. What is 
problematic is when a country, which does not have a suitable set of traditional liberal democratic 
values, wants to democratise. This is because the foundation which liberal democracy will set is 
fundamentally flawed.  
 
Arguably, the democratic transition has not generated enough legitimacy to follow through, leaving 
such democracies in “a catch-22 situation. [They lack] legitimacy [and therefore]...cannot become 
effective [while] lacking effectiveness, they cannot develop legitimacy” (Huntington 1991:258). 
Legitimacy derives from performance. It is generated by the successful execution of responsibility to a 
public, from which they benefit. When legitimacy is weak, the democratic regime becomes unstable 
and gives rise to revolution and hostile takeovers. In many instances, the failure of political elites to 
successfully carry out their democratic duty is what has led to disillusionment. In Latin America for 
example, as argued by Brown (2009), there have been more frequent elections and fewer re-elected 
officials, than in any other region in the world.  
 
In such a scenario, “the intractability of problems, the constraints of the democratic process, and the 
shortcomings of political leaders became the order of the day. The leaders in...new democracies often 
came to be viewed as arrogant, incompetent, or corrupt, or some combination of all three” (Huntington 
1991:256).  Where once, elites and the public fought to achieve the “euphoric and ephemeral high of 
democratisation” (Huntington 1991:262), the failure to achieve political legitimacy and deal with the 
consequent issues during the democratic transition to consolidation left elites and their electorate to 
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adapt to the “grubby and plodding low of democracy” (Huntington 1991:262). With that said, the 
beginning of the third wave reversal is in one part, a result of the latest el desencanto which has swept 
the globe, as illustrated by the lack of democratic progress and development given in the Table 1.  
 
 
 
Its loss of legitimacy has created a civilizational reawakening in which its meaning, that is democracy, 
“does not mean that problems will be solved... [but rather] that rulers can be removed; and the essence 
of [contemporary] democratic behaviour is doing the latter because it is impossible to do the former” 
(Huntington 1991:263). It is important to do a brief analysis of what Huntington means when he says 
impossible. Why can some countries make the transition successfully and maintain their status until 
consolidation has been achieved while others simply cannot? Why, during the third wave, did 
authoritarian nostalgia reach breaking point? It is because political culture is inherently 
institutionalised. Arguably, the progression of democracy has reached a stalemate in its current context 
because while “a democratic political culture takes time and habituation” (Di Palma 1991:154), recent 
events mentioned in this study have unveiled a possible rejection of the process of habituation entirely.  
 
What made democratic political practices during the third wave of democratisation so prevalent was 
the lack of alternative regimes. Large authoritarian movements such as military junta’s, dictatorships 
and Marxist-Leninist parties in Eastern Europe had failed and were replaced with no alternatives other 
than democracy. Be that as it may, the crucial question which Huntington (1991:269) poses is of 
course, “was whether or not this would remain the case, or whether new movements would appear 
promoting new forms of authoritarianism”. Examples in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) as 
well as South American and Asian countries would illustrate a new upswing of hybrid regimes, while 
an increase in the lack of freedom in the world would argue the same. At the beginning of this century 
and in line with the 2001 terrorist attacks, 72.5% of all the world’s 40 new democracies were defective 
and continue to “establish themselves... as relatively durable systems of political rule” (Merkel 2004: 
50).  
 
Although numerous democratic revolutions have arisen in Africa and the Middle East, the success of 
their democratic transition has yet to be observed, due in part to the post-revolution challenges these 
countries, such as Egypt, are currently facing. Similarly, the autocratic regimes which have been 
challenged by this revolutionary wave have in all sense of the word, stood their ground.   While the 
idea of a democratic alternative has already been introduced by scholars such as Diamond (1996), it 
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was Huntington (1996A) who gave them a name and conducted an in-depth investigation into their 
plausibility. In The Clash of Civilisations (1996A), Huntington identified Asia and Islam as the two 
emerging powers that would in the future derail Western authority.  
Firstly, Huntington (1996A) noted that the Islamic civilisation posed the largest threat to the West’s 
religious identity; namely that of Christianity owing to its assumption that the world had primarily 
adopted Western values, Islamic fundamentalists would seek to alter this through a global resurgence. 
Secondly, Huntington (1996A) pointed to the East, where he argued that to improve their international 
position, countries such as China would agree to increase their levels of cooperation with countries 
such as Iran; which are well noted for their dislike of the West. Thus, it is another reason as to why this 
study chose the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (US) as a starting point for the beginning of 
a possible existence of third reverse wave, because Huntington (1996A) singled out the “Muslim 
propensity toward violent conflict as the most important coming challenge to world peace and 
American power” (Packenham and Ratcliff, 2007).  
 
This is not to say that democracy has failed entirely, but rather that it is not suitable for all societies as 
once it was believed to be by the West, and that defective democracies will emerge as a by-product of 
its over zealous ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. This statement must be coupled with Guillermo 
O’Donnell’s (2007:5) acceptance speech on his Lifetime Achievement Award from the International 
Political Science Association, in which he posed the question whether we were facing “a crisis of 
democracy as such, or of some democracies”. The ideal form of “government is that in which the 
sovereignty...is vested in the entire aggregate of the community [which in turn] is conducive to order, 
progress and permanence (Goodwin 1997:267). If liberal democracy proves to be unstable, then the 
obvious conclusion would be to state that it might perhaps not be the most ideal form of government.   
 
Demoting Democracy: Issues of Culture and Anti-Democratic Rhetoric 
 
It is important to study the factors that make democracy volatile, in so far as it will create a basis upon 
which possible assumptions regarding the existence of a third wave reversal can be made. What makes 
democracy unstable is not its fundamentals, but rather the context in which it is placed, much like Di 
Palma’s analogy of the hot house plant and democracy. The successful implementation of liberal 
democracy in the West was due in part to the abundant existence of Huntington’s variables. Hence, the 
factors needed to promote and sustain a democratic transition already existed in the Western 
civilisation. Western ideology, tradition, culture and history were conducive to a democratic 
revolution.  
47 
 
 
With that said, it is imperative to analyse whether other civilisations have a strong enough foundation, 
or enough variables, to support a democratic transition from a socio-cultural point of departure. 
Arguably, the Orthodox world of the former Soviet Union, the Eastern World of Asia, the Muslim 
World and the civilisation of Sub-Saharan Africa are not predisposed to a liberal democratic transition 
and its sustainability with regard to the cultural, social and economic obstacles is too great.  At its most 
fundamental of levels, none of these civilisations are historically linked with that of democracy’s; 
meaning that they have no past experience with, this ultimately Western, ideology. This is not to say 
that they cannot democratise at all, but rather that it makes the transition all the more difficult. 
Similarly, the death or departure of long serving autocratic leaders, would according to Huntington 
(1993), initiate a process of democratisation, but not make it inevitable.  
 
Huntington (1993) has already argued that in most cases, authoritarian regimes are replaced by other or 
newer forms of the former regime. Egypt’s most recent revolution, which ousted the country’s 30 year 
dictator and which is now under the rule of the military is no guarantee that it will become democratic. 
Egypt has very little experience in being an equal and unrestricted society, making the foundations to 
its transition already systematically weak. In fact, [f]ull-scale democratisation has not yet occurred...in 
one-party states that were the products of domestic revolution” (Huntington 1993:12). Egypt might 
ascribe to more liberal policies, but in no way does its revolution secure a democratic transition.  
 
Furthermore, the recent uprisings in Libya have been met, not with a relatively passive response by its 
autocratic ruler akin to Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine al Abedine Ben Ali, but rather by 
large-scale violence, military and police brutality and shoot-to-kill policies authorised by Moamer 
Gadaffi, who remains the longest serving dictator in the contemporary era. Overall, the initiation of a 
coup d’etat or a social revolution does not necessarily make democratisation inevitable, but rather 
makes the emergence of violent and prolonged periods of instability more likely. There is no pride in 
an ideology that does not belong to them, which does not resonate their cultural and traditional 
attitudes. Similarly, there is no moral compass when it comes to making democratically inclined 
decisions because their value systems are different.  
 
In all four of Huntington’s (1996A) anti-democratic civilisations, instances where democratically 
elected leaders themselves have ended democracy are present, a testament to the lack of commitment 
towards the democratic processes. In Africa and Latin America, democracy is merely a prerequisite to 
financial assistance, a promoter for foreign direct investment and a condition for humanitarian aid. In 
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other words, they democratise purely because they have to and not because they want to. Only a 
handful of the African and Latin American leaders have been staunch promoters of liberal democracy, 
while no Islamic or Eastern leader comes to mind.  Overall, there is an obvious divide between 
Western liberal democracy and non-Western civilisations.  
 
Here, Huntington’s (1991) variables come in to play, and make the issue of culture an influential 
factor. This is because it demonstrates the importance of the historical foundation on which liberal 
democracy is built and the cultural legitimacy derived from such groundwork. If “democracy is based 
on the consent of the people” (Goodwin 1997:217), a lack of such approval would mean that the 
democratic regime is not legitimate, and that the political culture is not aligned to democratic 
institutions and processes.  Those civilisations with a minimal number of Huntington’s (1991) 
predefined variables are less inclined to have a democratic culture, while those, such as the West who 
do have a significant number of variables, will be more inclined to democratise.  
 
Thus, a “profoundly anti-democratic culture would impede the spread of democratic norms in the 
society, deny legitimacy to democratic institutions, and this greatly complicate if not prevent the 
emergence and effective functioning of those institutions” (Huntington 1993:13).  
It has been argued by theorists such as Huntington (1996B) and Diamond (1996:7) that “no anti-
democratic ideology with global appeal has emerged to challenge the continued global ideological 
hegemony of democracy as a principle and formal structure of government”. Since that time, it is the 
assumption of this study that two non-democratic ideologies have indeed emerged and have begun to 
challenge the liberal democratic status-quo.  Two of the greatest emerging civilisations in the 21st 
century belong to the East and the Muslim World, and have been identified by Huntington (1996A) as 
powerful opponents to the current status quo.  
 
 
The most significant and potential alternative to democracy is authoritarianism via Asian-style whose 
traditions are founded in Confucianism and whose economic success makes this system of government 
immensely appealing. Moreover, since the late 1980’s, the “Communist Party in China has continued 
to show that it is possible to have a thriving market economy within the context of flexible communist 
thinking” (Mullard 2004:70). Hence while it might be true that democracy cannot operate unless it is 
coupled with a market economy, capitalism does not necessarily become weaker in the absence of a 
liberal democratic government. This argument can not only be supported in the Asian countries listed 
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above, but also in the Muslim states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan where there is an absence of 
democratic practice.  
 
Similarly, the Islamist alternative whereby state and religion are merged and in which order on all 
government levels is maintained is perceived as appealing to some – most notably to those wishing to 
subscribe to religion as a way of life, and also because of the civilisation’s size.  Both Confucianism 
and Islam have become key role-players, infiltrating the political, social and economic spectrum of the 
international system. Civilisations such as the Chinese (Confucianism) and Muslim World (Islam), 
according to Huntington (1993), are particularly hostile towards democracy. In fact, for Huntington 
(1996A) they are the two most unreceptive dogmas to have ever existed, in relation to the promotion of 
liberal democracy.  
 
The obvious dilemma this creates then, would be to acknowledge the possibility of an international 
shift away from a Western style of governance such as democracy, towards a more authoritarian and 
religious outlook, especially if these two civilisations continue upon their ever increasing influential 
path in global politics. In order to fully present the capacity of culture to promote or obstruct 
democratic transitions, it is imperative that Confucianism and Islam be analysed in relation to liberal 
democracy. It is important to highlight in what ways these two civilisations are in opposition to 
democratic values, and thus illustrate how they have, and will continue to affect the spread of liberal 
democracy and its dominance. Such high levels of economic growth have led to the expansion of 
Asian relations in areas of trade and commerce, that its economic leader, namely China has been able 
to re-instate itself as potential hegemon.  
 
 
In contrast the West’s historical tradition for liberalism and a free market economy, Huntington 
(1996A:219) displays East Asia’s total divergence. In fact, by the end of the 20th century, East Asia 
had one stable democracy, several new and unstable democracies, four of the five communist 
dictatorships remaining in the world, plus military governments, personal dictatorships, and one-party 
dominant authoritarian systems. Similarly, and what introduces the key component to the investigation 
that follows, its East Asia’s commitment to its own culture. Indeed, the threat of ideological conflict in 
the region is minimal, in so far as Huntington (1996A) theorised that culture, when used as a 
commodity, would decrease differences over time, thus limiting, as one Chinese General stated “fights 
among family members” (Huntington 1996A:251).  
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Countries such as China, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam are all practitioners of 
classic Confucianism, or at least derivatives thereof. Similarly, in Mongolia, the Philippines and 
Thailand, Chang, Chu and Park (2007) state that pockets of support for authoritarianism are growing 
rather than diminishing. That is, for the Chinese, and those of Chinese descent, “even if citizens of 
another country, are members of the Chinese community and hence in some measure subject to the 
authority of the Chinese government” (Huntington 1996A:169). Historically, the political culture of 
Asian society is founded on the importance of authority. Indeed, the individual finds his or her identity 
in and as, a functioning member of the social order. People who ascribe to the Confucian ideology 
have little, if no, rights against the state and as a result, have limited individual rights.  
 
The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy are central values, which in turn allows little room 
for debate and opposition in all realms of society. From an early age, Asian tradition dictates the 
importance of authority, which over time spreads to the broader spectrum of government. This notion 
of communal identity of the self has a long history, which today is “reinforced by the expansion of the 
economic relationships among the several Chinas, which, in turn have been a major element promoting 
rapid economic growth.... [thus providing] the material and psychological impetus to enhance Chinese 
cultural identity” (Huntington 1996A:169).  
 
 
 
Similarly, as a result of Asia’s over-all “geopolitical configuration, political history, and predominant 
cultural legacies...strong drags on the development of robust democratic political cultures [are 
present]” (Chang, Chu and Park 2007:69), in so far as the society is comprised of a large number of 
ambivalent and perplexed people whose “inconsistent political orientations burden their democracies 
with a fragile foundation of legitimacy” (Chang, Chu and Park 2007:73). Therefore, so long as 
Confucian orientated societies are “plagued with... [this] crisis of authority, it... [is] impossible for 
their governments to advance...political development, because they... [cannot] meet the essential 
requirements of penetrating more thoroughly into the society and [mobilise] human...resources (Pye 
1992:9).  
 
Freedom of expression, critical debate and other fundamental characteristics of liberal democracy are 
either limited or virtually non-existent, but at the same time, according to Eastern doctrine and 
tradition, unwanted. While it is beneficial to hold more than less, of Huntington’s variables in order to 
accomplish a successful transition to democratisation, it must be argued that the most important factor 
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of all is legitimacy, because “no democratic regime can stand long without legitimacy in the eyes of its 
own people” (Chang, Chu and Park 2007:66). The Confucian style of governance argues that “what 
people want and need...is not democratic government, but good government – that is, government that 
will provide economic well-being, political stability, social order, communal harmony, and efficient 
and honest administration” (Huntington 1996A:12). Here, the idea lies upon the choice of “clean and 
mean [over] filthy and free” (Huntington 1996A:12).   
 
Cultural values of “collectivism, hierarchism, and conformism are likely to detract from the process of 
cultural democratisation by discouraging East Asians from rejecting the norms of authoritarian rule 
and accepting those of democracy” (Shin 2008:95). Similarly, those states such as South Korea who 
have implemented liberal democratic systems in their countries have themselves often failed to obey 
the basic laws and rules of democratic politics. Out of all the Confucian orientated countries, only 
Japan and the Philippines have had some measure of experience with democracy, and it is only 
because in both cases, the West intervened. Overall, economic development and Confucian orientated 
value systems still remain the two most influential mechanisms driving the Eastern civilisation; neither 
of which needs liberal democracy to sustain it.  
 
Moreover, Asia is the world’s largest continent as well as the most populous, housing almost 60 
percent of the world’s population. Its Confucian ideology does not need to be appealing, as Diamond 
(1996) so states, for it to gain enough influence. The demographic size of the Confucian polity, 
encompassing all its traditional values, and the continental export of its people which is currently 
taking place will be enough to infiltrate other political societies and civilisations, and thus influence 
methods of governance. Huntington (1996A:229) concludes; 
 
Every other major power... has engaged in outward expansion, assertion, and imperialism coincidental with 
or immediately following the years in which it went though rapid industrialisation and economic growth. No 
reason exists to think that the acquisition of economic and military power will not have comparable effects in 
China. For two thousand years China was the preeminent power in East Asia. Chinese now increasingly 
assert their intention to resume that historic role and to bring to an end the overlong century of humiliation 
and subordination to the West and Japan that began with British imposition... in 1842.  
 
Similarly, in the Islamic tradition, “there is no equipoise between Caesar and God” (Huntington 
1993:19). Islam, in the past and still today, plays a significant role the “social, economic, and 
political developments of Arab Societies and Political Systems” (Huntington 1996A:174). The 
relationship between politics and religion is closely linked. Political participation is largely 
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influenced by religious association to such an extent that the concepts of Islam and its politics are in 
stark contrast to the basic tenets of democratic practice. Islam is in such contrast to liberal 
democracy that the only two Arab countries, according to Huntington (1993:19) that were able to 
sustain a form of democracy for a significant period of time were Lebanon and Turkey.  
 
Even so, Lebanon’s amateur democracy soon collapsed after Muslims became the majority, and 
where Islam soon prevailed as the dominant socio-political ideology in the country. On most 
occasions, authoritarian regimes seeking for a change in regime have expressed interest in some 
kind of shift towards democracy; in authoritarian Islamist societies however, “movements explicitly 
campaigning for democratic politics have been relatively weak, and the most powerful opposition 
has come from Islamic fundamentalists” (Huntington 1993:20).  
 
 
As stated earlier, the terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists which occurred on 11 September 
2001, can be perceived as the most open assault on the Western democratic world, and are an 
example of Islam’s hostility towards the Western democratic system. Islam is hazardous not only to 
the Western political doctrine, but also to the social rule that the state must remain secular. If 
Islam’s purpose is to achieve total credence, then it will undermine not only the political landscape 
of most of the Western world, but the social values and norms that are generated through religion as 
well. Social and economic modernisation, according to Huntington (1996A), uproots societies and 
incites traditionalist reaction: retaliation by the Muslim world would prove to be most violent, 
because its followers all strive for perfection, a way of life that is also known as the greater jihad.  
 
Some fundamentalists have taken this measure of existence to extremes, following instruction to 
“fight those who do not believe in God...until they pay the tax in acknowledgement of superiority 
and they are in a state of subjection” (Wright 2006:108). This notion becomes even more legitimate 
when Islam is considered to be under threat, because to Muslims, the Islamic tradition is an 
affirmation of freedom, making life without it, one of slavery and the rise of a world order where 
“governments...are based on the rule of man over men” (Wright 2006:108).  A reason as to why 
there has been such a fundamentalist revival, is because the “strength of the perceived threat from 
liberal, Western values [is jeopardising] traditional Islamic societies” (Fukuyama 1992:46).  
 
Concluding Remarks 
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Together, Confucianism and Islam comprise a large set of contrasting values, traditions and 
historical backgrounds to those of the West. While it can be argued that even variables that are 
conducive to democracy do exist within each of them, they are, in relation to the argument which 
this study presents, too fragile to instigate a fully fledged and lasting democratic transition in the 
style of Western liberal democracy. In reality, democracy comes in many forms and is not aligned 
to a distinctive set of institutions. Rather, the world has seen many types of defective democracies, 
including soft and illiberal ones. Overall, these democratic distortions at their very foundation are 
not true democracies because they are not Western. Countless non-Western societies are 
experiencing an insidious process of what Huntington (1996A:5) calls “cultural indigenization”.  
They increasingly resist Western attempts to export Western values, because they are not out 
merely to seek “material comfort, but respect or recognition, and they believe that they are worthy 
of respect because they possess a certain value or dignity” (Fukuyama 1992:152). The opposing 
civilisations are merely searching for recognition of their own cultural traditions. Democracy is like 
a glass slipper. It is delicate to begin with, it requires the right foot to wear it and its transitional 
journey must be undertaken with the utmost care. To be worn, it requires the right set of variables; 
otherwise, injury to both itself as an ideological process and to its owner will occur.  
 
Over the course of history, too many countries have tried and worn democracy, only to see it 
shatter, and leave social, political and economic scars on the nation as well as state which adopted 
it. The importance of Huntington’s (1991) historical, economic and social variables cannot be 
stressed enough. Indeed, without them, the discrepancies in cases, have not only left a jaded 
perception of liberal democracy, but also a hostility perhaps now strong enough to challenge it. The 
next chapter will illustrate to what extent this glass slipper analogy exists by demonstrating what 
occurs when liberal democracy becomes too uncomfortable to wear, and as a result, investigate 
whether or not a third wave reversal has begun.  
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Chapter 3 
Events Promoting the Possible Existence of a Third Wave Reversal 
 
Huntington’s (1991) historical analysis has allowed this study to generate observational data which in 
turn, has reinforced the causal relationship between the possible existence of a current third wave 
reversal and Huntington’s previous two waves. In other words, by building on to Huntington’s 
historical analysis, this study will attempt to document a relationship and determine an association 
between past reverse waves and the one the Western liberal world is perhaps facing. According to a 
recent publication by Freedom House (2011:3);  
 
The last five years have features an overall decline in global respect for the values of liberal democracy: 
multi-party elections, the rule of law, freedom of association, freedom of speech, the rights of minorities and 
other fundamental, universal human rights. The consecutive annual declines represent the longest period of 
erosion in political rights and civil liberties in the nearly forty year history of Freedom in the World. 
 
In light of this dilemma, this chapter will critically plot specific non-democratic examples which have 
taken place since 2001, thus drawing on a possible conclusion that a third wave reversal has begun and 
measure the extent to which liberal democratic values have declined. This study will be limited in 
terms of the sample which is very wide and the community global in size. Nonetheless, as liberal 
democracy appears to be the most dominant political system within the current political spectrum, it 
makes the magnitude and scope of the examples relevant.   
 
The criteria which Huntington (1991) used to conclude the first and second wave reversals, will again 
be applied to conclude as to whether or not the current international political order is experiencing a 
third wave reversal. As both the first and second waves of democratisation were followed by extensive 
reverse waves, it is now important to determine whether the third wave of democratisation has reached 
its end. Similarly, while many of the movements and their causes from democratic to non-democratic 
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regimes have varied, there are prevailing factors that stand out. With that in mind, this chapter will 
conduct an individual analysis of each of these factors while providing examples.  
 
 
A Weakness in Democratic Values 
According to Huntington (1991:292), “systematic failures of democratic regimes to operate effectively 
could undermine their legitimacy”. It has already been noted in Chapter 2 that democratic regimes are 
not without their problems in that their systems of governance are slow, they are often unable to 
saturate politically dogged societies and their electoral processes often produce inequality. Similarly, 
their voting systems are inappropriate for countries with numerous ethnic cultural groups because there 
is no one dominant majority which in turn, affects societies with multiple minority groups. Moreover, 
democracy has the ability to turn upon itself when its own procedural regulations allow for the lawful 
entrance of perceived terrorist groups into public office. One must be mindful that Hezbollah and 
Adolf Hitler were both elected in to government through relatively free and fair democratic elections. 
The 2010 Democracy Index, published by the Economist’s Intelligence Unit stated the following; 
Free and fair elections and civil liberties are necessary conditions for democracy, but they are unlikely to be 
sufficient for a full and consolidated democracy if unaccompanied by transparent and at least minimally 
efficient government, sufficient political participation and a supportive democratic political culture. It is not 
easy to build a sturdy democracy. Even in long-established ones, if not nurtured and protected, democracy 
can corrode.  
In predominantly Western countries, these issues are few and far between in so far as they boast a vast 
array of Huntington’s variables, and are therefore more inclined to comfortably position themselves 
within the democratic spectrum because “the forms and phrases of classical democracy are for many 
nations associated with events and developments in their history which are enthusiastically approved 
by large majorities” (Schumpeter 1942:266). However, in countries that are not of Western ideological 
origin, these seemingly trivial systematic issues could determine the success and failure of the 
fledgeling democracy. When citizens give up one regime for another, they do so in order to improve 
their way of life. When they adopt an ideology that is not inherently theirs, there is also a large 
expectation of successful results. For example, if one were to purchase an expensive car, one would 
expect luxurious amenities. Similarly, when an ultimately non-democratic society chooses to adopt 
liberal democracy, its level of expectation is high. 
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Thus, when democracy fails to produce that which it promised, or that which it has done in other 
states, “the memories of authoritarian failures fade... [and] irritation with democratic failures... [are] 
likely to increase” (Huntington 1991:29). Such is the current scenario in Egypt where citizens and 
international observers have begun to doubt the logic behind the Nile Revolution. Therefore, 
legitimacy is imperative to the sustainability of democracy for its own doctrine dictates the lawful need 
for public support. It cannot, by its own rules govern a society through force. With that in mind, when 
the society becomes disenchanted, the value system of democracy breaks down, which in turn leads to 
a reversal to authoritarian rule. Furthermore, it is imperative to underline the effect that systems of 
value have when introducing liberal democracy into a historically conservative society.  
Even when democracy measures some relative success within such a society, the innate nature of a 
country’s people often seek to go back to what they traditionally knew. Hence, even the slightest 
systematic failure of liberal democracy can spark an anti-democratic transition or authoritarian 
nostalgia. In fact, the systems of democratic governance do not have to fail at all, for more 
authoritarian modes of governance to re-emerge and operate simultaneously with liberal democracy. It 
is in these instances that observers of democracy point to the existence of ‘soft’ or ‘illiberal’ 
democracies, regimes in which certain democratic values are adopted along-side authoritarian ones. 
Nonetheless, they are still defined as democratic in so far as they subscribe to the procedural notions of 
what democracy is, namely that of a country that holds relatively free and fair elections every few 
years, during which the electorate chooses a leader.  
Here, this study will illustrate by using examples how the non-Western civilisations of the 21
st
 century 
have all undergone systematic failures under democratic rule. These examples will highlight the first, 
out of a total of seven, steps which demonstrate a possible third wave reversal. In Orthodox Russia, the 
Kremlin has endorsed new manuals for high school classrooms. The first is a history textbook which 
endorses Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Putin’s rule, both of whom were notorious for being 
undemocratic and dictatorial. The second is a social studies textbook that is marked by intense hostility 
towards the United States (US). The former is used to describe the centralisation of power under Putin 
as essential to the building of a stable Russian state, free from outside interference. The latter boasts 
Russia’s right wing character, namely authoritarian and conservative.  
The Eastern Civilisation of Asia, Mongolia, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan are the only 
countries, out of a total of 48 who are ranked as free on Freedom House’s Map of Freedom in the 
World (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010). In light of this and on the 
world’s largest and most populous continent, only ten percent of its land is therefore democratic and 
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only 400 million out of four billion people are governed along democratic lines. Statistically, one 
could argue that because liberal democracy is the world’s dominant ideology, a large area will 
ultimately result in a higher chance of Asia housing democratic countries, but this in reality, is not so. 
In fact, the Asian continent has the least number of democratic countries, even though it is the largest 
and most densely populated. One can translate this into a lack of liberal democratic values in a highly 
dominant Confucian society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: An Observation of Democratic Development in Asia 
Constructed using (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2011) and 
(http://www.asian-nation.org/demographics.shtml) 
 
The Muslim world does not fare any better in relation to freedom and democracy.  Presidents and royal 
blood lines remain immensely powerful and unrestricted in the Middle East and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). Opposition continues to remain weak, allowing leaders to go unchecked by effective 
watchdogs such as independent judiciaries and a free media. This is not only because counter 
institutions to authoritarian regimes are fragile, but also because there is a weakness in political 
engagement from the people, who stand to uphold human rights and government accountability. While 
recent developments might demonstrate otherwise, they do not guarantee the development of a 
democratic transition.   
It must be stated that the commitment of Arab states to the Islamic faith is immensely strong, 
comprising a high regard for royal families who are seen as direct descendents of the prophet 
Muhammad. As a result, democratic regimes are not particularly conducive to the Muslim culture in so 
far as such a dominantly hierarchical structure is more befitting to monarchies and aristocracies. 
Similarly, those who subscribe with absolute commitment to Shariah law do so with the objective of 
An Observation of Democratic Development in Asia 
 
Landmass in Relation to Freedom 
Method: Free Societies ÷ Total Number of Countries in Asia × 100 
Calculation: 5 ÷ 48 × 100 = 10.41% 
Conclusion: Just over ten percent of the Asian landmass is ‘free’ 
 
Population in Relation to Freedom 
Method: Free Societies ÷ Total Number of Countries in Asia × Average Total of Asian 
Population 
Calculation: 5÷ 48 × 3 879 000 000 = 404 062 500 
Conclusion: Only an average of four million people out of a total of four billion people 
live within democratic societies.  
 
Overall, the statistical probability that Asia should house the greatest number of 
democratic societies fails to compliment the determined conclusion that it does not.  
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seeing its worldwide enforcement. Already, Islamic fundamentalists have engaged in a global jihad to 
further this cause, often threatening nations who refuse to accept Islam.  After the terrorist attacks that 
took place in 2001, the United States (US) attempted to implement liberal democracy in Iraq.  
 
Its approach failed miserably in so far as Iraq was incapable of overcoming its underdevelopment and 
serious religious differences. Not only was the country crippled by economic and political 
mismanagement, it also did not have the knowledge and historical experience to successfully promote 
liberal democratic values. In light of this, Iraq might possibly follow the same trajectory as Uganda did 
after gaining independence from Britain, when the establishment of liberal democracy was left to a 
country who had few of the building blocks needed to make it successful . Dowden (2008) illustrates 
to what extent an exercise of this sort can subsequently create a democratic meltdown, and how, in the 
case of Uganda, show what the democratic will of the West has instigated. 
 
At independence in 1962, Britain attempted to leave behind a Westminster-style democracy in the tropics 
with a President and a Prime Minister. Maybe they thought they had cleverly created harmonious balance. 
They might as well have left the Ugandans the instruments of the London Philharmonic Orchestra and told 
them to play Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony….The Democratic Party was left in the wilderness. The British 
walked away. Disaster was only a matter of time (Dowden 2008:41).  
 
The failure to encourage Iraq’s democratic transition has marked the post-Saddam era as one of the 
worst political periods in Iraqi history. Furthermore, the obvious collapse of Iraq’s present government 
and its inability to govern the state under democratic values paints an ominous picture for democracy’s 
future success within the country.  Similarly, instead of attempting to consistently and gradually reduce 
the level of oppression created by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s dictatorship, the United States 
(US) openly expressed its support for the Muslim Brotherhood by supporting the revolution.  
 
The issue which arises is the argument, that in most cases, authoritarian regimes are replaced by new 
leaders who continue to rule under authoritarian rules and institutions. The chance that the Muslim 
Brotherhood will unanimously adopt a regime that openly supports liberal democratic values is remote, 
especially if one were to look at past experience. As of 2010, the only countries that were not 
considered to be dictatorships in the Middle East, this according to the Economist’s Democracy Index 
(http://afghancentral.blogspot.com/2011/02/arab-countries-democracy-index.html), were Lebanon, 
Iraq and the Palestinian ‘territories’. Only three out of 22 countries or only 14 percent of the Arab 
world is democratic, even though most of them have at one time experienced a democratic transition.  
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What this shows is the habitual return to authoritarian styles of government due to a lack of systematic 
success and a lack of democratic values within the political culture of the Muslim civilisation. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, ethnicity and tribal loyalties pose the same threat as Islam does to liberal democracy 
After independence, many of Africa’s new leaders were met with the challenge of having to convince 
different tribes and or ethnic groups to live peacefully together, despite the small matter of these same 
groups having a history of conflict. The issue of national homogeneity played an important role in the 
failures of many African states to build nations. Meredith (2006:2) points out;  
 
Kingdoms that had been historically antagonistic to one another, such as Buganda and Bunyoro in Uganda, 
were linked into the same colony... [while in] the Sahel, new territories were established across the great 
divide between the desert regions of the Sahara and the belt of tropic forests to the south – Sudan, Chad and 
Nigeria – throwing together Muslim and non-Muslim peoples into latent hostility 
 
Because many ethnic differences exist, even within one country, the true meaning on the nation-state is 
often in a position of crisis in Africa, which in turn creates a very weak foundation for liberal 
democracy to start. In many cases, dictatorships emerged from an environment where the fear of loss 
of power was overshadowed by democratic values that demand equality and mutual acknowledgement 
of all civic institutions – a demand of liberal democracy that is immensely difficult to fulfil in 
ethnically divided societies. The anxiety that power would once more be lost, or ‘stolen’ prompted 
many an African leader to keep a firm grip on the systems of government.  
Similarly, the abundance of ethnic groups living within one country often posed a problem to 
democracy’s election process; a factor which remains one of the most fundamental characteristics 
ascribed to liberal democracy. In the Ivory Coast, there are currently more than 60 different indigenous 
ethnic groups, making voting along lines of ethnicity immensely problematic. After independence, 
African leaders with nationalist objectives chose to select party candidates, based not on their ethnic 
affiliation, but rather on the notion of integration and ultimately, in an attempt to create a nation-state. 
However, as time passed and the number of post colonial democratic elections grew, the stakes for 
winning those elections became higher, as potential leaders discovered that they could win more votes 
if they appealed to targeted ethnic groups, promising to improve services and infrastructure in their 
area.  
 
In a continent where class formation had hardly begun to alter loyalties, ethnicity provided the strongest 
political base. Politicians and voters alike came to rely on ethnic solidarity. For politicians it was the route to 
power. They became, in effect, ethnic entrepreneurs. For voters it was their main hope of getting a slice of 
government bounty. What they wanted...[was] an ethnic patron who could capture a share of the spoils and 
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bring it back to their community. Primary loyalty remained rooted in tribal identity. Kinship, clan and ethnic 
considerations largely determined the way people voted. The main component of African politics became in 
essence, kinship corporations (Meredith 2006:156). 
 
Sixty years on and not much has changed. Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe systematically divides 
the provision of food and other government services between his Shona tribe in the North and the 
‘rival’ Matabele in the South; while Kenya’s adoption of a new constitution sparked much criticism for 
its ethnic underwriting. Similarly, in 2010, the Ivory Coast underwent its first democratic election in 
over six years following issues around the opposition, Mr. Alassane Outarra’s nationality. In the Ivory 
Coast, a person is only considered to be a true Ivorian citizen if either his or her parents are born there. 
In his case, Outarra’s father was born in Burkina Faso, an issue which prevented him from running for 
the presidency on two separate occasions. Countries such as Guinea, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, 
Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda, have all been confronted by the obvious conflict that Western liberal 
democracy demands and that a segregated society can provide.  
 
 
In many African countries, the internal issue of national identity far outweighs the possibility of 
successful democratic transition. In fact, not a single African country is ranked as fully democratic on 
the Economist’s Democracy Index. Overall, the only non-Western countries, belonging to the other 
four civilisations and who are classified as fully democratic are South Korea and Japan. The remaining 
24 are ideologically Western. The British National Party (BNP), for example, has been met with 
hostile criticism regarding its ‘whites only’ policy and its nationalist ideology and explicit racism. 
Nonetheless, the party doubled its support in Britain’s 2006 local elections and has increased its voter 
support from only 50 thousand votes in the 2001 general elections to over 500 thousand votes in 2010. 
In this instance, it can be argued that liberal democracy as a political ideology is becoming weaker in 
even the oldest of democracies, pointing to a possible fundamental flaw in its mechanics. That is, it 
points to Huntington’s (1991) wave theory as a predictive model rather than an assumption; 
highlighting that if democracy cannot sustain itself, it will undergo peaks and troughs in the future or 
at present, as it has done so in the past.  
 
The need to revert to a societal structure by which the British National Party’s (BNP’s) own ideology, 
is not founded on democratic values and which people are now supporting, points to an overall distaste 
for liberal democratic values and practices. Yes, there was an election and the electorate placed their 
vote through democratic processes, but who and what they voted for cannot be attributed to liberal 
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democratic sentiment. Similarly, in 2006 Italy’s Prime Minister, Mr, Silvio Berlusconi struck a pre-
election political alliance with the granddaughter of fascist dictator Benito Mussolini and leader of the 
neo-fascist New Force Party.  
 
While Mr. Berlusconi continually referred to his opposition as ‘Communists’ and threats to 
democracy, stark criticism was placed upon his objectives when he formed a coalition with Allesandra 
Mussolini’s party, which according to its website claims to be merely “ valuing and strengthening the 
people’s tradition and culture” (Scherer and Ghieth, 2006). Moreover, in Sweden, which is considered 
to be one of the world’s most democratic countries, its liberal parliament has had to allow the entrance 
of the right wing party called the Sweden Democrats into its seats. In the country’s 2010 general 
election, the party won 5.7 percent of the vote while claiming 20 seats for the first time. From 2002 to 
2010, the party has gained a staggering 4.3 percent in voter support, which like the British National 
Party, highlights a growing nationalist ideological turn around.   
The 2010 Democracy Index ranked Norway as the fullest democracy in the world, but in 2009 the 
Progress Party took nearly a quarter of the seats in parliament after riding a wave of anti-immigrant 
sentiment in Norwegian society. Not only did one of the Party’s former members massacre 77 people 
in the name of fighting immigration, but its leader, Siv Jensen stated that “a left-wing political elite 
were allowing Western civilisation to be eroded by Muslim immigrants with opposing values” (Ritter, 
2011). Similarly, the Netherlands, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia and Slovakia have all 
experienced the same phenomenon, where voters are beginning to revert to the right-wing politics of 
authoritarianism, fascism and nationalism; and less towards liberal democracy.  
 
Thus, we are not only seeing an anti-democratic stance towards new democratic transitions, but also a 
reversion from historically democratic countries as well. In the discussion on how systematic failures 
and the lack of democratic values can contribute to a third wave reversal, it must be emphasised that 
the traditional notion of Western liberal democracy supports to a large extent, only Western countries. 
The evidence and examples brought forward in the above discussion point to the problematic nature of 
democracy when imposing it upon a traditionally non-democratic society and its greater civilisation. In 
general, it also highlights the systematic failures of liberal democracy as a whole in the contemporary 
era in so far as predominantly Western countries appear to be less inclined to remember the benefits of 
the ideology and are more disposed to overhaul it entirely.  
 
Economic Crisis 
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The 2008 economic recession contributed significantly to the breakdown of liberal democratic 
influence around the globe. Indeed, the Economist Intelligence Unit itself stated that following the 
2008 recession, democracy would retreat.  When a democratic state is unable to provide a relatively 
stable amount of economic welfare for its people, legitimacy for the ruling powers begin to erode. 
According to Davis and Corothers (2010:1), “frustrated citizens voted out incumbents in more than 
thirty-five percent of the elections in 2009, including long-term ruling parties in Iceland, Japan and El 
Salvador”. In the same year, the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) warned of 
the important link between economics and the political legitimacy of liberal democracy.   
 
It stated that “the democracy dimensions of the financial and economic crisis should not be neglected 
as the social and political impact of the economic downturn is already emerging as a major threat to 
the development gains of the last decade” (http://www.idea.int/un/democracy_finance_crisis.cfm). 
Countries with weak democratic institutions would be vulnerable to setbacks, while established 
democracies would face problems arising out of nationalist sentiments owing to an influx of 
immigrants, and because governments play a vital role in enhancing the legitimacy of their function, 
criticisms by a county’s citizens regarding certain policy decisions could erode voter support. Again, 
the importance of economics in relation to generating political legitimacy becomes problematic when 
governments, developed or developing fail to provide the services the electorate expect.  
 
Hobsbawm (1995) attempts to explain how the ascension of Western democratic governments, have 
over the last 50 years become forms of social insurance in so far as their economic policies have been 
used as tools to maintain political legitimacy. However, balancing political legitimacy is only possible 
when governments are able to maintain sufficient levels of economic growth. The 2008 economic 
crisis illustrated that many Western economies were not stable. In fact, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) warned that the world’s financial system was “teetering on the brink of systematic 
meltdown” (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7665729.stm). Survivors of the crisis are now keenly 
aware of what is lost in a crisis of confidence, in so far as when the financial network of a government 
begins to unravel, “voters are notoriously inclined to blame whatever party or regime is in power” 
(Hobsbawm 1995:416).  
 
Institutions which have been most affected during times of economic crises have been the “democratic 
or labour parties of the West, whose main instrument of satisfying their supporters [through] 
economic...action by local governments lost its force” (Hobsbawm 1995:417). What have generally 
emerged are new political forces that range from extreme right wing parties to social movements, 
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whose promises to provide those services which the former party has failed to do, spark civic attention. 
Supported by Hobsbawm (1995), the importance of these new movements lay not so much in their 
constructive natures, as their antagonism to the old which failed to uphold its promise of social and 
economic liberation. Thus it was not a disregard to the political system as a whole, but towards the 
social failures of the system.  
The up-and-coming working class of the 21st century became accustomed to the idea of guaranteed 
employment, or that whatever employment one had aspired to, would be available to take and make 
theirs. Now, that promise does no longer exist, and with that, comes a sense of “disorientation and 
insecurity [which has] produced significant tectonic cracks and shifts in the politics of developed 
countries...on which the stability of several Western parliamentary democracies had rested” 
(Hobsbawm 1995:416). By 2020, it is estimated that China, will overtake the United States (US) as the 
economic hegemon. In fact, of the world’s most ten powerful economies, only four are rated as full 
democracies on the Economist’s Democracy Index.  
 
The remaining six, namely China, India, Russia, Brazil, France and Italy, are categorised as flawed 
democracies or hybrid regimes, comprising societies that according to Merkel (2004), are not 
represented by a government that acknowledges civil rights and political liberties, that can be held 
accountable and who is able to effectively govern its people in a democratic fashion. Similarly it has 
been estimated that by 2020, the United States (US), Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom will 
lose their current economic ranking and be replaced by defective democratic states. Barrington Moore 
Jr. (1967:417) states that the “persistence of royal absolutism or more generally of a preindustrial 
bureaucratic rule into modern times has created conditions unfavourable to democracy of the Western 
variety”.  
 
Interestingly, he emphasises that the founders of contemporary modernisation are China, Russia, 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan and India, all of whom have had strong monarchical 
systems at one point or another in their history. What this illustrates is that one does not need to be 
democratic to introduce modernity. That is, a country does not need to be democratic in order to 
provide the services and infrastructure necessary to generate political legitimacy, and a non-democratic 
regime can do the same, if not better in providing what its people need to survive. Democracy is 
therefore not a prerequisite for development, and happiness.  
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A Decrease in Economic Power by Democratic States 
2010 2020 
1 United States 1 China 
2 China 2 United States 
3 Japan 3 India 
4 India 4 Japan 
5 Germany 5 Russia 
6 Russia 6 Germany 
7 United Kingdom 7 Brazil 
8 France 8 United Kingdom 
9 Brazil 9 France 
10 Italy 10 Mexico 
Table 2: A Decrease in Economic Power by Democratic States 
Constructed using: (http://blog.euromonitor.com/2010/07/special-report-top-10-largest-economies-in-
2020.html)
12
 
 
The important relationship between capitalism and democracy must not be overlooked. One of the 
greatest contributions economic development has given to liberal democracies is a higher standard of 
education amongst its citizens. As a result, “educated individuals tend to be more tolerant of 
opposition and of minorities, and more committed to democracy and participation” (Diamond 
1992:117). Nonetheless, the relationship between capitalism and liberal democracy is still problematic 
in so far as “not all [successful] capitalist societies have had liberal democratic polities” (Waisman 
1992:140).  
 
One reason for this is the development of conscious critical thought, which has afforded societies a 
greater perspective on their existence. While authors such as Lipset (1959) have argued that the better 
educated a society, the more democratic it is, education has also served as a means by which people 
can be more aware of its criticisms. The primal and once consuming need to survive has given way to 
a space where reflection on the subjective can take place. This space has infiltrated numerous areas of 
personal and social life, and it should not be assumed that it has in no way impacted on political 
thought as well. Indeed; 
 
...in place of exemplary instructions in the virtuous life and recommended models of the good life, one finds 
an increasingly pronounced, abstract demand for a conscious, self-critical appropriation, the demand that one 
                                                          
12
 While this information was taken from a blog, Euromonitor International is an institution which has provided global 
market research and other business information since 1972.  
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responsibly take possession of one’s own individual, irreplaceable and contingent life history. (Habermas 
1996:96) 
 
This subjective will is what makes democracy problematic. Schumpeter (1942) argues that to think 
that there exists a universal common good is false, because no set of values or traditions can mean the 
same to every person; there is no unanimous acceptance of their meaning, let alone understanding. 
Democracy overlooks this important issue, by claiming that the fairest way to go about it is to give 
power to the majority. While it does attempt to in some way ease the severity of this issue, a political 
ideology cannot remove the subjective present in the discourse of political culture. A primary pillar of 
democracy is the acknowledgement and provision of equality, and yet this ideology shows its 
contradicting nature by not allowing non-Western societies “to decide for themselves what the criteria 
for equal treatment should be” (O’Neill 2000:510).   
 
Instead, it forces upon those societies which it infiltrates, doctrine comprising alien tradition and 
expects them to accept laws which in many aspects, have not been granted legitimacy by the people. 
Even in those societies in which political guidance is desperately needed, liberal democracy is placed 
on the negotiating table by the West with a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude, leaving very little space for 
disadvantaged states to manoeuvre and debate. These political prerequisites often do not coincide with 
the culture of the society in which liberal democracy is employed, and which, as this study will 
discuss, often leads to greater difficulties. It is the coercive nature of liberal democracy that prompts 
this study to adopt a critical discourse analysis and apply it to the examples as presented in this 
investigation.  
 
Moreover, it has assisted in demonstrating the existence and consequent importance of the forces 
which build a society and how they are used in developing a unique version of reality that is partial to 
that society’s interests. Similarly, by using a critical discourse analysis, this study will attempt to 
explain why acts of oppression have as a consequence, been responded to in displays of resistance 
towards ideological oppression. China, India, Russia, Germany, Italy and Brazil have all historically 
been inhospitable towards liberal democracy; yet, data shows that their economies are still highly 
influential. Many of the Latin American countries however, who in 2001, suffered extreme levels of 
macroeconomic instability, and who attempted to alleviate the worsening condition by borrowing 
money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) faced popular outcries by their citizens.  
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In countries such as Argentina and Mexico, dissent regarding the “structural adjustment requirements 
demanded by the much-maligned lender of last resort” (Brown 2009:432), increased all because the 
conditions ultimately removed the electorate from political engagement. While these two countries 
swore to uphold democratic practices, their relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
ultimately ignored what their electorate requested. What the electorate voted for, through democratic 
elections, was not what they received. In fact, data has shown that while structural adjustment 
programmes are designed to encourage economic development, achieving democracy is not the 
ultimate goal of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
 
In other words, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) “historically favours authoritarian regimes over 
democracies when deciding on loans, perhaps because dictatorships are more capable of implementing 
unpopular reforms” (Brown 2009:433). Indeed, when leaders are not required to be held accountable, 
it is easier for them to undermine the people. That is, if they are not interested in being elected by way 
of social choice, then they are in no way obliged to fulfil the needs of the electorate during their rule. 
Their apathy towards good governance, makes them key targets for institutions who are not inclined to 
acknowledge practices of good governance if they do not have to.  
 
In countries such as Chile and Uruguay, “instability and dictatorship were largely...the result of 
economic institutions that produced...stagnation and social and state structures [that were] not 
conducive to stable democracy” (Waisman 1992:142). As a result, it would appear that while liberal 
democracy requires a free market economy to sustain legitimacy, capitalism is not compelled to 
function alongside democracy. With that in mind,  and with the necessity which liberal democracy 
requires capitalism to function, the decline in legitimacy for elected governments following the 2008 
economic recession could be a major contributing factor to the a third wave reversal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The systematic weaknesses of liberal democracy in the context of democratic contestation were 
highlighted by the 2008 economic recession because they undermined the; 
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political and macroeconomic stability required for growth, by precipitating frequent government changes or 
through populist mobilisation against economic stabilisation and adjustment policies. The cause of economic 
growth is best served...by limited democracies, controlled for long periods either by a dominant ruling party 
or by stable coalitions, even though these systems do not necessarily live up to the allegedly unrealistic 
standards of Western models (Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor 2003:23). 
 
During the 1980s the American model of democracy was appealing to newly democratising states 
because it “conveyed an image of strength and success” (Huntington 1991:287). In the 21st century 
however, there is no denying that the United States (US) is facing severe economic problems, meaning 
that if the United States (US) is perceived to be the winning model for democratic success, its current 
and future failure at an economic hegemon has and will certainly diminish the appeal of liberal 
democracy. The time during which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank could 
demand “political democratisation...as a precondition for economic assistance” (Huntington 1991:289) 
is over.  In the Chinese contest, it is difficult to determine what constitutes aid as most of its 
programmes are concessionary loans.  
 
The concessionary aspect of the loan is legitimate aid, but the principal must be paid back unless China 
eventually cancels the debt, which it has a record of doing for the poorest of African countries. 
Chinese aid has, over the years, gone into a variety of projects ranging from agricultural endeavours, to 
basic infrastructure and public health. What could emerge are governments who are not democratic, 
but who are still able to provide basic welfare to their people; a stark contradiction to the argument that 
democratic regimes provide a better standard of living than authoritarian regimes do. Similarly, 
arguments opposing the assumption that non-democratic regimes have lower levels of economic 
growth than what democratic regimes, should also take into account those actions taken by democratic 
states to impede economic development through the international trade zone by way of sanctions, high 
tariffs, restrictions on developmental aid and the subsidising of locally made produce. 
 
 
 
The Breakdown of Law and Order Resulting from Terrorism and Insurgency 
 
Every liberal democratic state is obliged to not only observe domestic rules and regulations, but 
international law as well. Adherence to these rules then governs the conduct and thus relationships of 
each and between these independent territories. In a dominant Western world, it is commonplace to 
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expect a non-democratic state to disregard international law and break rules. Indeed, peace treaties and 
cooperation agreements are often broken, and in these territories, constant mediation is required 
through said treaties and agreements. Chad and Sudan as well as Egypt and Palestine are examples of 
states that need continual treaty observation and negotiation in order to prevent hostile encounters from 
taking place. What is not considered to be customary in a traditional Western world is the blatant 
dismissal of international rules and regulations by the world’s most perceivably democratic nation.  
 
Domestically, the United States (US) is comprised of a Presidential system which according to law, 
allows the President to deploy the country’s military, but not to declare war. What the constitution 
states is that Congress allowed to make that announcement. Moreover, the American constitution only 
justifies war if its territory is attacked. To this day, and following the terrorist attacks that took place 
on 11 September 2001, the United States Congress has not declared war, nor given the President 
authority to do so, while the government has been unable to prove that Iraq attacked the United States 
(US). Thus, by its own domestic policy, the United States (US) violated its own constitution. Similarly, 
the pre-emptive invasion of Iraq has also violated the United Nations Charter, which is a treaty as well 
as part of the supreme law of the United States (US).  
 
The Charter requires the United State to settle all disputes by peaceful means and instructs it not to use 
military force in the absence of an armed attack. In its entirety, the invasion of Iraq by the United 
States (US) was illegal, unjustified and met with overwhelming public opposition. As a result, 
commitment to democracy, by the world’s democratic idol, must be brought into question. The 
implementation of the country’s Patriot Act, which grants the President unprecedented powers to 
intercept telephone calls, emails, authorise torture, spy on supposed instigators of war and arrest and 
imprison its own citizens without granting them the right to a trail, is with respect, undemocratic.  
 
 
Moreover, the acts committed by the United States (US) government to combat any opposition, have 
been to disperse “economic aid and ideological propaganda, through official and unofficial military 
subversion to major war; preferably in alliance with a friendly or bought local regime [such as Israel 
and the United Kingdom], but if need be without local support” (Hobsbawm 1995:234). This example 
alone stands tribute to a possible third wave reversal in so far as the system itself illustrates that a 
democratic hegemon is legally guilty of committing that which only non-democratic regimes are 
thought to do. In contrast, the terrorist attacks that took place on 11 September 2001 are a good 
example of a breakdown of law and order. While the undertaking caused the deaths of just under three 
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thousand people and sparked one of history’s greatest insurgencies by the world’s democratic 
hegemon, it also generated fears in other sovereign territories about the emergence of global terrorism.  
 
On a global scale, terrorist activity and violence have grown worse since 2001. What would have been 
considered as extreme levels of terrorism prior to 2001 is now being thought of as the norm. According 
to Conetta (2006) the rate of terrorist incidents increased by 268 percent after 2001 than that of the 
figure prior of the 11 September attacks, while citing that there is a one hundred and sixty-seven 
percent increase in what might be called the average monthly rate of incidents. In 2008, a Washington 
Post journalist wrote that of the “1,840 incidents in the past 25 years, more than 86 percent have 
occurred since 2001” (Wright, 2008). As of 2001, India, Jordan, Russia, Indonesia, Egypt, Britain, 
Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, Morocco, Kenya, Tunisia, Israel, Iraq, Uganda, the Philippines, Sri 
Lanka and Pakistan have all suffered terrorist attacks that drew fatalities over the 100 mark and left 
hundreds in some instances, thousands seriously injured.  
 
The significant increase in global terrorism is important to this study in so far as it outlines a serious 
grievance with the current status quo. Indeed, most terrorist motives portray one key characteristic and 
that is the theme of injustice and inequality. Terrorists emerge from and identify with a large group of 
people who believe that they are unfairly repressed. Arguably, terrorism is not necessarily irrational 
behaviour as this activity has been particularly effective in anti-colonial struggles for independence. 
All terrorists proclaim to be suffering under the rule of a corrupt or illegitimate power and believe that 
their terrorist acts are an effective strategy to obtain liberation from their oppressors.  
 
Terrorism entails a great amount of self motivation as the organisation is one that demands change by 
any means necessary. It is a dynamic process that attempts to coerce states and smaller communities in 
to transgressing backwards or forwards into a way of life or ideology that the terrorist group desires. 
No one kills 3, 572 people and injures a further 2, 635 because they want to maintain the status quo.
13
 
These groups “attempt to achieve their goals in terms of creating religious freedom for their groups or 
bringing groups that they see as more theologically correct to power” (Lutz and Lutz 2004:14).  This is 
most notable with regard to the Muslim civilisation in so far as their Islamic faith dictates a global 
following.  
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In order to explain the “underlying rationale of the global jihad, [which] is seen as a reaction to the 
perceived oppression of Muslims worldwide and the spiritual bankruptcy of the West” (Baylis and 
Smith 2005:486), religious terrorism became known as “post modern terrorism” or “new terrorism”. 
Terrorists resort to political violence in order to achieve a goal that they cannot reach in any other way. 
Whether they do it to gain political power, overthrow a government or regime, or attempt to remove or 
execute an ideology from the social consciousness of a society; it is done with the underlying intent to 
change the status quo. Hence, the spread of global terrorism is an indication that resistance to Western 
liberal democracy is present, and dramatically increasing. 
 
Intervention or Conquest by a Non-Democratic Foreign Government 
In an attempt to explain how a third wave reversal could be induced through a breakdown in law and 
order, Huntington (1991:293) states that “if a non-democratic state greatly developed its power and 
began to expand beyond its borders... [and most notably if] the expanding authoritarian state militarily 
defeated one or more democratic countries in the process of expanding”, then democracy would be 
under threat. It must be noted that while Huntington (1991) argues that the possibility of such events 
are highly improbable, he also states that they are not, to some degree, impossible. Huntington (1991) 
maintains that authoritarian nationalism, religious fundamentalism, oligarchic authoritarianism, 
populist dictatorships, communal dictatorships and lastly, technocratic electronic dictatorships could 
all re-emerge if a third wave reversal was indeed taking place. 
A contemporary example of each instance will be discussed in order to illustrate how the influence of 
non-democratic states has indeed shifted the liberal democratic paradigm into reverse.   
 
a) Authoritarian Nationalism 
The ideological mobilisation of an ethnocentric state, most notably if it is not democratic is an example 
of an ‘autho-nationalist’ regime. This means that authoritarian states, which are considered to be the 
“psychological basis of ethno-centric attitudes” (Todosijevic 1998:1) use the back-drop of ideological 
structures to create a following and a sense of belonging in so far as people are “most receptive to 
those ideologies which afford the fullest expression of [an] over-all personality structure” (Todosijevic 
1998:2). Hence, an autho-nationalist regime is one which uses the psychological influence of ideology 
to generate its legitimacy and enforces it through long periods of socialisation. Arguably, the rise of 
nationalism, in such an age of modernity leads to the assumption that there is a contradiction between 
the evolution of a liberal utopia which Fukuyama (1992) imagined in which the entire global 
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community would subscribe to a liberal stasis of being, and re-emerging differences between an ‘us’ 
and ‘them’.  
 
One might go so far as to say that “we have been deluded [in so far as] the fires of nationalism were 
never quenched, only temporarily screened from view by our guilty realisation of their wilful 
consequences” (Smith 1995:51). The existence of ethnocentric attitudes and prejudice towards other 
cultures is what the psychological structure of an autho-nationalist regime is comprised of. A regime of 
this nature will use the systematic distinction of different cultural groups and subversively underline 
the importance of difference, which in turn generates concern between the ethnic groups as they 
continue to interact with each other. The consequent distinction of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ emerges which 
ultimately sees the distinction between privileged groups and those who are undermined. Indeed, the 
lack of a sense of nationhood thus worsens the anxiety of a people to nationalise, in so far as it 
guarantees the acknowledgement of identity which is currently perceived as being under threat.  
 
 
 
The notion of a national culture has “reasserted its primacy over politics, economics and technology, 
for culture is the unchanging fabric of society, with its slow rhythms of communication, its deep 
structures in the human psyche and its all-encompassing symbolic codes and networks of social 
relations” (Smith 1995:53). It can then be argued that modernisation and the spread of liberal 
democracy has not affected the basic relationship between different groups and other social structures 
in a manner that is conducive to a democratic extension, but rather in a fashion that causes large-scale 
changes that hinder a sense of nationhood because of capitalism and its political counterpart. In the 21
st
 
century, autho-nationalist sentiment is rife, as evident in Russia, the United States (US), and China.  
 
Huntington (1991:290) states that an economic crisis “or collapse that instensifie[s] social conflict and 
enhance[s] popularity to remedies that could only be imposed by authoritarian governments” will 
contribute to a democratic breakdown. Sentiments against the Islamic tradition and towards its people 
as well as issues of immigration, nationality, ethnicity and race have appeared at the centre of most 
campaigns conducted by parties such as the British National Party, the Sweden Democrats, the 
Freedom Party in Netherlands and the Jobbik Party in Hungary. At the core of their policies lies the 
argument that the failure of strict immigration laws has led to the deterioration of economic 
opportunity for their country’s citizens. Behind the guise of the terrorist threat, these parties argue that 
economic uncertainty has been a result, not only of the economic crisis, but of an influx of immigrants.  
72 
 
 
South Africa experienced the same problem in 2008 when immigrants from Zimbabwe, Malawi and 
Mozambique were attacked by South African citizens claiming that immigrants were reducing their 
chances of finding employment, suitable housing and other commodities.  
In the same way, France’s rigid policy towards the French Romani has sparked massive protests. 
Citing security concerns, President Sarkozy, through the government of France implemented a 
repatriation programme which up until 2011, has sent over 1000 Eastern Romani back to their 
countries of origin and which has authorised the destruction of 51 illegal Romani camps. In response, 
the European Commission (EC) has only threatened France with legal action. In all these examples, an 
increase in the gap between rich and poor and a subsequent rise in inequality has led to the overall 
emergence of societal divides and rising anti-democratic sentiment.  
 
In all these instances, very little has been done to oppose these racist outbursts and party formations. 
Arguably, European and other democratic countries are being divided by a phobic tendency towards 
exclusive citizenship, which in turn has highlighted a blatant disregard for liberal democratic values 
and practices. In contrast to the effect of immigration as a factor leading to nationalism is the current 
political status of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Poland and Slovakia have nationalist party 
coalitions, while in 2006, Hungary experienced riots when the Fidesz Party refused to accept election 
results. Similarly, in Prague, a “stalemated election led to seven months with no government, making 
the Czech Republic for a time, the largest NGO in Europe” (Rupnik 2007:18).  
 
In Bulgaria, voters had a choice between “an ex-communist and a pro-fascist who openly expressed his 
hatred towards Turks, Gypsies and Jews” (Rupnik 2007:18) during the country’s 2006 elections. 
Coalitions, the refusal to acknowledge election results and limited choice in leadership are all factors 
which contribute to the breakdown of liberal democratic practice. If an electorate uses their democratic 
right to vote for a leader, and their vote is not acknowledged, voter apathy will begin to infiltrate into 
society thus creating a disengaged civil society and a set of leaders who manipulate the democratic 
system in order to further their own agendas.  
 
b) Religious Fundamentalism 
The paradox has often been noted that the United States (US) which was founded upon secularist 
ideology is now one of the most religiously orientated countries in the world. The reason for this is that 
the religiosity of America stems paradoxically from the secularism of its constitution. That is, because 
America is legally secular, Christianity has become free enterprise in the sense that with the same 
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aggressiveness businessmen would display in the marketplace, churches fight for congregations. The 
result is religious mania, coupled with Christian fundamentalists attempting to influence people by any 
means necessary in order for the American society to live according to Christian morals and values. 
Carter (2005) points to the fact that Christian Evangelism influences political discourse in the United 
States (US), hence the legitimacy of the political decisions currently being made can be questioned as 
a result of its capacity to diminish critical thinking and rather evoke emotion based on no legal or 
rational grounds.  
 
According to Carter (2005), the diversified relationship between the state and religious organizations is 
the leading factor in the obvious digression from America’s traditional values, one of which is the 
separation of the state from religion. This is because, “fundamentalists have become increasingly 
influential in both religion and government… [and are] able to implement their long-frustrated 
philosophy into both domestic and foreign policy” (Carter 2005:3). A case in point is the way in which 
during the elections between George W. Bush and Al Gore, voters could choose between a candidate 
who called himself a born again Christian and who argued for more federal funding for faith-based 
programmes; and Bush, who was renewed in faith thanks to Billy Graham, the world’s most famous 
evangelist. There was not one non-religious candidate for the American electorate to vote for. In 2005, 
John Danforth, a representative of Missouri in the U. S Senate wrote; 
 
Republicans have transformed our party into the political arm of Conservative Christians. The elements of 
this transformation…are parts of a larger package, an agenda of positions common to Conservative 
Christians and the dominant wing of the Republican Party…The problem is not with people or churches that 
are politically active. It is with a party that has gone so far in adopting a sectarian agenda that is has become 
the political extension of a religious movement. (Carter 2005:63) 
 
Similarly, Kumar (1987:230) argues that, “the rulers and politicians [of today], trained in obsolete 
disciplines and shaped by class experiences that would have made them more at home in the 18
th
 than 
the 20th century [are] the carriers of an antiquated technique and philosophy that [is] bringing western 
civilization to the brink of catastrophe” hence, leaving Christian discursive habit to continue 
influencing political discourse. In Russia, where both a middle class and civil institutions are needed 
for democracy to be successful, its hybrid regime remains violent, unstable and economically unequal, 
despite the country’s literacy rate which according to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
stands at 100 percent. 
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c) Oligarchic Authoritarianism 
In authoritarian oligarchies, the political power lies in the hands a few select elites or figureheads, 
whereby “authoritarianism develop[s]... as a response to socioeconomic polarisation” (Huntington 
1991:294). This system of feudal rule makes the emergence of oligarchic regimes interesting because 
it is an ancient system of autocracy which has evolved in order to suit modern day political features.  
Contemporary systems of oligarchic authoritarianism exist in most ethnically fragmented societies, in 
which the elite belong to a specific cultural group in which power resides. In Africa, this form of 
authoritarianism is most prominent and has, since Africa’s independence been one of the greatest 
challenges towards achieving nationhood. The historic success of Western liberal democracy says 
nothing about the ideology’s long-term stability. To assume that liberal democracy is the ultimate 
Utopia as Fukuyama (1992) argues is in itself an ethno-centric mentality which is forced forward by 
insulated opinions from its creators. The inflexible form of democratic institutions which have been 
applied in traditionally non-Western societies has in itself fostered authoritarian regimes and 
oligarchies.  
 
The golden era of liberal democracy has perhaps been so enjoyed by those who prospered from its 
success that it has rendered those very people blind to its future shortcomings. A “democratic 
government cannot function unless citizens trust one another, and such trust is hard to achieve where 
numbers are large... [because] a shared national identity generates not only the mutual trust needed for 
the functioning of a stable democracy, but also collective solidarity, a precondition of distributive 
justice” (Ozkirimli 2005:77). In states that house a vast array of ethnic groups, serious difficulty has 
emerged in building nations, let alone democracies. From a conceptual standpoint, states which suffer 
from power struggles between various ethnic groups are at particular risk of violence, mass human 
rights violations and political instability.  
 
Because democracy is based on the politics of inclusion, this dilemma then poses an immensely 
problematic scenario. The process of democratisation “tends to give pride of place to the high politics 
of state rather than the deep politics of society....where elite pacts defining rules of the game are given 
more attention than the political struggles of marginalised groups” (Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor 
2003:21). In recent elections in countries such as the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea and Sudan, 
modern democracy has not been a clear- cut process. This is due to the unlevelled ethnic playing fields 
upon which these elections take place. In most countries, as Meredith (2006:156) explains, “political 
leaders spend much time on ethnic arithmetic, working out alliances that could win them power and 
keep them there”, rather than focusing on practising good governance.  
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While liberal democracy promises Africans a better way of life, all it really did was give them the 
opportunity to vote, which most of the time is along ethnic lines. This points to the argument presented 
by Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2003:21) that the “incorporation of [marginalised groups] has tended 
to be seen as a solution to the problems of political order or governability in fledgling democracies, 
rather than as a requirement of democracy per se”.  In a country that has more than 80 different ethnic 
groups, Ethiopia is notorious for playing the ethnicity card during elections. In its most recent 
elections, the country’s largest ethnic group was targeted by government officials because Prime 
Minster Meles Zenawi, who forms part of an ethnic group that constitutes only 6 percent of Ethiopian 
society, accused them of trying to oust him.  
 
The other eight most dominant ethnic groups as well as the Oromo’s, administer their own federal 
regions, which is a classic example of modern day feudalism. When supposed democratic states fail to 
achieve nationhood, multi-party elections only reinforce conventional ethnic loyalties, which 
ultimately resort to authoritarian oligarchies. Africa is a continent where issues of ethnicity remain the 
most prominent. In Somalia for example, a citizen is not an individual, but rather a member of one of 
the eight clans. It is a complex society based on clan families, each one sub-divided and halved again.  
 
Somalis do not ask each other where they have come from, but rather to whom they are related. In 
such a system, Somalis give their political allegiance first to their immediate family, then to their sub-
clans, then to their historical clan and only then, to the nation. Each level thus “define[s] the rights and 
obligations of Somalis as well as their standing in relation to others” (Meredith 2006:466). In such a 
kinsman orientated society, the notion of a people, founded on the same traditional and communal 
values is non-existent.  
 
What gives unity to the nation, what makes it a home, a place of passionate attachment, is not the cold 
contrivance of shared rights, but the people’s pre-existing characteristics: their language, religion, customs 
and traditions. Ethnic nationalism claims that an individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen; 
hence membership is the nation is not a matter of will. It can only be acquired by birth, through blood. 
(Ozkirimli 2005:23) 
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Democracy’s multi-party process is suited to countries which have already achieved a sense of 
nationhood. Its failure in societies where multi-ethnic groups are not homogeneous is obvious, in so far 
as it requires a stable middle class and an active civil society to hold the government accountable. 
When neither is strong enough to enforce checks and balances, the power of the ruling government 
goes unchecked, thus allowing abuses from cultural oppression in Kenya, to ethnic cleansing in India 
and genocide in countries such as Sudan to take place. 
 
d) Populist Dictatorships 
In contemporary society, the rise of populist dictatorships can be most prominently identified in 
countries such as Venezuela and North Korea, while also in parts of East and Central Europe (CEE). 
Under the leadership of Hugo Chavez and Kim Jong-il, Venezuelan and North Korean people have 
elected leaders based not on competency alone, but rather on charismatic fundamentals. Indeed, the 
notion of national heroism has surpassed the importance of competence in so far as they have risen to 
power on the back of public support.  
 
According to Krastev (2007), populism in Central European debate refers to emotional, simplistic, and 
manipulative discourse which is directed at the gut feelings of the people or opportunistic policies 
aimed at buying the support of the people. For example, in Poland, the proclaimed capital of Central 
European Iliberalism (Krastev 2007), the government is run by a coalition of three parties. The one 
belongs to the  
 
right-wing populists of the Post-Solidarity Law and Justice Party, the [other is] the Post communist 
provincial troublemakers of the Self-Defense Party and [the last party] the heirs of the pre-World War II 
chauvinist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic groups that form the League of Polish Families. This coalition has 
been characterised... as employing a peculiar mix of the conservative rhetoric of George W. Bush and the 
authoritarian political practice of Vladimir Putin (Krastev 2007:56).  
 
What is alarming is that the third wave democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are currently being 
marginalised. That is, countries are paying less attention to human and civil rights and parties are using 
non-Western rhetoric to attack the liberal philosophy. Overall, the reality of the region illustrates the 
emergence of “political polarisation, a rejection of consensual politics, and the rise of populism” 
(Krastev 2007:57).  
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Anti-Western sentiment, keeping United States (US) military operations outside of their territories, 
becoming nuclear weapon strongholds and charismatic statesmanship has overall, illustrated the desire 
to foster leadership that is non-Western as well as non-democratic. For example, Venezuela’s 
President, Hugo Chavez was elected to power based on popular lines. Chavez has been described as 
being charismatic and in-touch with his people, often working with a hands-on approach to solving 
issues of poverty and inequality. A man who “never tires of proclaiming a commitment to participatory 
rather than liberal democracy.... Chavez is creating what many classical liberal thinkers feared most: a 
quasi-tyranny of the majority” (Corrales and Penfold 2007:99).  
 
By instituting his ‘Bolivian Revolution’, Chavez has nationalised important industries and used oil 
revenues to pay for social programmes in order to alleviate poverty. His blatant hostility towards and 
criticism of the United States (US) points to an anti-democratic relationship, in so far as a large portion 
of his popularity is based on defying Western policies and choosing to form bilateral relationships with 
traditionally non-democratic states such as Iran, Cuba and Libya as well as Colombian rebels. 
Outsiders as well as the upper to middle class in Venezuela have often accused Chavez of being a 
dictator. Chavez has managed to achieve total control of all institutions that are able to hold the 
executive accountable including the country’s unicameral National Assembly, which “after the 
opposition boycott of the December 2005 elections now contains not a single opposition legislator” 
(Corrales and Penfold 2007:99). 
 
Indeed, Chavez has suspended Congress more than once, clamped down on media freedoms, changed 
the structure of the country’s Constitutional Court and his extension on presidential term limits has left 
a perception that his rule has not and will not be democratic in the future. Be that as it may, he has 
improved Venezuela’s infrastructure as well as the education and healthcare system, thus generating 
vast support from the country’s lower classes. Moreover, the people have willingly supported his new 
constitution and right to unlimited rule. What this illustrates is that Chavez is capable of maintaining 
legitimacy, not by following democratic rules and regulations, but rather by improving the aggregate 
standard of living in his own country.  
 
 
His political legitimacy therefore arises from being a popular leader, and not just from being a 
democratic one. Similarly, North Korea’s Kim Jong-il has displayed blatant disregard for the West. 
His courtship with China and Russia illustrates his lack of bilateral friendship with the West. His 
leadership, which has often been accused of being a personality cult by the United States (US) and its 
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supporters, is driven by a strict school curriculum which stretches from primary to tertiary education 
systems in which students are obliged to register for indoctrination courses that exemplify their leader. 
In a similar fashion, their textbooks are saturated with pro-Jong-il propaganda in order to strengthen 
his popularity. Nonetheless, Kim Jong-il has been able to keep his population united, even while living 
under the weight of a nuclear threat for longer than any other nation in history.  
 
In such a scenario, one must then assume that a leader, whose people show support for his traditionally 
anti-Western style of Government, must in a sense be anti-Western and against liberal democracy 
themselves. People “do not always value autonomy.... This is because every culture is also a system of 
regulation. While it facilitates choices, it also disciplines” (Ozkirimli 2005:76).  If a leader, is chosen 
by the people, through democratic means, who is at liberty to say otherwise?  That is to say, if a 
democratic nation attempts to oust another regime, based on the grounds that the chosen leader was not 
elected through democratic means, then it too would be going against its motto of ‘the people rule’.  
 
e) Technocratic Electronic Dictatorships 
In their paper, The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception, Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer (1944) explain how the capitalist elite use the media industry as a tool to organize society 
into a systematic mechanism that operates in terms of ideologies that favour the select few. These elite 
make certain that in the media all; 
 
executive authorities do not produce or sanction anything that in any way differs from their own rules, their 
own ideas about consumers, or above all themselves [and that] the objective social tendency is incarnate in 
the hidden subjective purposes of company directors, the foremost among whom are in the most powerful 
sectors of industry (Hollows, Hutchings and Jancovich 2000:8) 
 
 
 
Following from this is Louis Althusser’s theory of ideology, which describes how parties and 
institutions exercise hegemonic influence through deciding on the content of mass media products and 
their distribution, all of which lead to the formation of the opinions of society. Althusser goes on to 
explain that the attitudes of society are effectively shaped by various systems implemented by the 
dominant class though Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA’s) which inform the subjectivity of 
individuals at a multiplicity of levels. Douglas Kellner (2005) explains how the mass media inform our 
perceptions and opinions of the world by stating that: 
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[f]ilm and the other products of media culture provide materials out of which we forge our very identities… 
[the separation] of “us” and “them”. Media images help shape our view of the world and our deepest values; 
what we consider good or bad, positive or negative, moral or evil. Media stories provide the symbols, myths, 
and resources through which we constitute a common culture and though the appropriation of which we 
insert ourselves into this culture. Media spectacles demonstrate who has power and who is powerless, who is 
allowed to exercise force and violence, and who is not. They dramatize and legitimate the power of the forces 
that be and show the powerless that they must stay in their places or be oppressed (Kellner, 2003).  
 
The ‘us’ and ‘them’ division of which Kellner speaks, is less a consequence of conscious critical 
thought and more a result of unconscious habitual prejudice deriving from society’s unmindful  record 
of indoctrination, in so far as the media links together “different groups and [provides] a shared 
experience that promotes social solidarity” (Gurevitch, Bennett, Curran and Woollacot 1982:227). In 
this way, the professional communicators of today strengthen the status quo by representing the extant 
social system as legitimate. During Egypt’s 2011 revolution, South Korea dropped flyers and small 
portable radios over North Korea in an attempt to induce a similar revolution. Similarly, China banned 
the word “Egypt” from being displayed on any Google search. Both China and North Korea are 
notorious for limiting press freedom and using propaganda to spread political agendas. Egypt itself 
shut down the county’s Internet system, as did Algeria and Libya, thus preventing the flow of 
information.  
 
 
 
 
According to Freedom House (2010), only 35 percent of the world’s media is rated as free and that, 
 
only 16 percent of the world’s inhabitants live in countries with a free press.... The population figures are 
significantly affected by two countries, China, with a Not Free status, and India, with a Partly Free status, 
that together account for more than two billion of the world’s roughly six billion people. The percentage of 
those enjoying Free media in 2009 declined to the lowest level since 1996....The overall level of press 
freedom worldwide, as measured by the global average score, worsened... in 2009, contributing to an 18 year 
negative trend.  (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2010) 
 
For obvious reasons, this is immensely problematic because the less informed sectors of society tend to 
be more prone to indoctrination through the mass media, and through politicians who use it as a tool to 
push their political agendas. Russia is a country that is immensely efficient in using the media for this 
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purpose. Vladimir Putin uses democracy as a tool in order to gain support for his policies, using the 
notion of ‘people power’ as a disguise for the actual use of manipulation by elites. In other words, he is 
“adroit in using the appeal of anti-Americanism in the world.... [heading] a regime that in some ways 
resembles democracy, but in...  reality is a near-total monopoly of power (Krastev 2006:53). The 
manipulation of democratic practice is not some random happenstance or only a result of anti-
democratic mentality, but rather a premeditated execution of masterful propagandist efficiency.  
 
Russia is “not an illiberal democracy by default, it is an illiberal democracy by design” (Krastev 
2006:54), whose creators are not politicians pushing through policies at the Duma, but rather by 
Russian technologists, defined by Krastev (2006:55) as the Kremlin’s infamous grand masters of 
manipulation. Political technologists operate on various levels within Russian society, most notably by 
speaking as experts on behalf of the public good. But overall, they are commentators who interpret for 
the public what is going on in Russian and global politics. Thus, owing to their precariously influential 
role in Russian society, the Russian “political technologist resembles a Western political consultant in 
the way the electric chair resembles an armchair” (Krastev 2006:56), and makes him or her even more 
detrimental to the formation of a critically informed society because of their influence over the media.  
 
The type of political regime that governs Russia today would have been unthinkable in the pre-television age. 
The art of the political technologists lies in replacing the political representation of values, interests, and 
ideas that is at the heart of liberal democracy with a media representation of a non-existing political reality 
that is at the core of managed democracy. Their ideology is a Molotov cocktail of French postmodernism and 
KGB instrumentalism....What they borrowed from the rich tradition of the Soviet Secret Police, were the 
technologies that can make the unreal real.... Thus fashioning themselves as the post liberal post intelligencia 
(Krastev 2006:57-58)  
 
All these above mentioned examples serve as salient contemporary manifestations of the relationship 
between the media and democracy. They illustrate the way in which the mass media are used as a 
means to do what the state by law is not allowed to do, that is, to be used as a microphone through 
which political agendas can be disseminated. When a society is not critically informed about its 
political, social and economic standing, it is unable to make rational decisions. Indeed, a lack of 
critical political engagement which is a result of a lack of formal education, is highly detrimental to the 
spread and success of liberal democracy.  
 
Social and Political Polarisation 
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Social polarisation emerges when there is a division within a society. The partition is generally a 
consequence of income inequality where the notion of a dual city emerges comprising a high income 
community and a low income community. Because of such economic displacement, a perpetuating 
cycle of differentiation between economic classes emerges which often leads to their physical 
segregation and the development of informal settlements, slums and ghettos for the poorer classes.  
 
The disparity between rich and poor becomes more prominent when an increase in illiteracy and poor 
education induces a process by which this urban underclass experiences a different way of life, which 
in turn creates entirely different morals and standards. Similarly, because there is a lack of financial 
security, acts of violence and crime tend to increase. In the contemporary world of economic 
development, four countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China – also known as BRIC have 
emerged as leaders in advancing economic development. More importantly, they have initiated a shift 
away from developed countries as economic powerhouses.  
 
Countries such as Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) and 
Canada - who are also known as the G7, are being overtaken in rates of economic development by the 
developing world, which by 2027 will have enough power to “influence international economic 
financial policies...bail out wealthier nations [and continue to] develop independently due to booming 
internal demand” (http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20090617/155278052.html). Here it is important to 
highlight two immensely important differences between the G7 and BRIC. Interestingly, four out of 
the five countries who constitute the G7 are considered to be full democracies, based on the 
Economist’s Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index.  
 
In contrast, none of the BRIC states are ranked as fully democratic, but instead are categorised as 
flawed democracies and hybrid regimes. In Brazil for example, the per capita income has continued to 
be highly concentrated in the hands of a small minority. In fact, “the wealthiest ten percent pocket[s] 
forty-four percent of the country’s total income” 
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200609/16/eng20060916_303467.html. As an economic 
representative for the rest of Latin America, these figures do not bode well for the future of liberal 
democracy in the region. According to Kapstein and Converse (2009:61), “inequality... [has been] 
higher in democracies that eventually underwent reversal”, thus pointing to a predominant relationship 
between economic stability, equality and the sustainability of democracy.  
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In Russia, inequality has risen as a result of the growing markets and an elite few who have profited 
from the plundering of natural resources. Similarly, while inflation has risen, the salaries of Russia’s 
middle class have not, thus making the gap between rich and poor increase as people find it more 
difficult to afford basic commodities. Russia’s healthcare system provides only for those who can 
afford it, and tertiary education is limited to those who are willing to pay the high prices that the 
universities set. As a highly defective democracy, the welfare structure of Russia has proven to be 
weak, which in turn has resulted in the country’s “disintegration of [its] social safety net” (Orenstein 
2009:81). Similarly, while India is considered to be at its peak of economic development since it 
gained its independence almost 60 years ago, its social structure illustrates on ground level, a very 
unequal society.  
 
The Calcutta slums and the continued application of the cast system has overall, led to the emergence 
of highly polarised societies. While there has been an increase in development, its benefits “have not 
trickled down, and at the same time have exacerbated regional imbalances” (Chakravorty 2006:63). 
Because those seeking employment move to cities, overpopulation and extreme poverty have led to 
deteriorating physical structures and limited space. As the cycle continues, this process only worsens 
and decreases levels of education, at the same time increasing levels of poverty and even crime. China 
is no different, in so far as only 10 percent of urban families own 45 percent of the total urban wealth... 
while workers have seen their income decline from [just over] 51 percent... to 39 percent” (Shaoul, 
2010).  
 
Moreover, few people are able to afford decent housing, which leads to an increase in informal 
settlements where shelters are built onto existing structures. A large majority of the Chinese people 
believe that the distribution of wealth in the country is unfair. Even more disturbing was a report 
presented in 2010 by Premier Wen Jiabao to the National People’s Congress (NPC), which stated quite 
clearly that social welfare spending would soon be halved, that the government would not implement 
any initiatives to redistribute income more fairly and that spending on public security would be 
increased. On the whole, an increase in economic polarisation is detrimental to political engagement in 
so far as in all the countries listed above, the issue of education has become a key concern.  
 
Because poverty limits the ability of people to pay for a decent education, their ability to participate in 
political activity on a critical level is limited. Not only that, but they also become more involved in 
day-to-day living, thus becoming even more disengaged with government. When there is an increase in 
economic polarisation, leadership is left in the hands of a few elite, who have no direct relationship 
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with the economically disabled majority. The relationship between the people, and its rulers becomes 
weak which is in the general sense of the word, undemocratic, and a contributing factor to a third wave 
reversal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Snowballing 
 
When a successful democratic transition takes place in one country, Huntington (1991) states that a 
domino effect can take place, in other countries which will follow suit and democratise as well. The 
reasons are various, but all in all, comprise the notion that if democracy can work ‘there’, it might be 
able to work ‘here’. However, Huntington (1991) also acknowledges this processes’ opposite, by 
highlighting that reverse snowballing can also take place during which countries whose ideological 
structure is traditionally anti-democratic, might spur on other countries to ridicule liberal democracy as 
well. Thus, reverse snowballing can entail a display of total contempt for Western interference and its 
democratic ideology.  
 
When this act of contempt is demonstrated by a powerful non-Western country, it serves as the 
principal harbinger for others to express their misery as well, thus setting a reverse snowball in motion. 
Thus, what emerges is a system in which countries that oppose liberal democracy and the West, gather 
support through direct and indirect processes, and use this encouragement to practise traditionally non-
democratic styles of governance. This rhetoric is then emphasised domestically and abroad, creating 
bilateral relationships with autocratic leaders and the like. An example of reverse snowballing is most 
prominent relation to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his meetings with Libyan leader 
Moamer Gadaffi and referring to him as a hero, grouped with the leaders of Hamas, Hezbollah and the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihadists as well as forming close ties with Cuba, a notorious enemy of the West.  
 
Through his promotion of non-Western rhetoric, Chavez has entertained and praised some of the 
world’s most hostile leaders to the West, who are known to be open about their opposition towards 
democratic practices. So far, Chavez is one of the few presidents to have embraced Saddam Hussein 
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and his Iraqi government. Chavez has openly stated that Venezuela and Iraq share similar values, 
concluding that Iraq’s totalitarian government is a “model for Venezuela” 
(http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/9/24/191722.shtml). In relation to openly 
displaying his support for Cuba, Chavez expressed his support by stating that Venezuela and Cuba “are 
swimming together towards the same sea of happiness” 
(http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/9/24/191722.shtml).  
 
Similarly, Chavez has promoted bilateral relations with Iran by affirming that Iran’s hostilities towards 
the West are justified and worthy. Chavez has also been accused of supplying weapons and 
intelligence to Colombian rebels, while also hosting them in his own country and allowing one rebel in 
particular, the leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to speak in front of 
Venezuela’s National Assembly. If a democratic regime is created by people, and not by trends, as 
Huntington (1991) states, then it too can be unmade by people as well. Indeed, a democratic 
breakdown, albeit for its causes, is first and foremost a result of its causers. With that in mind, the 
actions of Hugo Chavez and his supporters demonstrates an emerging anti-democratic wave.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
All the examples discussed in this chapter serve as a reason behind the necessity of conducting a new 
investigation into Huntington’s (1991) wave theory. On the following page is a table illustrating the 
practical application of Huntington’s (1991) wave theory. Table 3 serves as a summary for those 
examples that were discussed in this chapter and which are aligned with Huntington’s (1991) factors 
that contribute to wave reversals. While this study has only analysed a handful of instances suitable to 
this study’s cause, there are more examples of anti-democratic sentiment present in the contemporary 
era; notwithstanding those that would have occurred since this study was conducted – all of which 
would find themselves befitting enough to belong within at least one of the sections above.  
 
Furthermore, this study would not do justice to the title of its paper if it discontinued at this point, for 
identifying current examples that may serve as relevant factors leading to a third wave reversal do not 
fully explain the social dynamics currently at play and what their influence on the future of liberal 
democracy will be. It is in this light that this study will conduct a critical discourse analysis of 
Huntington’s (1991 and 1996) work in order to strengthen the argument which this paper brings 
forward.  
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Factors Leading to Wave Reversals 
Weakness in Democratic Values 
Authoritarian nostalgia in Egypt following the Nile Revolution. Russia’s education system 
supports two new textbooks. One praising the anti-democratic regimes of Stalin and Putin 
while the second criticises the United States (US). Low levels of democratic values in Asia. 
Royal bloodlines and religion in the Muslim world limits the adoption of democratic values. 
Issues of ethnicity, culture and nationhood continue to plague most of Africa and hinder 
democratic transitions. Right wing approaches to governance are slowly being adopted in 
Europe. 
Economic Recession 
2008 economic crisis causes a democratic retreat as governments begin to lose legitimacy 
and voters their confidence in elected leaders. Non-Western countries begin to have more 
political sway as their economic strength begins to buy them influence. Financial bail outs 
by Western institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) result in political 
instability and a decrease in confidence towards democracy.  
The Breakdown of Law and Order Resulting from Terrorism and Insurgency 
On the 11
th
 of September 2011, terrorists coordinate four suicide attacks on the United 
States (US). The attacks result in 3572 deaths. The September 11
th
 attacks lead to the 
United States (US) violating its own constitution. Rate of terrorist activity increases by 
more than 100 percent following the 2011 attacks. 
Intervention or Conquest by a Non-Democratic Foreign Government 
 Authoritarian Nationalism: Levels of ethno-centric nationalism are increasing – 
most notably in developed and or Western countries.  
 Religious Fundamentalism: Christian Evangelism and other influential religious 
organisations in the United States (US) have a direct influence on the country’s 
domestic and foreign policy. 
 Oligarchic Authoritarianism: Ethnically fragmented societies, most notably in 
Africa continue to pose a threat to democracy, as marginalised groups are not 
represented in the democratic process, while large numbers of ethnic groups in one 
given country continue evade the democratic notion of the word ‘majority’.  
 Populist Dictatorships: An increase in popular, yet undemocratic leaders in 
countries such as Brazil and North Korea, as well as Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) begin to buy the electorate’s favour, despite democracy’s clause on term 
limits.  
 Technocratic Electronic Dictatorships: North Korea, China, Libya, Algeria and 
Russia continue to limit the freedom of information by controlling and manipulating 
state information.  
Social and Political Polarisation 
Large discrepancies in income have lead to initiatives driven by developing countries to 
promote economic development. The G7 are slowly being overtaken by BRIC, who 
overtime have generated a proportional amount of economic sway, which in turn is enough 
to buy in some cases, political influence. Not one of the BRIC countries are labelled as full 
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democracies despite their up and coming political influence, while all of the G7 are full 
democracies.  
Snowballing 
Anti-Western rhetoric emanating from the third world has led to the creation of strong bi-
lateral ties between leaders in the developing world. 
Table 3: A Summary of the Practical Application of Huntington’s Wave Theory 
 
Chapter 4 
The Problem of Universal Agreement: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Liberal Democracy 
 
In order to adequately apply a critical discourse analysis, it is important to provide an interpretation of 
the theoretical and contextual analysis as supplied in the previous chapters. Here, a thematic 
breakdown of Western ideas and non-Western reality is imperative in order to understand the actual 
state of liberal democracy in the 21
st
 century. It will also serve to highlight the imbalance of political 
power and the sense of false idealism that is causing a decrease in liberal democratic sentiment. An 
exercise in critical interpretation of an author of Huntington’s calibre is problematic in so far as his 
work has provided the majority of the foundation upon which this study has been conducted. 
Nonetheless, it is imperative that such an examination be done, for it will assist in highlighting the 
discrepancies which exist between the theoretical persona of liberal democracy and its present 
situation.  
 
For academics such as Huntington (1991), democracy means a system of government that involves 
“contestation and participation” (Huntington 1991:7). This understanding of democracy implies first of 
all, free and fair elections in which parties engage in a legitimate effort to win the electorate’s vote. 
Secondly, he highlights that a limitation on power, in which the electorate may hold their government 
accountable for their actions or inaction after they have been elected into office is important. Overall, 
Huntington (1991) chooses a procedural definition of democracy, focussing mainly on elections and 
the civic responsibility of the electorate to monitor their chosen government.  
 
Huntington (1991) aligns himself with Schumpeter (1942) who defines democracy as “that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1942:269), or in a 
similar fashion, free and fair elections, competition and accountability. Here, Huntington instantly 
places himself at odds with his chosen study, in so far as he also acknowledges that democracy is not 
clean cut, but rather that it is a “dichotomous variable...[consisting of] betwixt-and-between cases” 
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(Huntington 1991:12). Here is where Huntington’s perspective is flawed, in so far as he, as a Western-
orientated scholar chooses to analyse democracy, as defined by Western ideals in a context in which he 
acknowledges non-Western rhetoric.  
Albeit immensely valuable, Huntington’s contribution to the study of democracy fails to take into 
consideration that the foundations about which his analyses have been conducted, are predominantly 
Western orientated. Were his initial definition of democracy more substantive in nature, his analysis 
would have granted him greater capacity to argue for his reasons why liberal democracy rises and falls 
in waves. Huntington (1991) acknowledges that it is better to analyse democracy in a manner that 
recognises it as multi-faceted, but still chooses a procedural definition with which to align his study. 
He limits his argument and restricts his contextual analysis by the theoretical stance he chooses to take.  
 
In light of his dilemma, it is necessary to demonstrate to what extent his definitions of democracy 
contradict the realities currently facing Western liberal democracy. This chapter will highlight to what 
degree the idea of liberal democracy is shifting towards a more idyllic and or abstract conception. The 
illustrations and tables to follow will serve as testament to the vast difference between the ideals 
posited by Huntington (1991) as definitions of democracy and the definitions that are currently being 
generated from the various contextual examples.  
 
Contrasts in Theoretical and Contextual Application: The Meaning of Democracy 
 
Let us begin with analysing the notion of happiness in relation to liberal democracy. Authors such as 
Inglehart (1990) have found that democracy is to a large extent related to a society’s happiness. 
Similarly, happiness is strongly related to economic development in so far as wealth and or poverty 
have a significant impact on the psychological wellbeing of an individual and ultimately a society.  
What stands out here is the relationship between politics and economics, that is the combined effect of 
liberal democracy and capitalism on a society to generate a higher level of wellbeing and thus 
happiness owing to social and economic development. 
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Figure 4: The Relationship between Democracy and Happiness 
Contructed using Inglehart et al (2008). “Development, Freedom and Rising Happiness: A 
Global Perspective (1981-2007),” Association for Psychological Science Vol;3 No;4 264-285   
 
The freedom generated from social, political and economic equality ultimately leads to higher levels of 
happiness, and in contrast, happiness levels would be lower were it not for the presence of liberal 
democracy and economic development. In Chapters 2 and 3, the relationship between liberal 
democracy and economics was highlighted, arguing that without an increase in economic wellbeing, 
stability and development; liberal democracy would decline. Both Weber (2002) and Schumpeter 
(1942) contend that democracy, in its purest of forms, can only be created out of the capitalist process. 
Moreover, they both argue that the two are dependent upon one another.   
 
Taking from their theories, one essence of capitalism is freedom, through the search of self interest. 
Capitalism recognises that each person in a society has the right to own his or her own life and 
participate in the pursuit of their own goals and aspirations so long as they do not negatively affect 
another. The exercise is fundamentally based on human rights and the allocation of freedom. 
Capitalism is possibly the only economic system in which the notion of individual rights, and thus the 
notion of true democracy is fully recognised, in so far as both uphold the importance of freedom and 
again, individual rights. Thus, if the highest level of freedom can only be attained within a democracy 
and a capitalist society, then the theory suggests that the happiest of societies should exist under those 
which implement liberal democratic and capitalist practices.  
Below is a table rating the levels of happiness between 1981 and 2007 in some of the most and least 
democratically consolidated countries currently operating on the international political arena. Of the 
Happiness 
Democracy 
Democracy provides free 
choice. Free choice 
promotes social 
tolerance.Tolerant societies 
enhance freedom.  
Freedom increases levels 
of happiness. Economic 
development improves 
standards of living.  Higher 
levels of wealth promote 
social and political 
freedom. Freedom 
increases levels of 
happiness.  
Economic 
Development 
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fully democratic countries this paper has chosen, the United States (US), Norway, Great Britain and 
South Korea serve as an attempt to select a democratically consolidated country from as many 
different regions as possible, including one that is traditionally non-Western, namely South Korea. All 
of these countries were acknowledged as full democracies by the 2010 Democracy Index. Similarly, of 
the non-democratic regimes that were chosen, China, Russia and Hungary serve as an attempt to select 
one country from the remaining categories the Democracy Index lists, namely that of a flawed 
democracy, hybrid regime and authoritarian status.
14
   
 
Country Category Year Happiness 
Rating 
Increase/Decrease in 
Happiness 
U.S Consolidated 1982 1.78 Decrease 
2006 1.62 
Norway Consolidated 1982 1.80 Decrease 
2007 1.67 
Great Britain Consolidated 1981 1.67 Decrease 
2006 1.57 
South Korea Consolidated 1990 2.14 Decrease 
2005 2.01 
China Authoritarian 1995 1.95 Increase 
2007 2.06 
Russia Hybrid Regime 1990 2.46 Decrease* 
2006 2.24 
Hungary Flawed Democracy 1982 2.15 Increase 
1999 2.19 
Table 4: Comparing Levels of Happiness in Democracies and Non-Democracies 
Constructed using Economic Intelligence Unit. “Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat” in 
(http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf) and Inglehart et al (2008). 
“Development, Freedom and Rising Happiness: A Global Perspective (1981-2007),” Association for 
Psychological Science Vol;3 No;4 264-285   
 
Table 4 aims at highlighting the contextual reality of the theory pertaining to liberal democracy, 
capitalism, freedom and thus happiness. Of all the four democratic countries listed, their levels of 
happiness have decreased, while the remaining three countries, namely China, Russia and Hungary, 
which are not democratic, have increased. While Russia showed a decrease in happiness, it must be 
noted that even at its lowest of happiness levels; Russia’s rating was still higher than any of the four 
democracies listed.  
That is, even though Russia’s happiness rating decreased, it was still significantly higher than that of 
Norway, and even South Korea – which is not a traditionally Western country to begin with. From the 
data above, one can argue that democracy is not the only system of government in which happiness 
                                                          
14
 The start and end years differ due to the availability of data as given in the texts. 
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can be derived; despite the theoretical material that suggests it. Inglehart (2008) released value scores 
relating to an investigation that attempted to ascertain to what extent countries valued tradition and to 
what extent countries valued self expression.  Overall, the predominantly Western and Westernising 
countries had a lower tradition score and a higher self expression score, whereas in the case of non-
Western countries it was the opposite.  
 
Country Year Tradition/Values Score Year Tradition Values Score 
Norway 1981 0.89 2006 1.39 
Sweden 1981 1.20 2006 1.86 
Iceland 1981 0.01 2000 0.04 
Australia 1981 -0.34 2006 0.21 
Finland 1981 0.63 2006 0.82 
Switzerland 1990 0.19 2006 0.74 
Canada 1981 -0.52 2006 -0.26 
Netherlands 1981 0.73 2000 0.84 
Table 5: Measuring Values and Tradition in Democratic Countries 
Constructed using Inglehart, R, Foa, R, Peterson, C and Welzel, C. (2008). “Development, Freedom 
and Rising Happiness: A Global Perspective (1981-2007),” Association for Psychological Science 
Vol;3 No;4 264-285   
 
Between 1981 and 2006, many of the Western countries who participated, gradually increased their 
rating in relation to the importance of tradition.
15
 To understand Table 4 with greater insight, 
traditional values as defined by Inglehart, Foa, Peterson and Welzel (2008) pertain to those societies 
who emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute 
standards and traditional family values. These societies reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and 
suicide. They also have high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook. The countries which 
are listed in the table above are all ranked in the top ten democracies in the world by the 2010 
Democracy Index.  
 
 
Only Denmark and New Zealand show lower ratings on the importance of tradition and values, while 
the remaining eight show an increase in the importance and retention of cultural identity. Could these 
figures possibly suggest that the West is folding back into itself? Could they suggest that due to a non-
Western threat, Western traditions and the meaning of cultural identity are becoming more important? 
Similarly, could these post-industrial societies be returning to a more survivalist approach and less 
                                                          
15
 The start and end years differ due to the availability of data as given in the texts. 
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towards a subjective state of wellbeing due in part to financial insecurity dwindling freedom and a 
decrease in happiness? The figures in Table 4 illustrate that the Western world, as represented by the 
most consolidated democracies in the contemporary era is showing a decrease in its levels of global 
power and influence.  
 
The importance of identity is prominent in this analysis, and is perhaps an indication that Huntington 
(1996A) was correct in suggesting that the next conflict will not occur between countries, but rather 
between civilisations in an attempt to gain ideological superiority. In conjunction with this study’s 
analysis of a possible third wave reversal, the trajectory of liberal democracy might perhaps succumb 
to a third reverse wave in which this clash might take place.  To follow the political trajectory of 
liberal democracy which Huntington (1991) laid out in his three wave analysis would be to conclude 
that a third world war is upon us, as each reverse wave coincided with violent conflict. However, the 
data above could argue that the emergence of a possible reverse wave could be caused by an 
ideological evolution as suggested by Huntington (1996A).   
 
While the data presented above could arguably illustrate that democratic theory has become 
disengaged with democratic reality, one factor above all should be taken into consideration, namely 
that of democracy’s meaning. Defining democracy from a theoretical standpoint is different to the 
meaning democracy is given by the people living within or outside liberal democratic societies, and the 
biggest discrepancy is the finding that “most people think of democracy in terms of the freedoms, 
liberties and rights that it conveys, rather than procedural conceptions” (Dalton, Shin and Jou 2007:1). 
In other words, people tend to perceive democracy more from a point of citizen participation and 
critical political engagement than whether elections are held and what law making bodies are created.  
 
 
For theorists who adopt the procedural standard of measurement, liberal democracy is viewed in 
relation to procedures of governance, rather than what the ordinary individual deems it to be. Again, 
this is where Huntington (1991) fails in his analysis in so far as he chooses the wrong definition of 
what democracy means to those societies he analyses; thus starting from an entirely incorrect 
viewpoint. Considering that the procedural definition of democracy is theoretical in nature and 
predominantly Western in perspective, Huntington’s (1991) study fails to take into consideration the 
subjective nature of the human element of which this study argues is immensely important and 
fundamental to the success and failure of liberal democracy.  
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In simple terms, a country is not in the eyes of its people democratic if it holds elections. Instead, it is 
democratic if those rights, liberties and freedoms desired by its people, are granted. It can be argued 
that, “people understand that electoral and constitutional democracy is not enough; to most people the 
real meaning of democracy is in what it produces” (Dalton, Shin and Jou 2007:8). This viewpoint is 
immensely problematic when juxtaposed to the traditional notion of what liberal democracy is. If 
citizens in countries such as Russia and China have a higher happiness index than that of Norway and 
the United States (US), even though the former are considered to be two of the world’s most repressive 
regimes, could it then be argued that they are indeed more ‘democratic’ then their Western 
counterparts. Addressing the relationship between procedural and substantive democracy, it is 
important to highlight the relationship between voting during elections and post-election satisfaction.  
 
This discussion will serve to demonstrate the discrepancy between the theoretical and the contextual 
relationship of the meaning of democracy to ordinary citizens. At the turn of the millennium, a key-
point in the possible beginning of a third wave reversal, self-reported voter turnout during election 
times in Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Latin America reached 70%, 74% and 76% respectively. 
These figures are in no way objective because data collected in public opinion surveys tends to create a 
false sense of citizen participation. That is, “people seek to associate themselves with the socially 
approved act of voting in democratic elections” (Bratton, Chu and Lagos 2007:4). Ultimately, people 
have come to see democracy as a universally preferred form of government and are therefore more 
inclined to feel obliged to take part in its processes.  
 
Despite such high levels of self-reported voter turnout, the extent to which democracy has penetrated 
society on a substantial level is low. In Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Latin America, the 
percentage of the population who agreed that their country had achieved a full and functional 
democracy reached 29%, 36% and 15% respectively.   
 
Region Self-Reported Voter Turnout % Extent of Democracy % 
Sub-Saharan Africa 70 29 
East Asia 74 36 
Latin America 76 15 
Table 6: Assessing Procedural and Substantive Democracy  
Constructed using Bratton, M. Chu, Y and Lagos, M. (2006) “Who Votes: Implications for New 
Democracies” in http://www.globalbarometer.net/GBVoting.pdf.  
 
Statistically, the notion of participation from a procedural standpoint is much higher than the 
contextual reality of liberal democracy in these regions. Again, while the institutions of democracy are 
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present, regime performance and ultimately, the success of liberal democracy in relation to political 
culture within these societies remain minimal. While democratic technicalities appear to be optimal, 
post-election probabilities and substantive elements are failing to meet voter expectations.  Overall, 
what this data illustrates is that while voting can serve as a foundation for democratic sentiment in a 
society, it does not serve as a way of sustaining it. That is, there are other factors such as culture and 
attitude that between elections, serve to promote democratic development and sustainability.  
 
Another important element to discuss in relation to the meaning of democracy is how its definition has 
evolved over its historical timeline. Here, it is not on the theoretical meaning of which this study 
would like to focus, but rather the contextual nature of the perception of democracy in the minds’ of 
people. The democracy of Athens for example excluded large portions of their societies from 
participating in political life. Women, immigrants and slaves were not permitted to take part in 
political decision making, even though by definition, Greece is considered to be the most influential 
empire in developing contemporary liberal democracy. In Athenian society however, the restriction of 
women, immigrants and slaves from taking part in democratic practices was accepted, in so far as it 
was what democracy meant to them more than two millennia ago. Today, such limitations would not 
be tolerated in traditional liberal democratic societies, and therefore shows that democracy is 
constantly changing to meet the needs and wants of societies at a given time.  
 
Today, democracy is not a political order of the “village, the tribe, or the city-state; it is democracy of 
the nation-sate and its emergence is associated with the development of the nation-state” (Huntington 
1991:13). As the meaning of democracy is intrinsically linked with the nation, and not merely with the 
state, the human element cannot be disregarded when using Huntington’s (1991) analysis as a 
predictive model in which a possible third wave reversal can be forecast. With that in mind, it can be 
argued that at any given point in history, people have played a large role in giving democracy its 
meaning. So, the ultimate question which is: What does democracy mean to people today and by its 
definition, could it be contributing to a third wave reversal in the context of liberal democratic theory?  
 
European markets are becoming weaker where in some cases rescue funds to eliminate debt are being 
tightened; levels of happiness and standards of living are decreasing as unemployment increases, 
Western governments are failing to meet the expectations of their people which in some cases has 
resulted in outbreaks of mass anarchy; border restrictions pertaining to immigration control are on the 
majority of Western and European debate tables, while revolutions in Africa have produced little 
towards developing their post-rebellion democratic societies. In contrast, Central and Eastern 
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European markets are booming, expendable incomes are flush, Russia continues to outline its US$ 650 
billion plan to rebuild its army, South American strongholds continue to strengthen non-Western ties 
and develop policies aimed towards building their economies an lastly; China stands to become a 
formidable if not the most powerful economic empire in the coming future. 
 
Here, what stands as a possible difference between these two opposite scenarios is that the former 
subscribes to the traditional tenets of Western liberal democracy and the latter does not. Ultimately, the 
meaning of good governance; and what is required by governments to provide some measure of 
political, economic and socio sustainability may perhaps not imply the adoption of liberal democratic 
practice. Sentiment towards what is currently taking place in the West and dominant parts of Europe 
can to some nation-states serve as a measure of what Western doctrine can possibly produce. Thus the 
meaning of democracy will be and is possibly at the moment being subjected to another historical 
change in definition.  In 2006, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Program on 
International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) produced data that showed insight into how Americans and 
Russians viewed each other in relation towards each other and to China.  
 
When comparing styles of government, 54 percent of Russians stated that they approved of the United 
States (US) system and 56 percent approved of the Chinese system (Weber, Kull, McFaul and Zevelev, 
2006). While both styles of governance are different, Russian society stated that they believed both to 
be suitable to each country and their circumstances.  According to Weber, Kull, McFaul and Zevelev 
(2006), when asked in greater depth about sentiment, Russians stated that they preferred China over 
America, because Russian opinion valued modernisation and order over democracy citing that China 
held greater importance because of its economic success.  While Vladimir Putin did not score high 
marks in American public support, citing political oppression, data from the same survey showed that 
the people, whom the Prime Minister is accused of mistreating, actually support him.  In this light, it 
can be argued that the idea of what a society requires to operate on a successful level is greatly skewed 
by external perceptions of what is deemed as tolerable and acceptable versus what is not.  
 
Negative perceptions of Russia show the influence of what alternative ideas surrounding liberal 
democracy can be. While the United States (US) and its citizens continue to express their concern 
about anti-democratic practices, internal views about Russian society show a great level of happiness 
about the current political system Russia is practising.  When asked what system of government 
Russians preferred, the Levada Centre in Russia drew data relating to sentiment between 1996 and 
2010 in which it showed that overall, modern day Russians prefer the present system of government to 
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any other. Moreover, the data showed a decrease in favourable sentiment towards Western liberal 
democracy and an increase in support for Russian political institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Comparing Regime Types in Modern Day Russia   
Constructed using: http://www.levada.ru/press/2009101501.html 
Figure 5 shows that modern day Russians prefer their current system of government to their Soviet 
counterpart, or according to the Levada report, “an increasingly demonised Western alternative” 
(http://www.levada.ru/press/2009101501.html). Moreover, Figure 5 demonstrates the volatile nature 
ascribed to giving democracy and other political systems a definition, in so far as the sentiment 
surrounding what is important within a society and what is not fluctuates. Nevertheless, the data 
presented by the Levada Centre appears to eliminate the Western idea that modern day Russia is being 
subjected to an over authoritative political regime in which its people are waiting to be rescued by 
liberal democracy.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The element of power and its imbalance between the theoretical and the contextual have been brought 
to light. Theory and reality or external perceptions and internal experience have shown, from these 
examples, to be in most instances immensely different. This contrast is important to notice, as well as 
the fundamental link between combining literary analysis with that of a comparative study. The 
theories on which it is based are, by no means irrelevant, but rather are disengaged from the elemental 
influence of human subjectivity. The complexity of human nature cannot be boxed and labelled by 
theoretical definition and text. Therefore, it is arguably better to find answers to the dilemma of the 
future of liberal democracy, not by reverting  to what history and theory dictates by their definitions, 
but rather by the actions of civilisations and all the way through to the individual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: Former Soviet Style    B: Western Democracy 
C: Present Style     D: Other 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
D 
Timeline: 1996 - 2010 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
This study has demonstrated what role social consensus plays in legitimising liberal democracy, as 
well as maintaining it long enough to reach democratic consolidation. Furthermore, this study has 
shown what occurs when the dynamic between liberal democracy and political culture is neglected. 
That is, it has brought to light the difficulties which transitional democracies encounter when a group 
of foreign rulers set out to impose an alien ideology and carry out extensive social, political and 
economic changes on a society in the name of an ideal. In some instances as Moss (1975:262) argues, 
“such an attempt is bound to make broad sections of the community reconsider whether the values and 
interests that are thus put at risk are not more fundamental than the system of government that makes 
the assault possible”.  
 
Thus, not only is a third wave reversal evident, but it is also a reversal as Huntington (1996A) 
predicted, brought about by a confrontation between culture and politics. The rejection of democratic 
ideals does not occur because a society is ungovernable, but rather as shown in this study, because 
liberal democracy has not been granted legitimacy by the society in which it is placed. It is not a 
question of being backward or lacking in culture, instead it is a question of social consensus. When a 
democratic regime fails in a traditionally non-Western society, greater appeals for an alternative will 
develop.  
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Again, this is not to say that all non-democratic societies are dictatorial, tyrannical and despotic as 
defined by Western standards, but rather that they have subscribed to laws and styles of governance 
that best suit their needs and wants. The dictatorships of Mengitsu in Ethiopia, of al-Bashir in Sudan, 
of Mugabe in Zimbabwe, of Gadaffi in Libya and of Toure in Guinea are worthy examples of Western 
defiance and Fanon’s affirmation of the relevance of “culture and tradition to constitutional and 
political engineering” (Jinadu (2007:23). Indeed, these examples reinforce Huntington’s (1991) idea 
that the non-Western world is incapable of democratisation in so far as its political culture is unsuitable 
to foreign rules and norms of governance.  
 
 
 
The political instability of the non-Western world should not be attributed to inability, but difference 
because “there is no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people... [can] agree 
on.... This is due...to the...fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common good 
is bound to mean different things” (Schumpeter 1942:251). Hence the notion of Western liberal 
democracy is perceived more as an ideological imposter, than a culturally accepted way forward.   If a 
society grants legitimacy to an alternative style of governance, then it is the obligation of others to 
respect it. The problem arises when acceptance is not granted and tolerance is not bestowed, which 
more importantly, is why the 21st century is experiencing such a violent backlash against liberal 
democracy.  
 
Too often, we have ignored the fact that “liberal democracy is a delicate plant, as rare as an orchid in 
the jungle of past and present political systems” (Moss 1975:262), and that its re-habituation into other 
habitats cannot be guaranteed. The dominant Western political system has in many instances attempted 
to ignore this, and to force liberal democracy’s political transference despite obvious obstructions and 
in light of severe consequences. Whether out of political and foreign policy obligations, or out of 
genuine regard for what leaders believe will improve their people’s standard of living, the 
implementation of liberal democracy in a traditionally non-Western society will suffer from what can 
be termed as an identity crisis. If liberal democracy was as so many believe it to be the most optimal 
form of governance and it actually operated as such, then the reason for this study to be undertaken 
would not have existed.  
 
This is because there would be no cause to highlight what are the glaring problems within 
contemporary liberal democracies; from those who have achieved consolidation to those who are 
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currently in a democratic transition. From the creation of political institutions, the outcomes that are 
produced from regime performance and most importantly, within the realm of legitimacy as generated 
by the societal culture, the journey towards democratic consolidation is a complex and uncertain one. 
With so many possible exits, liberal democracy is hard pressed to remain on its trajectory. This is 
reason enough to explain why there are only 26 out of one 167 countries that are recognised as full 
democracies and motive enough to highlight the importance of Huntington’s (1991) variables as 
prerequisites to reaching the final destination of democratic consolidation.  
 
So what of the remaining countries? What of those who continue to strive for a democratic Utopia, and 
what of those who have failed or rejected this passage entirely? They are flawed democracies, hybrid 
regimes or authoritarian regimes. Flawed democracies have adopted liberal democratic institutions and 
have, to be optimistic, generated some measure of success, but continue to grapple with daily issues 
that keep their leaders preoccupied and disengaged from their people. In countries such as France, Italy 
and Greece, their flawed democracy status as defined by the 2011 Democracy Index is deteriorating as 
a result of negative economic, social and political trends, while overall, of the 13 countries that 
experienced a regime change in 2010, 11 suffered regression.  
 
Only Ghana and Mali had their statuses upgraded from hybrid regimes to a flawed democracy rating. 
Currently, Ghana and Mali have a democracy score of 6.02 and 6.01 respectively, while Hong Kong 
(China), a hybrid regime, has a democracy score of 5.92.  These figures demonstrate the close quarters 
between what Western standards of governance term acceptable and what they view as intolerable. 
Diamond (2002) points to the same argument of which this study has presented on the previous page, 
by stating that the ‘empirical reality... is a lot messier” (Diamond 2002:21), and it is becoming 
increasingly more difficult to try classify what democracy is and what it is not. Even when a country 
holds, what the procedural standard terms a democratic election; many countries in the hybrid regime 
category fail to meet the substantive tests that follow.  
 
Be that as it may, hybrid regimes such as Russia, where the electorate have chosen to support their 
current regime, as pointed out in Chapter 4, are still classified as unacceptable or intolerable forms of 
government by the West. According to Western notions of democracy, it is better to be classified as a 
flawed democracy as opposed to a hybrid regime. That is, it is better to suffer under a regime in which 
rising nationalism and mass deportations in France; failing economies and decreasing standards of 
living in most of Western Europe; and in which an executive still continues to exercise influence over 
its judiciary and legal functions by virtue of power to appoint judges in Mali, is better than being under 
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a regime in which electorates have demonstrated their content with such an ‘oppressive’ form of 
governance.
16
  
Are hybrid regimes actually authoritarian regimes in disguise, does this make them any worse at 
governing their people than many flawed democracies are and does this show that political culture 
plays a large role in the acceptance of a regime type, despite Western definitions of what is good and 
bad? Many hybrid regimes have been pressured to “adopt, or at least to mimic, the democratic form... 
[making] all hybrid regimes in the world today...pseudo-democratic in that the existence of formally 
democratic political institutions...masks the reality of authoritarian domination” (Diamond 2002:24). If 
so and to answer the remaining two questions, if high levels of happiness determine the extent to how 
far democracy has infiltrated into a society, then it can be argued that in the cases of Russia and China, 
hybrid regimes are just as democratic than as flawed democracies are.  
 
Moreover, it shows that political culture plays an extensive role in determining what creates happiness, 
and ultimately, what makes a regime acceptable, despite external opinions. Of the 26 countries that are 
classified as full democracies, the majority originate from North America and Western Europe, while 
the other full democracies have deep historical ties and thus an affiliation with the West. Throw flawed 
democracies into this mix and one would be able to argue that they are so because of political and to a 
large extent economic necessity. Here, it must be asked, but what of social necessity? Would South 
Africa have ended apartheid were it not for increasing external pressure? History boasts a string of 
instances in which majorities were oppressed by an ethnic minority who believed that their cause was 
legitimate.  
 
Similarly, would Chile’s march towards a democratic transition have transpired if increasing 
opposition, most particularly from the international community had not existed? Only 56 percent of the 
Chilean population voted against Pinochet’s presidential extension in the country’s 1988 referendum - 
a far cry from an overwhelming majority. In another instance, would the 2011 Egyptian Revolution 
have taken place if the electorate critically held a transition towards liberal democracy more in light 
with its processes than what they did as an ideal? Would they have still been willing to overthrow a 
government if they knew it would weaken security, slow economic progress, decrease standards of 
living and ultimately generate an overwhelming sense of disillusionment?  
 
                                                          
16
 The Pew Research Centre in Washington D.C conducted a survey and found that eighty-six percent of the Chinese 
population were satisfied with their government despite the 2010 Democracy Index ranking Hong Kong as a hybrid regime.  
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In all these instances and more, the social commitment towards building a democratic society is 
imperative. A weakness in this factor will prevent even the most efficient democratic institutions and 
praise worthy regimes from reaching democratic consolidation. The most recent trend towards 
democracy, as marked in Huntington’s (1991) third wave, appears to be followed by the development 
of just as many pseudo-democracies. While countries are still being pressured to democratise, the 
process is producing defunct and deformed versions of what the liberal democratic recipe requires. If 
one observes Huntington’s (1991) wave analysis, what stands out are the actions carried out by 
individuals and the sentiment towards their state of being that changed the status quo. In other words, 
it was how they felt towards the West and ultimately towards liberal democracy that led to reverse 
waves.  
 
If enough happiness was generated, Huntington (1991) would not have observed reverse waves and 
this study would be irrelevant. Thus, because there exists such a large amount of anti-democratic 
sentiment, then in relative terms, it can be argued that levels of happiness are low; and if this has to be 
juxtaposed to Huntington’s (1991) analysis, it can be deduced that the 21st century is currently 
experiencing a reverse wave. This study, can justify this argument by the examples presented in 
Chapter 3. It has been demonstrated that for each factor leading to a reverse wave, a contemporary 
example currently existed. But again, that is the theoretical aspect of the topic. However, Chapter 4 
introduced a more contextual viewpoint and highlighted the importance of what can for the purposes 
of this study, be termed the human element.  
 
While an economic recession, for example, can lead to a reverse wave, it is ultimately caused when 
standards of living decrease, people become dissatisfied and seek out alternative measures or 
governments in an attempt to regain what they have lost. In other instances, insurgencies and terrorist 
attacks take place because those involved feel that their actions are justified in light of what they 
perceived to be severe oppression, but does this make those who do not subscribe to Western values 
bad or inferior? As previously discussed, if political culture dictates an alternative form of government 
under which greater levels of happiness can be achieved, then implementing liberal democracy into 
such a society would only increase levels of unhappiness. Thus, liberal democracy as an ideal is a far 
cry from its realistic persona is and thus requires a level of commitment that only a few nations have 
been able to achieve.  
Political culture remains the final obstacle for liberal democracy to overcome in so far as reverse 
waves occur not because democracy is intrinsically flawed, but because of the contrasting natures’ of 
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the societies in which it is placed. And, in the 21st century in which societies have been given the 
greatest of opportunity to express their identities and lay legitimate claim to them, a reverse wave is 
most likely to take place or already exists. Liberal democracy has granted a large majority of the world 
freedom of expression, but in no way should theorists or rulers for that matter; expect those opinions, 
as expressed by freer societies to be entirely supportive of liberal democracy. Therefore, liberal 
democracy, by its own virtue has given everyone a voice.  
 
These expressions, regardless of whether they promote or oppose liberal democracy, should be heard.  
Again, it is why it is suggested that liberal democracy is not inherently flawed, because these voices 
are being acknowledged, and it is through such recognition that the increase in anti-democratic rhetoric 
is being noticed. Admitting that there is a lack of political culture in many democracies, is an indicator 
that liberal democracy as a political ideology is once more backsliding, or will at some point in time in 
the near future.  The historical trajectory of liberal democracy, as laid out by Huntington (1991) has 
not changed its course and will enter into another reverse wave, so why not now? Why can it not be 
argued that the current political order is in its latest reverse wave? And what will happen when that 
reverse wave enters into its trough?  
 
If we find ourselves afraid of a third world war, of a nuclear holocaust, of an economic recession or 
revolution, we are only to remind ourselves of the current war on terror, of growing inter-state 
conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Georgia, of the al-Shabaab rebels in Sudan, of North Korea’s 
nuclear testing, of the 2008 stock market crash, the economic collapse of many European and Western 
countries and of course, the Egyptian, the Libyan and Tunisian revolutions that have taken place in 
2011. These instances are only a handful of examples that point towards the existence of a third 
reverse wave.  The question is: Can scholars continue to argue that the theories as brought forward by 
Huntington (1991 and 1996), juxtaposed with the comparative examples which have been highlighted 
in this study, serve not as a predictive model for the future and present position of liberal democracy?  
 
 
As this study seeks to continue with Huntington’s (1991) wave analysis, then it can be assumed that 
liberal democracy, by its own law will experience a fourth wave in which this Western ideology will 
once more serve as a dominating force. Again, anti-democratic sentiment will be crushed by new 
democratic transitions and growing numbers of full democracies. In such an instance, there is little 
concern, and one must simply allow liberal democracy to run its course. There is another argument 
however, and that is the rise of a non-Western hegemon, of a political alternative, one that will 
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override all liberal democratic practices and end the long-standing rule of the West. Huntington 
(1996A) has on more than one occasion been proven wrong, and similarly, been proven right.  
 
Huntington’s (1991) wave theory may serve as a predictive model, thus aligning itself with the former 
assumption. However, his argument in The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order 
(1996A) would be more suitable to align itself with the latter argument. Both instances are possible; to 
say which one is more likely however is complex. There is a third alternative, perhaps a combination 
of Huntington’s theories. The strength of the West will decline and also liberal democracy, while a 
non-Western civilisation will become more influential on the international political arena. In this 
instance, liberal democracy will continue to operate in those countries in which it is conducive, while 
greater tolerance to non-democratic states will be granted under the protection and growing influence 
of the non-Western power.   
 
The argument which Huntington (1991) presented in The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late 
Twentieth Century (1991) remain a relevant theoretical framework in the contemporary era in so far as 
a third wave reversal has been identified by using the factors that Huntington (1991) applies. Similarly, 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (1996A) has offered a 
space in which this study can affirm the relevance of culture with regards to the success or failure of 
liberal democracy. Overall, the dominant theories provided by Huntington (1991) and (1996A) which 
have been applied in this study, have strengthened the debate that liberal democracy is indeed 
experiencing a third wave reversal, this time as a result political culture and its effect on rigid political 
institutions.  
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